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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
SOFT POWER AS THE NEW NORM:
HOW THE CHINESE-RUSSIAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP (SOFT) BALANCES
AMERICAN HEGEMONY IN AN ERA OF UNIPOLARITY
by
Chaka Ferguson
Florida International University, 2011
Miami, Florida
Professor Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Major Professor
This study explores how great powers not allied with the United States formulate
their grand strategies in a unipolar international system. Specifically, it analyzes the
strategies China and Russia have developed to deal with U.S. hegemony by examining
how Moscow and Beijing have responded to American intervention in Central Asia. The
study argues that China and Russia have adopted a soft balancing strategy of to indirectly
balance the United States at the regional level. This strategy uses normative capabilities
such as soft power, alternative institutions and regionalization to offset the overwhelming
material hardware of the hegemon.
The theoretical and methodological approach of this dissertation is neoclassical
realism. Chinese and Russian balancing efforts against the United States are based on
their domestic dynamics as well as systemic constraints. Neoclassical realism provides a
bridge between the internal characteristics of states and the environment which those
states are situated. Because China and Russia do not have the hardware (military or
economic power) to directly challenge the United States, they must resort to their
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software (soft power and norms) to indirectly counter American preferences and set the
agenda to obtain their own interests. Neoclassical realism maintains that soft power is an
extension of hard power and a reflection of the internal makeup of states.
The dissertation uses the heuristic case study method to demonstrate the efficacy of soft
balancing. Such case studies help to facilitate theory construction and are not necessarily
the demonstrable final say on how states behave under given contexts. Nevertheless, it
finds that China and Russia have increased their soft power to counterbalance the United
States in certain regions of the world, Central Asia in particular. The conclusion explains
how soft balancing can be integrated into the overall balance-of-power framework to
explain Chinese and Russian responses to U.S. hegemony. It also suggests that an
analysis of norms and soft power should be integrated into the study of grand strategy,
including both foreign policy and military doctrine.
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CHAPTER I
A NEW (SOFT) BALANCING ACT
Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War nearly two decades ago, scholars and policymakers
have debated how great powers would respond to an era of American unipolarity. The
collapse of the Soviet Union ended the bipolar rivalry between East and West and left the
United States as the undisputed hegemonic power on the planet. A number of scenarios
were presented after the Cold War – some sobering, others more auspicious – to address
this unique moment in world history. Some worried (or hoped) that the United States
would be able stride the world as Gulliver unbound, pursuing its foreign policies in a
unilateralist fashion. The world’s great powers had no choice but to kowtow to the
Washington consensus or be left in its wake.1 Others predicted that disaffected great
powers not allied with Washington would form balancing coalitions against the United
States in an attempt to return the international order to one of multipolarity.2 Still others
suggested that great powers would willingly accept Washington’s lead if they were
allowed to partake in the public goods generated by the liberal international order
established after World War II. Indeed, scholars of similar theoretical persuasions have
supported and opposed the hypotheses outlined above. For example, some realists
1

For the strongest argument on this front, see Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign
Affairs 70, no. 1, (1990-91): 23-33; Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment Revisited,” The
National Interest, Winter (2002-2003): 5-17; William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,”
International Security 24, no. 1, (Summer 1999): 5-41; Michael Mastanduno, “Preserving the Unipolar
Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War,” International Security 21, no. 4,
(Spring, 1997): 49-88.
2

Kenneth Waltz, “Structural Realism After the Cold War,” International Security 25, no. 1, (December
1997): 5-41; Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States’
Unipolar Moment,” International Security 31, no. 2, (Fall 2006): pp 7-41.
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support the contention that balancing is unlikely against the United States in the near
future, whereas other realists cite recent behavior by some great powers as evidence of
nascent balancing strategies.3
The present study wades into this contentious debate concerning great power
strategic reactions to American hegemony. The main question posed here is how will
great powers not allied with the United States formulate their grand strategies in a
unipolar international system? In other words, will they bandwagon with the United
States or attempt to balance American hegemony or some combination of both? Will
conflict or cooperation define their overall relations with the United States? Will they
seek to return the system to one of multipolarity or are they satisfied with the stability
provided under American hegemonic leadership? Moreover, from a theoretical and
analytical standpoint, what are the major causal determinants of great power behavior in a
unipolar system? Are they mainly exogenous or endogenous? Which theoretical
frameworks can best explain such complexity? And finally, will the study of great power
behavior under unipolarity contribute new insights to International Relations theory?
To start with the last question first, the answer is yes. A hegemonic system
provides a unique opportunity to analyze how great powers will react to extreme
3

For example, see G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth, “Introduction:
Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences,” World Politics 61, no. 1 (Jan. 2009): 1-27;
Stephen Walt, “Alliances in a Unipolar World,” World Politics, 61, no. 1 (Jan. 2009): 86-120 and William
C. Wohlforth, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” World Politics 61, no. 1 (Jan.
2009): 28-57; John G. Ikenberry, ed., America Unrivaled: The Future of Balance of Power, (New York:
Cornell University Press, 2002); T.V. Paul, “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy,” International
Security 30, no. 1, (summer 2005): 46-71; Robert Pape, “Soft Balancing Against the United States,”
International Security, 30, no. 1, (summer 2005): 7-45; T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michael Fortmann,
eds., Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University
Press, 2004); Kai He and Huiyun Feng, “If Not Soft Balancing, Then What? Reconsidering Soft Balancing
and U.S. Policy Toward China,” Security Studies 17, no. 2, (2008): 363–395; Stephen Walt, Taming
American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005).
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imbalances of power. Traditional International Relations theory focused on the role of
alliances and arms buildups to prevent the rise of a hegemonic power. However, little has
been written about balancing against an actual hegemon, and current theory is weak in
explaining or predicting what happens when the balance of power breaks down and a
state achieves hegemony. The current study hopes to help fill that void.
Consistent with the theoretical tradition or realism, I argue that great powers not
allied with Washington are likely to balance against U.S. hegemony and have, in fact,
begun to do so. Unlike previous eras, great power balancing in the current unipolar
system is likely to use indirect measures to ward off hegemonic ambitions. Traditional
defensive alliances and internal arms buildups are ineffective strategies in a system where
the sole hegemonic power’s material capabilities far outstrip those of all its nearest
competitors combined. Therefore, great powers that view America’s globalizing
influence as a threat or constraint must adopt alternative strategies to insulate themselves
from U.S. imperium. Thus, this study argues, the grand strategy likely to be adopted by
great powers not allied with the United States will be one of “soft balancing.”4 A soft
balancing strategy adopts indirect means or “low level efforts” such as the formation of
limited diplomatic coalitions, ententes, regional alignments and use of international
institutions to restrain hegemonic power.5
The aim of my study, then, is two-fold: the first objective is to identify and
explain the causal determinants that drive great powers – in this case China and Russia –

4

See Robert Pape, “Soft Balancing Against the United States;” Paul, “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S.
Primacy;” and Robert Art, “Striking the Balance” International Security 30, no, (Winter 2005-06): 177185.
5

Pape, “Soft Balancing Against the United States.”
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to soft balancing. The second interrelated goal is to improve realist theory by including
variables often neglected by realist scholars, specifically normative or soft power
capabilities, into the realist framework.6 In a hegemonic system, norms can be viewed as
one of three pillars that uphold world order – the other two are military and
political/economic pillars. The latter two “material” capabilities are necessary for the
former, but the former reinforces the latter in a feedback loop, a point generally
recognized by Gramscian and liberal theorists of hegemony, but largely neglected by
realists.7 The thrust of my argument is that the structure of the international system is the
main determinant of great power behavior, but the system must include a third dimension
of capabilities, which are normative. The insertion of normative capabilities might seem
an odd addition to realism, but it is an important rectification that will lead to many
insights about state behavior in contemporary international politics. For example,
Mesbahi has shown that norms function within a third social domain of capabilities
separate from, but interrelated with, military and economic dimensions at the strategic
6

For strong arguments of realism’s failure to address normative issues, see Stefano Guzzini, “Structural
Power: The Limits of Neorealist Power Analysis,” International Organization 47, no. 3, (Summer 1993):
443-478; Jennifer Sterling-Folker, “Realism and the Constructivist Challenge: Rejecting, Reconstructing or
Rereading,” International Studies Review 4, no. 1, (Spring 2002): 73-79; Ken Booth, “Security in
Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice,” International Affairs 67, no. 3, (July 1991): 527-545;
For a major treatment on this topics, see Robert Keohane, ed., Neorealism and its Critics, (New York:
Columbia University, 1986). The Liberal tradition of International Relations has taken the lead in dealing
with the concept of normative or “soft” power. See Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in
World Politics, (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).
7

For liberal conceptions, see G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and The
Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001) and Robert
Keohane, After Hegemony, (Princeton University Press, 1984); for Gramscian views see Stephen Gill, ed.,
Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations, (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1993) and Robert W. Cox and Timothy J. Sinclair, Approaches to World Order, (Cambridge, U.K.:
Cambridge University Press, 1996); for a constructivist stance, see John G. Ruggie, Winning the Peace:
America and World Order in the New Era, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). This point is
also made in the emerging field of critical geopolitics. See Mehdi Parvizi Amineh and Henk Houweling,
Central Eurasia in Global Politics: Conflict, Security and Development, (Boston: Brill NV, 2004).
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level.8 These dynamics work symbiotically, he argues, but can be analyzed separately.
However, triangulating these concepts requires a synthesis of theory into a coherent
framework, something which an eclectic approach can accomplish.9
Specifically, this study explores the strategies China and Russia have developed
to deal with U.S. hegemony by examining how the two great powers have responded to
American intervention in Central Asia. In general, realism anticipates that great powers
not aligned with a hegemonic power will seek to balance it, especially if a hegemonic
power encroaches territorially.10 One way to achieve some measure of independence in a
unipolar world is the creation of regional spheres of influence as a buffer to hegemonic
encroachment. Under hegemony, the fear of encirclement is exacerbated by the
projection of soft power because a hegemonic system is one of rule rather than one
simply of brute force. 11 In other words, “as a world-system wide phenomenon,

8

The theoretical and analytical frameworks developed in this study were influenced by, and adapted from,
Mesbahi’s research on the normative dimensions of state power, particularly in American-Iranian relations.
See Mohiaddin Mesbahi, “Public Diplomacy, Power and Normative Challenges,” paper presented at
International Conference on Bridging the Divide Between the United States and Muslim World Through
Arts and Ideas: Possibilities and Limitations,” June 6-7, 2009, New York University. Also see Mesbahi,
“The Iranian Islamic Revolution and the International System: 30 Years of Mutual Impact,” paper
presented at The Islamic Revolution 30 Years After, Sharif University, Tehran, December 22-23, 2008;
Mohiaddin Mesbahi, “Iran and Central Asia: Paradigm and Policy,” Central Asian Survey 23, no. 2, (June
2004): 109-139; Mesbahi, “Iran's Foreign Policy Towards Russia, Central Asia and the Caucasus,” in John
L. Esposito and R.K. Ramazani, eds., Iran at the Crossroads, (New York: Palgrave, 2001).
9

Mesbahi, Mohiaddin, “Central Eurasia in Global Politics: Conflict, Security, and Development by Mehdi
Parvizi Amineh and Henk Houweling.” Slavic Review 65, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 179-180.
10

David J. Myers, Regional Hegemons: Threat Perception and Strategic Response, (Boulder, Colo.:
Westview Press, 1991); John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: W.W.
Norton & Company, 2001). There are exceptions to this: some realists argue that maritime great powers,
unlike their continental counterparts, are not likely to face balancing coalitions. See Jack S. Levy and
William R. Thompson, “Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States Ally Against the Leading Global
Power?” International Security 35, no. 1, (Summer 2010): 7-43.
11

As Joseph Nye notes, soft power can lead to attraction or repellence of the hegemon’s political and
normative agenda. See “Foreword,” in Watanabe Yasushi and David L. McConnell, eds., Soft Power

5

hegemony denotes a unipolar structure of capability matched by a unipolar structure of
influence.”12 Unlike previous great powers, which faced military and economic
challenges,13 China and Russia also face normative challenges from the United States.
The normative dimension is a crucial variable in understanding responses to American
hegemony because it links domestic factors to systemic level structures and is the crux of
a soft balancing strategy.
For example, Russian foreign policy vis-à-vis the United States is shaped by both
the internal characteristics of the Russian polity and American capabilities. Regardless of
political ideology, members of the Russian foreign policy elite have advocated for a
multipolar international system.14 However, whether elites believe that this objective
could be achieved by cooperating with, or competing against, the United States is based
partly on the values of those in power. For example, the so-called Euro-Atlanticist school
of Russian foreign policy embraced the values of a Western model of development and
eventual rapprochement with the United States after the dissolution of the Soviet Union,
whereas the neo-Euro-Asian school valued the reassertion of the Russian state as a pole

Superpowers: Cultural and National Assets of Japan and the United States, (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe,
2008).
12

David Wilkinson, “Unipolarity Without Hegemony,” International Studies Review 1, no. 2 (1999): 142.

13

Paul Kennedy’s magisterial work, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, demonstrates the role of
material capabilities in the international system. However, Kennedy’s work, like many before him, focused
on bipolar and multipolar systems, where emphasis on material capabilities is paramount. The gap between
relative strength of the great powers in those systems is not large, and therefore, traditional balancing
methods were adopted. In a unipolar system, there is a gulf between the capabilities of the superpower and
the other great powers. See Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military
Conflict from 1500 to 2000, (New York: Random House, 1987).
14

Mohiaddin Mesbahi, “Russian Foreign Policy and Security in Central Asia,” Central Asian Survey 12,
no. 2, (1993): 181-215.
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of power to balance the West.15 Similar to Russian foreign policy, Chinese relations with
the United States have a domestic dimension to them as well. Akin to the neo-Euro-Asian
school in Russia, “many Chinese increasingly fear [that the United States] will not just
seek to contain China’s foreign policies, but will also actively seek to convert China’s
society and polity in America’s own image.”16
To be sure, how China and Russia perceive norms they consider to be Western or
American colors their responses to U.S. hegemony; however, these concerns are the
outgrowth of U.S. military and economic might, as realists maintain, not the norms in and
of themselves.17 Similar Western norms are advocated by smaller European states, which
are of little strategic concern to Russia and China. Nevertheless, the normative
component of hegemony becomes increasingly significant because of the ability of the
superpower to project its domestic ideology on a universal plane. The projection can be
demonstrated by the U.S. promotion of the so-called “Colored Revolutions” in Central
Asia and the Caucasus in the mid-2000s. These “revolutions” clearly disturbed China,
Russia and the autocratic rulers of the smaller Central Asian states, who perceive the
advancement of Western notions of democracy and human rights a threat to their rule.18

15

Mesbahi, “Russian Foreign Policy and Security in Central Asia,” 185 and Mohiaddin Mesbahi,
“Regional and Global Powers and the International Relations of Central Asia” in Adeed Dawisha and
Karen Dawisha, eds., The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, (New York:
M.E. Sharpe, 1995).

16

Peter Hays Gries, “Forecasting U.S.-China Relations, 2015,” Asian Security 2, no. 1, (2006): 75. Also see
Yizhou Wang, “China’s State Security in a Time of Peaceful Development: A New Issue on Research
Agenda,” China & World Economy 15, no. 1, (2007): 77-86.

17

For an opposing viewpoint on the causative role of norms in state behavior, see John Gerard Ruggie,
“What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge,”
International Organization 52, no. 4, (Autumn 1998): 855-885.

18

Stephen Blank, “U.S. Interests in Central Asia and their Challenges,” Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of
Post-Soviet Democratization 15, no. 3, (Summer 2007): 312-334; Eugene Rumer, “The United States and
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Until recently, realism largely has failed to address the distribution of normative
capabilities across the international system and how this capability affects great power
relations.19 As outlined above, rectifying this negligence requires the inclusion of
domestic variables such as identity and political ideology because a hegemonic power
will seek to remake other states in its own image.20 Indeed, classical realists readily
recognized the importance of ideas, and structural realists were not completely indifferent
to them, although neither incorporated or integrated them into their theories. Hans
Morgenthau noted the “cultural” component of imperialism; E.H. Carr wrote about the
“harmony of interests” a great power sought to achieve by projecting its interests onto the
system; Kenneth Waltz viewed the “white man’s burden” to “civilize” native peoples as a
Western ploy to achieve its hegemony in the developing world; Robert Gilpin argued a
major objective of states was to increase their influence over each other to fulfill
“political, economic, and ideological interests [emphasis added]”; and John Mearsheimer
recognized the power of nationalism as an ideology.21 As Murielle Cozette maintains,

Central Asia: In Search of a Strategy,” in Central Asia: Views from Washington, Moscow and Beijing,
(Armonk, N.Y: ME Sharpe, 2007) and Dmitri Trenin, “Russia and Global Security Norms,” The
Washington Quarterly 27, no. 2, (Spring 2004): 63-77.
19

For some of the more trenchant criticisms of realism’s inability to adequately incorporate domestic
factors such as identity and ideology into its framework and still remain “realist” see Jeffrey W. Legro and
Andrew Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?” International Security 24, no. 2 (Autumn, 1999): 5-55;
and John A. Vasquez, “The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An
Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz’s Balancing Proposition,” American Political Science
Review 91, no. 4, (Dec. 1997): 899-912. On the problem of realism’s lack of a social dimension, see John
Gerard Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together?” and Sterling-Folker, “Realism and the
Constructivist Challenge.” The author argues that realism can, and should, incorporate domestic factors
into its paradigm. Neoclassical realists have made a strong case for this position, which is dealt with below
and more thoroughly in Chapter 2.
20

Robert Jervis, “The Remaking of a Unipolar World,” The Washington Quarterly 29, no. 3, (2005): 7-19.

21

Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973); E.H. Carr, The Twenty
Years’ Crisis: 1919-1939, (New York: Palgrave, 1981); Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics,
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realists understand the importance of ideas: “but were cautious of cloaking interests in a
guise of moral principles. … While not providing a precise vision of the future of
humankind, realism certainly recognizes that meaningful political action is always
infused by something that transcends pure power politics; that is, by an ideal for which to
stand, and a belief that it can be realized, however imperfectly.”22 Despite an awareness
of norms, identities and ideas, realism largely neglected ideational or normative factors
except in an ad hoc manner.23 However, critics of realism’s indifference to norms have
been generally aimed at structural or neorealism.24
Although cloaking interests in moral principles is a valid concern, soft power is
not incompatible with the tradition. Joseph Nye, who introduced the concept of “soft
power” to mainstream International Relations scholarship, argues that there is no conflict
between realism and soft power and that concept goes at least as far back as Machiavelli,
if not further.25 The concept of “soft” or “normative” power, according to Nye, fell out

(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1981): 24; John Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe
After the Cold War,” International Security 15, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 5-56.
22

Murielle Cozette, “What Lies Ahead: Classical Realism on the Future of International Relations,”
International Studies Review 10, no. 4 (2008): 678.

23

Although realists generally have not integrated norms into their theoretical frameworks, “most realists
recognize states are not simply motivated by considerations of the balance of power of relative capabilities.
They also pursue distinct normative or ideological agendas, usually in response to domestic political
factors, which might include spreading religion, championing the rights of the oppressed or furthering a
particular political cause. However, in practice, most states have proved ‘rational’ in the sense that they are
keenly aware of structural distribution of power in the system, and do not pursue their normative agendas at
the expense of their vital national interests,” writes Adrian Hyde-Price in “A ‘tragic-actor’? A Realist
Perspective on ‘Ethical Power Europe,’” International Affairs, 84, no. 1 (2008): 3.

24

Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” International Security 20, no.
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of the realist framework as a result of neorealism’s attempts to make power measurable
for their structural judgments.26 “Power was reduced to measurable, tangible resources. It
was something that could be dropped on your foot or on cities, rather than something that
might change your mind about wanting to drop anything in the first place.”27 Indeed,
Chinese diplomats have recognized potential of soft power throughout the millennia.
From the Qing dynasty to Mao and into the modern day, China has maintained an “active
cultural diplomacy” toward other nations.28
To address the limitations of the classical and neorealist approach to power
politics, I utilize a neoclassical realist framework to help explain Chinese and Russian
responses to American hegemony.29 The theory most closely aligned with the study of
power politics continues to be realism (both in its classical and structural guises) and this
study takes the position that realism still provides the best explanations for interstate
relations, although it must be reoriented or readapted to specific systemic configurations
and contemporary contexts. Systemic structure continues to drive great power behavior;
however, neoclassical realism argues specific great power responses and policies derive
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their hue not only from system polarity, but global norms and regional and domestic
dynamics as well. As Brian Rathburn notes, “Anarchy in structural realism provides
strong incentives for states to accumulate power, but we cannot understand power
without reference to what happens within states and how people think and what they
believe.”30
Realism, specifically its “neo” variant, long has neglected the role of non-material
capabilities and human agency, which has contributed to the misjudgments made by
many neorealists after the Cold War.31 The crude version of hegemony adopted by
realists also has limited the efficacy of realist theory in explaining state behavior in a
unipolar world, where global norms can be more threatening than armies and navies.
Robert Jervis makes this case when he points out that a hegemonic project goes
beyond simple material dominance; hegemony has ideological or normative as well as
economic and military components. “For the United States, the frontier is ideological
rather than geographic, but the basic point is the same: preservation of a desirable and
ordered zone requires taming or subduing areas and ideologies of potential
disturbance.”32 The reverse of this logic runs true as well. If ideology or norms are an
important element in establishing hegemony, they could be important in de-establishing
hegemony as well. From this standpoint, soft balancing becomes a viable strategy to
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restrain hegemonic ambitions when great powers cannot match the material might of the
hegemonic power. In fact, adding norms to the repertoire of great power capabilities does
not undermine the realist paradigm, but rather enhances it. As Mesbahi notes, realism
can be “enriched” by including soft power as a capability, which can have an
incommensurate qualitative affect as a multiplier of hard power.33
Problem
As mentioned earlier in the document, one goal of my research project is to
determine the causal mechanism that shape great power reactions in a unipolar system.
The contention put forth in this study is that great powers not allied with the United
States will favor a “soft balancing” strategy to balance American power rather than
bandwagon. Such a strategy uses low level or indirect measures to restrain American
power by focusing on the political and normative dimensions of hegemony. In addition,
states adopting a soft balancing posture are likely to create or utilize regional spheres of
influence as a buffer to U.S. hegemonic reach. In a unipolar era, regions could be
considered “poles of power” where great powers can coordinate to fend off hegemonic
interventions.34 The end of the Cold War and rise of American unipolarity also led to the
formation of “regional security complexes,” which provide actors greater autonomy and
more room for maneuver in a hegemonic system.35 In fact, regions can be viewed as
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balancing mechanisms distinct from traditional alliance politics.36 Soft balancing also can
occur in a military context when states adopt tactics that seek to indirectly offset U.S.
supremacy through denial of forward basing rights through diplomatic means, hindering
American command and control capabilities by targeting satellites, and politically
constraining American maneuverability through institutions such as the UN Security
Council and regional organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
Why China and Russia
China and Russia provide an opportune case to test great power reactions to
hegemony, specifically the concept of soft balancing. Both are considered great powers
and rank among the largest states in the world in traditional great power metrics: military
spending, population, GDP, territory and influence. Neither state is ally or enemy of
Washington. Explaining their behavior has been problematic because, although they are
status quo powers, neither is integrated into the Western world order. Indeed, their
position in the Western order could be deemed “non-fraternal”37 and they are considered
by some as “fellow travelers out of the periphery” of Western power.38 Furthermore, the
study of great powers is still important for contemporary International Relations because
they are largely responsible for setting the rules of engagement in global politics.
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China and Russia also provide a suitable test case for soft balancing because their
reactions to American hegemony are disputed and could be subject to falsifiability,
although such a goal is not easily achievable in a case study.39 Some scholars argue that
the two great powers are not balancing U.S. hegemony whereas others maintain that the
strategy is one of “soft bandwagoning” or hedging rather than balancing.40 A major
problem, however, is that many analyses of Sino-Russian relations are theoretically or
analytically incoherent. Many theorists simultaneously argue that Russia and China have
joined forces to counterbalance the United States, but that they are not actually balancing
the United States. Regional specialists also are at odds over whether the Sino-Russo
partnership in Central Asia constitutes balancing or some other behavior.41 For example,
regional and area specialists have identified consistent behavior by China and Russia to
oppose U.S. policies in Central Asia (and other regions of the world), yet deny any larger
phenomenon is at work. In fact, some of their own analyses contain antipodal views on
Chinese and Russian behavior.42

39

The term “reactions” is used in this context because it is relatively neutral. Reactions to American
hegemony can be positive or negative (depending on the reference of an actor) or there could be no reaction
at all. Reactions can range from hard balancing to inaction.

40

Rosemary Foot, “Chinese Strategies in a U.S.-Hegemonic Global Order: Accommodating and Hedging,”
International Affairs 82, no. 1 (2006): 77-94.

41

Albrecht Rothacher, “Allying with an Axis of Evil? The Ambivalent Role of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization in Central Asia,” Royal United Services Institute 153, no. 1 (Feb. 2008): 68-73; Ingmar
Oldberg, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Powerhouse or Paper Tiger?” paper published by
Swedish Defense Research Agency, June 2007.

42

Two prominent examples of this are Alexander Lukin, The Bear Watches the Dragon: Russia’s
Perceptions of China and the Evolution of Russian-Chinese Relations since the 18th Century, (Armonk,
NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003) and Bobo Lo, Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing and the New Global
Geopolitics¸ (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008). Both books argue that China and
Russia have cooperated to constrain or counterbalance U.S. hegemony, but that such behavior should not
be considered balancing.

14

Rajan Menon’s recent report on Sino-Russo relations, for example, is indicative
of such analyses. Menon, a specialist in Russian regional policy in Central Asia, argues
that viewing strategic partnership as a reaction to “the new Cold War” amounts to
sophistry and rejects “the erroneous belief that that Russia and China have formed a de
facto anti-American alliance.”43 Yet further in the report, Menon writes that Russia and
China have used the SCO to oppose U.S. intervention in Central Asia and have joined
forces to oppose NATO expansion. More importantly, however, is Russia and China’s
security predicament in a unipolar world. “The appropriate response to such a challenge
in Moscow and Beijing’s view is for other governments to organize a multipolar order, in
which new centers of power counterbalance the lone superpower, or ‘hegemon’
[emphasis added],”44
It is generally recognized that China and Russia do not view the United States as
an existential or territorial threat; that is, neither great power expects the United States to
violate their territorial sovereignty absent some unforeseen circumstances (the same holds
true for the United States). Yet, if territorial violation were not a concern, why then
would China and Russia try to “organize a multipolar order” to “counterbalance the lone
superpower”? Again, viewing norms as a system-level capability helps to explain this
quandary. Because the United States already has established military supremacy,
Christopher Layne argues its “quest for hegemony is driven instead by an ideational,
deterritorialized conception of security divorced from the traditional metrics of great
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power grand strategy: the distribution of power in the international system and
geography.”45 In other words, the United States pursues material and ideological interests
in Central Asia and elsewhere, although from a realist viewpoint, the former outweighs
the latter. In this case, “norms or ideal interests can considerably reinforce, legitimize and
help sustain a realpolitik inclination to intervene when they are accompanied by major
material interests or proximity to [a] Great Power or its major allies.”46
Why Central Asia
A decade into the 21st century, there are only a few regions in the world that
possess the prerequisites necessary for such “soft” balancing to take place. Specifically,
great power responses to unipolarity are likely to occur in regions where a hegemonic
power has intervened as an “off-shore” balancer.”47 It is likely in these regions that great
powers outside of the Western order will challenge Washington’s diktat. One such region
is Central Asia, where great powers Russia and China have formed a “strategic
partnership,” which, at least publicly, is aimed at returning the international system to one
of multipolarity. This partnership has manifested itself in regional institutions such as the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which has evolved from a regional security
regime into a platform to reduce American influence in Central Asia. Conceivably, the
region could serve as a focal point for great power balancing in contemporary
international affairs.
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Similar to the era of the Great Game,48 contemporary Central Asia “has become
an arena where several nations hope to extend their influence, and fear the consequences
of their opponents doing so.”49 Central Asia, like the Middle East, is also a region where
great power rivalry is extant and acute, though not necessarily hostile.50 Both exogenous
and endogenous factors have shaped the formation of the region. In the case of China and
Russia, each has strategic, economic, energy and security interests in the region. Regional
dynamics, such as the threat of transnational terrorism and the “Islamic factor” have
fostered regional cooperation between China and Russia51 and the presence of U.S. troops
in the region has hardened it. As Menon points outs, “For now, there is an intersection of
interests between Russia and China because of the shared suspicion of the American
military presence in the region, symbolized by U.S. access to the Kyrgyz airbase at
Manas; the common concern about Islamic radicalism in Central Asia; and ‘the strategic
partnership’ formed in response to a U.S.-dominated unipolar world.”52 Nevertheless,
elements of cooperation exist between the three major powers and latent conflict between
China and Russia could undermine any alignment against the United States.53
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Central Asia also constitutes a “regional security complex,” defined by Buzan and
Wæver as “a set of units whose major processes of securitization, de-securitization, or
both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or
resolved apart from one another.”54 As a regional security complex, Central Asia can be
studied as an autonomous unit and serve as a test ground for soft balancing. Advocates of
soft balancing argue that the means are largely political and indirect rather than military
because of the disparity in power relations between great powers and the United States.
Another major component of soft balancing is regionalization or the creation of regional
spheres of influence. Many of these tactics have been utilized in Central Asia, where
China and Russia have tried to block Western nations and organizations from the
region.55
Organization of Study
This study has two objectives – theoretical and analytical – and the structure of
the study builds toward those goals. The introduction outlined the theoretical problems
facing the concept of “balance of power” and how this lack of cohesion has made it
difficult to explain the Sino-Russo partnership. To achieve these dual purposes, the study
attempts to merge theory and analysis. Such an approach should make the work appealing
to scholars and policy analysts.
Chapter Two discusses the theoretical tradition adopted by this study (realism)
methodology and case selection. Although the work falls largely within the realist
tradition, Chapter Two makes a case for theoretical eclecticism. In fact, neoclassical
54
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realism provides a bridge to other paradigms and methodological procedures because it
focuses on the interplay between domestic and external factors. Competing schools of
thoughts are rarely completely incommensurable and there is plenty of fruitful ground for
cross-fertilization of theories.
Chapter Three explores the concept of “balance of power” and its different
variations, including soft balancing, which is the strategy this study argues has been
adopted by China and Russia against the United States. It provides definitions of some
key concepts, such as hegemony, capabilities and power projection, and describes what
behavior could constitute balancing. Chapter Three also incorporates normative
capabilities into the balance-of-power framework, which I argued above, has been
neglected to the detriment of realist theory. Furthermore, it seeks to develop a systematic
methodology that can test for occurrences of such a strategy. This goal is necessary to
distinguish soft balancing from harder varieties and to specify the domain under which it
applies. Such a framework would help analysts as well because it could eliminate much
of the ambiguity surrounding the Chinese-Russian strategic partnership.
In Chapter Four, the study describes how Central Asia has evolved into a
“regional security complex” (RSC) since the end of the Cold War, and more recently,
following American military intervention in the region after the September 11, 2001
attacks. It maintains that the intervention of the United States in the region facilitated a
“strategic partnership” between China and Russia, which used the SCO and other
mechanisms as a counterbalance to U.S. influence. Chapter Three also focuses on the
strategic vision Beijing, Moscow and Washington have of Central Asia. Strategic vision
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involves the long-term security, military, economic and normative objectives each actor
has in the region and how those regional objectives fit in their overall global vision.56
The Chinese and Russian conception of soft power and international norms is
dealt with in Chapter Five. Beijing and Moscow have their own interpretation of
democracy and international institutions, which compete with those of the United States,
although retaining the same terminology. The struggle to define international norms can
help states achieve “milieu goals” that create an international environment conducive for
their preferences. China and Russia often work in concert within international and
regional mechanisms to balance the United States at the normative level, which is a form
of “strategic language politics.”57 Such rivalry over language follows the logic of soft
balancing, where rivalry among great powers takes place across the normative rather than
material dimension of power. Analyzing the role norms plays in the balance of power
also links the domestic to the international. The soft power China and Russia would like
to promote is a reflection of their domestic culture and vision of world order. Defining
the rules of the game is just as important as playing the game itself.
Chapter Six focuses on the specific soft balancing responses China and Russia
have adopted to counter American intervention in Central Asia. It examines how China
and Russia have used the Central Asian security complex to counterbalance the American
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presence in Central Asia. It analyzes Russian and Chinese bilateral relations with one
another, their multilateral relations with the smaller Central Asian republics, and their
influence in regional institutions such as SCO. The chapter demonstrates how states can
use regional spheres of influence as well as deploy normative measures, such as
alternative conceptions of democracy and differing institutional arrangements, to offset
ideas and ideologies that they find threatening.
In Chapter Seven, the study examines Chinese and Russian foreign policy and
military strategy from the theoretical standpoint of soft balancing. There has been a
dearth of literature the role soft balancing plays in military rivalry and this chapter seeks
to fill that vacuum. The chapter explores how China and Russia have tried to use soft
balancing to undercut U.S. military superiority without engaging American power
directly. For example, Chinese defense doctrine in regards to the United States is
predicated on the concept of “strategic denial” or “anti-access,” a goal that Russia shares.
Moreover, Chinese and Russian strategists include “soft” or “normative” power as
strategic capabilities in their military doctrines and foreign policy. Alternative norms,
such as the concept of “sovereign democracy,” allow China and Russia to deliberately
ignore human rights issues in order to achieve diplomatic advantage with respect to the
United States.
The conclusion discusses the policy implications of the new Central Asian “great
game” and the role regionalization could play in the future. Regional dynamics could
affect the balance of power in the international system. Russia and China (and to a lesser
extent Iran, India and the EU powers) each seeks a return to multipolarity and would like
to establish themselves as leaders in their respective subsystems. From a geopolitical
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standpoint, changing security relations in Central Asia could affect energy distribution in
the region (through pipeline reconfigurations, for example), the battle against Islamic
extremism and terrorism, and attempts to reduce weapons proliferation and drug
trafficking. The outcome of great power rivalry in Central Asia will have ramifications
not only for the region, but for the entire international system.
Lastly, a much more rigorously defined concept of soft balancing can help
analysts of the contemporary international system make informed decisions about foreign
and defense policy. New analytics are required to study the strategic role of language
politics in international affairs and to assess the effect of soft power on the overall
strategic balance of power. Failure to understand these new dynamics could lead to
flawed policy. Underestimating the Sino-Russo strategic partnership, for example, could
leave U.S. policymakers unprepared for the dissemination of new norms and economic
development models antithetical to Western interests. On the other hand, fears of a fullblown Chinese-Russian anti-Western alliance could cause American policymakers to
overreact diplomatically and militarily, and unnecessarily raise tensions between the
United States and a newly-formed Eurasian bloc. Such an outcome would be a selffulfilling prophecy, and indeed a tragedy of great power politics.

22

CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL OVERVIEW AND METHODOLOGY
The Role of Theory in Social Science

Despite their differences, all theories share the assumption that theory in itself is
important to understanding the world; all explanations of the world are based upon some
theoretical assumption, whether acknowledged or not. Indeed, outcomes cannot be
explained without recourse to cause and effect. Fundamentally, theories simply attempt to
demonstrate how A causes or leads to B. Explaining causation, however, does not mean
that theories can predict all outcomes. Evolutionary theory, for example, explains how
living organisms change over time, but evolutionary theory cannot predict what a specific
organism will evolve into in the future.
This study takes the position that, although theory is extremely important, it
should not straightjacket the study of social phenomena. Scholars should not be enslaved
to theory; theory should serve scholarship. Theory should not be devoid of validity or
devolve into mere abstractions; it should be applicable to the “real” world. Therefore,
sound International Relations theory must be grounded in history, geography, politics and
other social science disciplines. Theory should provide a holistic framework that helps
identify and explain patterns. Similar to a roadmap, theory is a guidepost that can direct
us, although we might not be able to see all the bumps along the way. A broader
conception of theory does not give license to pick and choose evidence that backs up our
preconceived notions about phenomena while throwing out evidence that can disconfirm
our views. Rather, we should recognize that elegant theories cannot capture all the
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complexity of social relations. To capture that complexity, this work strongly advocates
for theoretical eclecticism. Just as astrophysicists, for example, have borrowed from
quantum mechanics to improve their understanding of black holes, International
Relations theorists similarly can adopt insights from other social sciences to better
explain relations between states.
To that end, this chapter discusses the main theoretical paradigm to be used in this study,
realism, and demonstrates how realism can be improved by incorporating ideas from
other schools of thoughts.
Theoretical Approach
The theoretical and methodological approach to this study is neoclassical realism.
The neoclassical paradigm provides a sophisticated, overarching framework that can
subsume the eclectic themes enumerated in Chapter One into a streamlined explanation
of great power responses to American hegemony. Although sharing similar ontological
and epistemological assumptions, neoclassical realism was developed as a response to the
“hyperrealism” advanced by structural realists such as John Mearsheimer and Kenneth
Waltz before him.58 “Its purpose is to argue that, although the neorealist movement has
added much to our understanding of international affairs through its careful examination
of the impact of polarity on state behavior, it also has jettisoned the concern for unit
attributes and interactions that was crucial to traditional realist theory.”59
Despite some important differences, neoclassical realism holds a set of
assumptions about international politics that places it into the overall realist research

58

Schweller and Priess, “A Tale of Two Realisms.”

59

Ibid, 2.

24

program. These attributes, which all realists accept to one degree or another, constitute
the “hardcore” of the paradigm. They are: an acceptance of anarchy as the organizing
principle of the international system; a focus on the international system as a main
variable affecting state behavior; a state-centric approach; a view of international politics
as competitive; an emphasis on material factors; and an assumption that states are
egoistic and autonomous actors that pursue self-help.60
Yet there are areas where neoclassical realism clearly diverges from its brethren.
For example, neoclassical realists depart from classical realism’s strict emphasis on the
domestic origins of foreign policy and neorealism’s strict focus on systemic constraints.
These extremes, as Stephen G. Brooks points out, are the result of an overreliance on
particular aspects of human nature – aggression (classical) and fear (neo) – to generate
hypotheses. Furthermore, the adherents of classical and neorealism both assume that
states rely primarily on the use of threat of military force to secure their objectives and
concentrate solely on the balance of military capabilities.61 Neoclassical realists do not
object to these assumptions, but rather argue that states can adopt a wide range of
strategies to counter threat. Military means are a major component of statecraft, though
not always the primary option.
The limitations in neorealism’s approach to international politics were highlighted
after the Cold War. Changes in the bipolar system ushered in a new wave of complexity
that “so overwhelmed neorealism's ultra-parsimonious, structural formulation that it now
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appears more as a theoretical straightjacket than a progressive research paradigm.”62 The
main deficiency of neorealism was its inability to account for the rules that govern the
international system. These “rules” do not arise solely out of materiality, although that is
a necessary component of rule formation, but from social systems as well, an aspect of
international politics largely discounted by neorealists.63
Here, the neoclassical conception of hegemony shares much in common with
Gramscian, neo-Marxian and liberal notions, which account for the role of domestic and
international institutions to imbed norms that constrain actors.64 Peter Katzenstein, a
constructivist theorist, articulates this point when he writes: “The primary foundation of
rights and rules is in the power and interests of the dominant groups or states in a social
system.... In every social system the dominant actors assert their rights and impose rules
on lesser members in order to advance their particular interests.”65
There are several benefits for using a neoclassical realist framework to analyze
Russian and Chinese response to U.S. hegemony. First, the non-probabilistic nature of
neoclassical realism opens it to productive dialogue with non-realist paradigms.66
“Domestic politics and ideas are fair game for realism, and neoclassical realists have
taken up this mantle.”67 The challenge, however, is “to do so while remaining consistent
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with what scholars from both approaches consider their core assumptions.”68 The
problem of incommensurability is not as difficult to overcome as might seem at first
glance because there is a great deal of consonance and overlap among paradigms.
According to Mohiaddin Mesbahi, many of the disputes among paradigmatic approaches
are over terminology rather than substance:
One can, for example, defend realism, especially the traditional version, for
recognizing the ambiguity of the notion of interest and understanding the role of
the mythology of power and prestige, not just material interest, as a driving force;
or the Kantian variety of liberalism, which both assumes a certain connection
between typology/identity and behavior and the composite nature of the actor; or
Gramscian Marxism (to which critical geopolitics is indebted) for recognizing that
the role of ideas is key to hegemony and self-assertion and resistance; or
constructivism, especially the rule-oriented version that recognizes the coconstitutionality of agent and structure. A more nuanced understanding of
competing paradigms reveals fewer distinctions and more complementarity and
mutual enrichment and borrowing.69
Neoclassical realism is also similar to some neoliberal and neo-Marxist
approaches because it focuses on the interplay between systemic and domestic factors
without abandoning neorealism’s emphasis on structural constraints. Gideon Rose
describes how scholars studying the interaction between exogenous and endogenous
forces can remain realist in nature: “[Neoclassical realism] explicitly incorporates both
external and internal variables, updating and systematizing certain insights drawn from
classical realist thought. Its adherents argue that the scope and ambition of a country's
foreign policy is driven first and fore most by its place in the international system and
specifically by its relative material power capabilities. This is why they are realist. They
argue further, however, that the impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is
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indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening
variables at the unit level. This is why they are neoclassical.”70
Furthermore, neoclassical realism opens the “black box” of the state for
investigation. This is an important rectification for those who view the reification of the
state as problematic. Neoclassical and classical realists do not deny that domestic
interests groups advance their foreign policy goals by pressuring the state to formulate
and implement policies favored by particular interests. Indeed, those who capture the
helm of state are in position to decide the state’s interests. However, as realists argue,
once interests are articulated, states will pursue them the best way they can. Interests
accrete from below and then are carried out above by those autonomous “black boxes.”
Nonetheless, how states pursue interests – and whether they are obtained – is greatly
determined by their position within the international system. Although powerful domestic
lobbies can push their objectives on the state as they please, states do not always have the
willingness or capacity to carry them out.
For neoclassical realists, the state is more holistic than for advocates of structural
realism, who generally ignore domestic characteristics or utilize endogenous factors
when they see fit. Steve E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey Taliaferro describe the
more complex conception of the state as “top-down.”
Neoclassical realism acknowledges there is no universally accepted definition of
the state. Nonetheless, a starting point is Weber’s classical definition of the state
as a human community that claims the monopoly on the legitimate use of force.
Neoclassical realism presents a ‘top-down’ conception of the state, which means
systemic forces ultimately drive external behavior. The executive … is best
perceived equipped to perceive systemic constraints and deduce the national
interest. Nonetheless, while the executive is potentially autonomous from society,
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in many contexts political arrangements frequently compel it to bargain with
domestic actors (such as the legislature, political parties, economic sectors,
classes or the public as a whole) in order to enact policy or extract resources to
implement policy choices.71
The interplay between the state and society is invariably complex and the case of
China and Russia highlights such indeterminacy. The domestic bargaining among sectors
(bureaucracies, lobbies, parties, etc.) in China, Russia and the United States, however, is
beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, other domestic factors are pertinent to the
balance of power in Central Asia. Many analysts, for example, postulate that the latent
conflicts between Moscow and Beijing will eventually undermine their “strategic
partnership” and any attempts to counterbalance U.S. hegemony. The conflicts, of course,
are the result of tension between domestic and foreign interests. Russia, for instance, is
concerned about the rapid population growth of ethnic Han along its Siberian border with
China and the rise of China as an economic and military powerhouse.72 China is
increasingly concerned about potential overreliance on Russia for obtaining energy and
weapons. Nationalists within both countries are wary of the other. Yet overshadowing all
of these concerns is the specter of U.S. hegemony.
The arms trade between China and Russia illuminates the necessity of analyzing
both endogenous and exogenous factors to explain their relationship. From a neorealist
standpoint, Russia should be wary of feeding the beast by transferring advanced weapons
and platforms to the Chinese dragon. Although the domestic military industrial complex
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factors heavily into Russia’s decision to sell weaponry to China, Robert H. Donaldson
and John A. Donaldson find that identity plays an important role, too.73 They write:
“Russia’s status and identity as a superpower remain important to its conception of its
self-importance and role in the international arena. For a significant segment of the
foreign policy and security elite in Russia, fear of U.S. domination is mixed with
wounded pride and resentment … [and] China’s identity as Asia’s most important and
powerful country clashes with the goals and interests of the United States.”74
Neoclassical realism argues that domestic factors, ideas and identities do make a
difference, but are shaped by significant systemic pressures. The case of arms transfers
above is indicative of this as well. Russian and Chinese identities are fashioned largely by
their global standing in relation to the United States, and their arms trade is a result of
their relative weakness in regards to U.S. capabilities. Another example is both states’
overall grand strategies. China’s concept of “peaceful rise,” for instance, can be viewed
as a strategy to avert the disastrous outcomes of Japanese and German attempts at
hegemony during World War II. Yet, this trajectory is still dependent on outside factors,
including American opposition to Chinese desires to reunify with Taiwan.75 In the case of
Russia, alliance patterns and regional cooperation, too, result from identity shaped by
external relations. In its relations with the Muslim world, Russia, like the West, fears the
rise of Islamic radicalism. Yet tensions between Islam and the West might present Russia
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with an historical opportunity to make overtures with Muslim states in Central Asia and
the Middle East, despite the potential for a clash of civilizations. Both these examples
demonstrate the complex interplay between exogenous and endogenous factors. Realists
give greater weight to external constraints, but neither variable can be quantified by any
reliable measure, a problem that is addressed in the proceeding sections.
Selection of Case Study
The case to be evaluated is contemporary and constantly evolving. However, the
focus will be on Russian and Chinese reactions to American intervention in the region
since the September 11, 2001 attacks, which resulted in the U.S.-led war against al Qaeda
forces and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Using 9/11 as a benchmark narrows the
scope of the case to a period of about a decade, although the United States had made
initial and limited forays into the region before that point. The region will be defined as
the five former Soviet Republics of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), China and Russia. The Shanghai Cooperation
Organization is a linchpin that organizes these states into a regional security complex
(save the obscurantist and isolationist Turkmenistan, which is a non-member). Other
important extra-regional actors include SCO observers Iran, India, Mongolia and
Pakistan; and Afghanistan, the European Union and Turkey, however the policies and
interests of these states are addressed only insofar they relate directly to the ChineseRussian strategic partnership. Finally, although this study is of a contemporary case, a
brief historical overview of the region’s dynamics will be provided in the fourth chapter.
In terms of scope, this analysis is restricted to the strategic reactions of China and
Russia to the United States and does not include in depth analysis of the five smaller
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states of former Soviet Central Asia. These states have attempted to utilize the SCO and
their bilateral relations with China, Russia and the United States to leverage concessions
from each other and the great powers, but as small states, their behavior is peripheral to a
study focusing on the strategies of great powers. The interests of the smaller states,
therefore, will be analyzed largely in the context of their interaction with the three major
powers, for example, how democratization, terrorism or energy security in Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan affects the overall balance of power in the region.
The internal dynamics of the smaller states is beyond the scope of this study.
Methodology
This case study should be viewed as a heuristic project that helps to facilitate
theory construction, not necessarily the demonstrable final say on how states behave
under unipolarity. Furthermore, it adopts an eclectic approach to theorizing through the
utilization of insights from other paradigms to enhance the efficacy of realist theory.
There are strengths and weaknesses to utilizing heuristic case studies and eclectic
theoretical approaches, but overall, this study maintains that such a research program
advances our knowledge of the world, although with some important caveats.
Heuristic case studies, as Alexander George explains, are “used as a means of
stimulating the imagination in order to discern important new [emphasis in original]
general problems, identify possible theoretical solutions, and formulate potentially
generalizable relations that were not previously apparent. In other words, the case study
is regarded as an opportunity to learn more about the complexity of the problem studied,
to develop further the existing framework, and to refine and elaborate the initially
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available theory employed by the investigator in order to provide an explanation of the
particular case examined.” 76
A single case study also can be “useful for evaluating causal explanations if it is
part of a research program [and] if there are other single observations, perhaps gathered
by other researchers, against which it can be compared, it is no longer a single
observation.”77 In the case of the Chinese-Russian relationship, there is a bountiful
literature, much of it at odds, on their responses to American unipolarity, in general, and
U.S. intervention into Central Asia, in specific. There is also emerging research on the
role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in the international system. Much of the
literature on this burgeoning institution, however, has come from Chinese, Russian and
Central Asian area specialists, who have not systematically analyzed the SCO through the
contextual framework of IR theory.78 This study maintains that viewing the SCO through
the lens of IR theory could help reconcile some of the disparate and diverging views of
Chinese and Russian reactions and the role of the SCO, which range from highly alarmist
to extremely skeptical. Addressing the void of SCO analysis in IR scholarship also could
provide new theoretical and analytical tools to better understand the contemporary
international system.
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Furthermore, the study contributes to the growing debate about soft balancing.
The concept is still relatively in its early stages and there is much dispute about its
efficacy in explaining state behavior. Proponents of soft balancing argue there is a need
to flesh out its methodological concepts, provide empirical evidence of its efficacy, and
theoretically incorporate it into the overall balance of power of schema. This study
attempts to do all.
Toward Theoretical Eclecticism
Although this study mainly adheres to a neoclassical framework, it explicitly
incorporates insights from other theoretical paradigms. Peter Katzenstein, a major
proponent of theoretical eclecticism, argues that although there are risks to synthesizing
paradigms, the potential payoffs are worth it.79 “The recognition of the existence of, and
possible complementarities between, multiple research traditions holds forth the prospect
of translating the analytic languages and theoretical insights of each in the process of
improving transparadigmatic knowledge on specific substantive problems.”80
Despite some scholars’ misgivings about integrating paradigms,81 crossfertilization across different approaches can lead to productive new theory. Building a
broader conception of hegemony, for instance, can be achieved while maintaining
parsimony by synthesizing compatible elements into a new whole. On issues of ontology
and epistemology, liberalism, historical structuralism (particularly Marxism) and certain
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versions of constructivism do not diverge much from realism, despite some deep
methodological differences.82 Ontologically, for historical structuralists, liberals and
realists, material forces are the main cause of state behavior.83 Some constructivists also
view the structure of the international system as a constraint on actor behavior; although
for constructivists these structures include international norms.84 Nevertheless,
constructivists should not hold a monopoly on norms. Realists should – must – also
address the role norms play in the system.
On the role of international norms, however, an assessment of the contemporary
international scene demonstrates that the collective ideas of the major Western powers
have been a source of concern for China, Russia and other middle powers such as Iran
and Venezuela.85 “What is clear is that states have often differed in their reactions to
international rules – some accepting them, others no. Such attitudes can enhance or
undermine overall order.”86 In fact, the concept of soft balancing was developed to
explain how disaffected weaker states would respond to a hegemonic order they deemed
82

For example, although both realists and liberals view the international system as anarchic, they differ
over how much cooperation can overcome it. Realists and historical materialists generally focus on relative
gains and the distribution of wealth within a system, yet they disagree on whether the system’s main actors
are states or classes. Marxists, like realists, consider “the purpose of economic and political activity to be
the redistribution of wealth and power.” All three traditions generally privilege material forces as the driver
for social and cultural change; see Theodore H. Cohn, Global Political Economy Theory and Practice,
(New York: Longman, 2002), 121 For an extended comparison of the three major paradigms, see Michael
Doyle, Ways of War and Peace, (Norton, New York, 1997) and Cohn, Global Political Economy,
especially 76-83 and 135-138.

83

Like Marxism, there are structural and historicist renderings of realism; see R.B.J. Walker, “Realism,
Change and International Political Theory,” International Studies Quarterly 31, no. 1, (1987): 68

84

Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Relations, (Cambridge University Press, New York,
1999).

85

Michael Dodson and Manochehr Dorraj, “Populism and Foreign Policy in Venezuela and Iran,” The
Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations 9, no. 1, (Winter-Spring 2008): 71-87.

86

Jeffrey W. Legro, Rethinking World Order: Great Power Strategies and International Order, (Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005), 2.

35

unsatisfactory. In sum, neoclassical realism offers a viable framework for bridging the
philosophical gap between competing paradigms and weaving their compatible insights
into a synthetic whole.
Scope and Limitations
International Relations theory in general, and realist theory in particular, is an
ongoing process. My work is designed to be a contribution to the larger body of realist
thought by offering an explanation of the behavior of great powers under unipolarity.87 In
fact, it could be considered what Imre Lakatos referred to as a “progressive research
program.”88 Nevertheless, the study does not claim to offer a deterministic theory of
international politics, but rather a guide to how states are likely to respond to a unipolar
world structure. Although social science theory attempts to predict events, it cannot do so
in terms of numerical probabilities as the natural sciences, but only in large-scale trends
and generalizations.89 For the purposes of this study, I share the view that social sciences
must accommodate indeterminacy, irregularity and unpredictability.90 Although we may
strive for prediction, we may have to settle for less accurate forecasts. As John Lewis
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Gaddis writes, forecasts can be neither deterministic nor conditional; they are
probabilistic statements (If A, then probably B).91
The drawback of such an approach is the oft-cited problem of indeterminacy,
which is faced by many researchers.92 Suffice it to say, the social sciences, including
International Relations, are currently ill-equipped to render precise predictions about
social phenomena and such clairvoyance is highly unlikely: “There are so many
complexities and ambiguities in the foreign policy process that many influences are likely
to be found in any explanation of any particular policy shift.”93
The same largely holds true for Chinese and Russian responses to U.S. hegemony.
Different scholars have offered different causal explanations for Russian and Chinese
reactions to U.S. intervention in Central Asia, even though they generally concur on the
outcomes. The objective of this research project is to reconcile some of the disparate
explanations through a neoclassical realist conceptual framework. If such a framework
can identify a consistent pattern of behavior by China and Russia to undermine,
counterbalance or counteract U.S. ambitions in the region, then there might be a larger
phenomenon at work. The goal, then, is to determine which factors, if any, are the major
causes of Chinese and Russian behavior. Realists argue that the causes generally lie
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within the system – for example, the intervention of a hegemonic power into a region –
although they recognize outcomes are shaped by other mitigating factors. Studies of this
sort, which offer large-scale generalizations, make falsification difficult, though not
impossible. However, I concur with Paul Diesing that “disconfirmation is very useful, but
it is a limited, peripheral process that leads to modification rather than total rejection of a
theory.”94 Furthermore, if adaptations to a theory can explain more than its predecessors,
then it should be viewed as progressive.95 This is what Thomas Kuhn meant when he
wrote in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions that: “to be accepted as a paradigm, a
theory must seem better than its competitors, but it need not, and in fact never does,
explain all the facts which it can be confronted.”96
In the author’s view, this study does offer a much more comprehensive and
holistic account of great power behavior under unipolarity than recent works. There are
few analyses that systematically examine a case of purported soft balancing at the length
attempted in this study. Few works of Chinese-Russian relations adopt any explicit
theoretical orientation; and those that do give only cursory treatment in the length of a
chapter or less. Furthermore, there is a dearth of the role of norms and soft balancing
across the military dimension (Chapter Six) of state relations. The transformation of
military doctrine to include norms is beyond the scope of this study. However, it does
begin the conversation on how normative power can affect, and change, hard power and
the role soft power could play in the future of great power relations.
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CHAPTER III
SOFT BALANCING AS A HARD CONCEPT
“America acts like a pachyderm, rather than a T. rex. This beast inspires discomfort, not
existential angst.”
– Josef Joffe97

The “balance of power” is an essentially contested concept because there is no
consensus for its meaning. Yet despite the “elasticity” of the notion, the fundamental or
basic objective that underlies most balance of power abstractions involves what Dana
Zinnes describes as a “a particular distribution of power among the states of that system
such that no single state and no existing alliance has an ‘overwhelming’ or
‘preponderant’ amount of power.”98 Under Zinnes definition of balance of power, the
concept could be both strategy and/or outcome. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish
between “balancing” and “balance of power” for analytical purposes. In his theoretical
model, T.V. Paul offers a clear distinction between the two, which will be followed in
this study: “In tune with the commonly understood meanings of the terms, balancing is
viewed as a state strategy or foreign policy behavior while balance of power are regarded
as outcomes at the systemic or subsytemic levels, that is, as conditions of power
equilibrium among key states [emphasis in the original].”99
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To be sure, balancing is one of a range of possible strategies that can be adopted
by states to pursue their interests as well as a possible outcome of state behavior, whether
intentional or not. However, a strategic “balance” (or “equilibrium”) is not fated to occur,
as some neorealists are wont to argue, and states do not automatically balance against
rising power despite other factors, such as domestic politics, elite perceptions, aggressive
intentions or geography. History is replete with cases of states and polities that failed to
balance, underbalanced, remained neutral or chose other strategies such as bandwagoning
or buck-passing.100 History also shows us “that threat is not a necessary derivative of
power and that the emergence of powerful states has not always been accompanied by the
rise of a challenger or counter coalition. Consider the cases of nineteenth-century Britain,
which controlled three-quarters of the world and yet remained in ‘splendid isolation,’ as
well as the emergence of the United States as a Great Power before World War I without
the formation of a balancing alliance.”101 In other words, balance of power is not a
tautology, rather a probable, though not destined, outcome.
Consistent with the theme of this research project, this chapter utilizes the
neoclassical realist framework and draws on the theoretical eclecticism outlined in
Chapter Two to analyze and locate soft balancing within the balance of power
framework. First, it provides a review of classical and structural balance of power
theories to demonstrate that different systemic configurations generate different balance
of power logics: alliances are more suitable to multipolar systems; internal arms buildups
are more effective in bipolar systems; and soft balancing is likely the best balancing
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strategy in a unipolar system. Such an analysis can help locate state behavior along a
continuum of strategies rather than just view balancing as an either-all proposition.
Secondly, it attempts to identify the relevant exogenous and endogenous factors that
affect balancing behavior and outcomes under unipolarity. External constraints might
induce certain balancing strategies, but whether states decide to balance or not is located
in the domestic level of politics. Finally, this section examines more specifically the
literature on soft balancing and attempts to develop a methodology that can test for
occurrences of such behavior. Developing a methodology is necessary to distinguish soft
from hard balancing and specify the domain under which soft balancing applies.
Developing a third balance-of-power logic provides sound theoretical footing for
proponents of soft balancing who argue it is a distinct form of state behavior adopted by
countries such as Russia and China to counter U.S. hegemonic ambitions.
Balance of Power: An Overview
Balance of power is one of the four foundations of realist theory, whether in its
classical or structural variants.102 Classical realists such as Hans Morgenthau viewed
balance of power as a mechanism to ensure the survival of the system through
equilibrium of the units. “Consequently, it is the purpose of all such equilibrium to
maintain the stability of the system without destroying the multiplicity of the elements
composing it.”103 Similar to Morgenthau was Hedley Bull’s version of balance of power.
For Bull, balance of power logic requires only two neighboring states in anarchy seeking
to survive (what he called a “simple” or bipolar balance of power system as opposed to
102
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“complex” or multipolar balance of power system). Unlike the mechanistic view of
structural realists, Bull’s logic doesn’t necessarily presume that states are unconsciously
guided to balance due to the anarchic structure of the international system – balancing
can be either “fortuitous” or “contrived.”104 For Bull, the existence of general balance of
power serves to prevent the system from being transformed by conquest into a universal
empire; the existence of a local balance of power protects the independence of states from
absorption by a neighboring predominant power; and both the general and local balance
of power provide the conditions on which other institutions of international order depend
to exist.105 Kissinger buttresses this point when he argues that balances of power often
come about de facto based on systemic pressures, but also can be the conscious policy of
statesmen, who must “tend” or manage balances whether balancing is conscious or not.106
Neorealists, such as Kenneth Waltz, approached theory differently than their
predecessors, but their assumptions generally corresponded to those of Morgenthau and
Bull.107 Under Waltzian theory, for balance-of-power politics to prevail, only two
requirements must be met: the international order must be anarchic and states wish to
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survive.108 In a self-help system, when states face a threatening power, they will seek to
form a balancing alliance whether consciously or not. Waltz’s theory simply explains the
interests and motives of states, rather than describing what they will actually do, and
therefore offers little utility as an analytic.
Other theorists have attempted to rectify Waltz’s sparse balance-of-power theory
by adding variables or revising assumptions of state behavior under anarchy to better
predict state behavior. Offensive realists such as John Mearsheimer, for example, argue
that great powers don’t simply seek to survive in an anarchic system, but attempt to
dominate it because “survival mandates aggressive behavior” and dominance is the best
way to ensure survival.109 On the other hand, defensive realists such as Jack Snyder
maintain that great powers are more secure when they refrain from power maximization
and seek to defend the status quo.110
Stephen Walt formulated a “balance of threat” theory by adding “intent” to the
traditional metrics of economic strength, military power and population size in
determining balancing outcomes. “States that are viewed aggressively are likely to
provoke others to balance against them,” Walt suggests.111 Walt’s addition of “intent”
resolves some of the existing anomalies in balance of power theory by explaining why
great powers did not initially balance against the United States after the end of the Cold
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War.112 In the specific case of the United States, Walt writes: “The anomaly of states
failing to balance U.S. power vanishes when we focus not on power but on threats
[emphasis in original]. Although the United States is enormously powerful relative to
other states, it has not been perceived as a major threat by most other powers.”113
Other factors also played a role in limiting balancing against the United States; its
geographic isolation relative to other great powers has made it difficult for the U.S. to
engage in territorial expansionism; and because other great powers lie in close proximity
to each other rather than the United States, they tend to worry more about one another
than American power.114 However, as offensive realism predicts, the wake of the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks induced the United States to pursue a more unilateral
foreign policy and assertively intervene in regions once considered off limits during the
Cold War.115
In the abstract, balance of power simply predicts that states will seek to arrest the
rise of a threatening power (either because of its capabilities, intents or a combination of
both), at the regional or global level. Both classical realism and neorealism generally
agree on this ontological premise, but on different epistemological grounds.116 Although
balance of power as a system is a foundation of realism, the two traditions do diverge
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from there, with classical realism focusing more on agency (foreign policy/strategy) and
neorealists more on structure (system-wide distribution of capabilities/outcomes).117 The
divergence between theory and practice should not be viewed as “degenerative,” but
rather complementary. Indeed, neoclassical realism has provided a bridge between the
two realist strands. Brian Rathburn demonstrates that a convergence of neorealism and
classical realism can better explain balance of power both as a system (theory) and
strategy (practice):
Neoclassical realism in particular can be defended as having a coherent
logic that incorporates ideas and domestic politics in the way we would
expect structural realism to do so. This is the natural outgrowth of
neorealism, serving it in two ways. First, ideas and domestic political
variables are significant factors in a state’s ability to harness latent
material power. … Second, on questions other than power, it is not that
ideas and domestic politics do not play a role in structural realism, only
that the system is biased against such influences, so that any effect is
generally circumscribed to negatively affecting foreign policy.
Neoclassical realism explains when states cannot properly adapt to
systemic constraints and points out the serious consequences that result.118
Given the almost doctrinal acceptance of balance of power theory among both
classical and neorealists, the absence of hard balancing against the United States poses an
anomaly. The existence of this anomaly can result in either one of two outcomes – the
wholesale abandonment of the theory or the reformulation of theory to account for
discrepancies. Following in the rich tradition of balance of power scholars, this study
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attempts the latter by adopting a neoclassical realist framework.119 Before this task can
be undertaken, this chapter reviews the limitations of balance of power theory by
addressing several factors that might cause the balance of power to break down.
A Disappearing (Balancing) Act
Critics of soft balancing theories have cited a number of reasons why American
hegemony has gone unbalanced. William Wohlforth and Stephen Brooks argue that
American predominance in every critical dimension of power explains why no
challengers have arisen.120 Since no potential rival can match the United States in
material capabilities, there is no need to try, and bandwagoning is the preferred strategy
by other great powers in a unipolar system. And despite America’s war-making and
aggressive unilateral behavior abroad since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Keir
A. Lieber and Gerard Alexander maintain that U.S. power is not threatening enough to
provoke a countervailing coalition. “The major powers are not balancing against the
United States because of the nature of U.S. grand strategy in the post-September 11
world. There is no doubt that this strategy is ambitious, assertive, and backed by
tremendous offensive military capability. But it is also highly selective and not broadly
threatening.”121
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Great powers also might find American hegemony less dangerous because it is a
maritime rather than a continental power. According to Jack S. Levy and William R.
Thompson, great-power balancing coalitions are more likely to form against states
amassing high concentrations of military power in autonomous continental systems rather
than states amassing high concentrations of naval (and air) power and wealth in the
global maritime system.122 Dominant continental powers raise armies, which are more
likely to seek territorial empires and threaten the borders of other states. Dominant
maritime powers raise navies to protect and expand trade.123 Because the strategies and
behaviors of great sea powers differ from their continental counterparts, their interaction
with other great powers is dissimilar. Levy and Thompson argue that, although maritime
powers are unlikely to educe coalitional balancing, they could face soft balancing
coalitions and internal balancing. “We can certainly imagine the United States behaving
in such a way as to threaten the interests of other great powers and eventually to provoke
a balancing coalition, but the trigger would have to involve specific behavior that
threatens other great powers, not the fact of U.S. power.”124
On the other hand, China and Russia might prefer to bandwagon with U.S.
hegemony rather than balance it. Rosemary Foot makes the case that China’s strategy is
not soft-balancing, but rather “soft bandwagoning.” Under this strategy, China tries to
make its interests coincide with those of Washington. “In this sense, while Beijing’s
strategy can be viewed as accommodation with the current U.S.-dominated global order,
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it also contains an important ‘hedging’ element, or insurance policy, through which China
seeks to secure its future.”125 Foot states flatly that: “China is neither part of, nor
determinedly seeking, to build anti-hegemonic coalitions. Consequently, other emerging
states such as Brazil, India and Russia should not expect too much in the way of
sustained cooperation from China on this front, assuming they are interested in forming
such coalitions.”126
Systemic, though not necessarily structural, changes also could affect the balance
of power. Even discounting the use of nuclear weapons, war among developed nations
would be so devastating that to undertake it would be irrational and thus militates against
costly balancing.127 Economic interdependence, too, has made war among great powers
largely obsolete, argues Richard Rosecrance.128 Democratic peace theorists, such as
Bruce Russet and John R. O’Neal, maintain that the liberal nature of the United States
makes it less threatening to other great powers, especially if they are democratic as
well.129 Liberals point to the role that international institutions play in tamping down the
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balance of power. Such institutions, G. John Ikenberry posits, are crucial “in establishing
order and securing cooperation between unequal states.”130
Theorists taking a constructivist approach have pointed to changing identities,
ideologies and shared norms among great powers to account for the decrease in balancing
behavior.131 For them, threats are not the result of intentions per se, but rather how states
construe another’s intentions. In the case of the United States, its liberal character makes
it less threatening than other great powers because the domestic nature of the United
States allows it to pursue a multilateral foreign policy. The main causal mechanism is
thus located internally. “A multilateral vision of world order is singularly compatible
with America’s collective self-concept as a nation. Indeed, the vision taps into the very
idea of America [emphasis in original]’’132
For these scholars, the balance-of-power mechanism is reduced in a unipolar
world because power is too concentrated in the hegemon; is militated by the liberal nature
of the United States and/or its character as a maritime power; overcome by globalization
and economic interdependence; or circumvented by the changing norms of great power
relations in the contemporary international system. If they are correct, then what does this
say for Waltz’s inviolable and immutable theory of balance of power? After all, even if a
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great power behaves with moderation, restraint and forbearance, “unbalanced power,
whoever wields it, is a potential danger to others.”133
Systems Logic of Balance of Power
A central argument of this study is that the configuration of the international
system is the main determinant of the type of balancing strategy states are likely to adopt.
In other words, the main independent variable is the polarity of the system, an exogenous
factor, and the dependent variable is the balancing outcome. Realists have mainly focused
on the balancing outcome of multipolar and unipolar systems.134 The debate has centered
on which system is the most stable, and therefore, the most likely to foster peace. It was
not until the end of the Cold War that realists began to carefully analyze the stability of
unipolar systems.135
Scholars such as Robert Pape argue that unipolarity is a distinct system with its
own balancing logic different from that of bipolar and multipolar systems (see Figure 31). Pape’s theoretical insights can be viewed as an extension of classical realism. For
example, Hans Morgenthau recognized that “the reduction of the number of nations that
are able to play a major role in international politics has had a deteriorating effect upon
the operation of the balance of power.”136 Although Morgenthau never extended this
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logic in Politics Among Nations, simple propositions can be drawn from his inference.
Morgenthau’s balance of power framework was shaped mainly by the classic multipolar
system of Continental Europe. Therefore, the reduction of five great powers to two would
deteriorate the balance of power if “balance of power” is viewed simply in terms of
alliance politics. However, what is occurring is not “deterioration” in the balance of
power, but a transformation of one balance of power logic into another. Realists shaped
by the first two World Wars and the Cold War understood the differing logics of
multipolar and bipolar systems, but apparently failed to envision a unipolar world
because none of their works before the end of the Cold War account for it.

Table 3-1: Balancing Logics
Type of System
Unipolar

Logic of Balancing
Non-Military alignments

Bipolar

Arms buildups

Multipolarity

Alliances

Despite the criticisms, recent neoclassical realist theory has focused on efforts by
China and Russia to counteract the United States by analyzing exogenous and
endogenous factors.137 The two external factors that largely account for the operation of
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the balance of power in the international system are the number of great powers and the
spread of nuclear weapons.138 Kenneth Waltz pointed to the proliferation of nuclear
weapons among great powers for the mitigation of balancing behavior: “In a world of
second-strike nuclear forces, alliances have little effect on the strategic balance.”139 And,
as mentioned above, Morgenthau noted the reduction of the number of great powers also
suppresses balancing behavior.140
The nature of the international system also can affect balancing strategies.141 In a
multipolar system, the increased number of great powers enlarges the pool of possible
dyads for alliance formation. This was manifested in the Eighteenth Century Europe,
considered to be the classical age of balance of power. “All the assumptions of the
structural model were in place: international anarchy, coherent states as rational
positionalists, and a multipolar distribution with Britain, France, Prussia, and Austria
constituting the classic system of five great powers.”142 The use of alliances was less
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effective as a balancing strategy during the Cold War bipolar system, where defections
from either bloc had little impact on the overall strategic balance. As Waltz explained:
The withdrawal of France from NATO’s command structure and the
defection of China from the Soviet bloc failed even to tilt the central
balance. Early in the Cold War, Americans spoke with alarm about the
threat of monolithic communism arising from the combined strength of the
Soviet Union and China, yet the bloc’s disintegration caused scarcely a
ripple. American officials did not proclaim that with China’s defection,
America’s defense budget could safely be reduced by 20 or 10 percent or
even be reduced at all. Similarly, when France stopped playing its part in
NATO’s military plans, American officials did not proclaim that defense
spending had to be increased for that reason.143
In a unipolar system, the capabilities of the hegemonic state or superpower so far
outstrip those of its nearest competitors that neither alliance formations nor internal arms
buildups are effective. Although aspiring hegemonic powers of the past such as
Napoleonic France and Nazi Germany eventually provoked balancing coalitions, the
United States is “likely to buck the historical trend. Bounded by oceans to the east and
west and weak, friendly powers to the north and south, the United States is both less
vulnerable than previous aspiring hegemons and also less threatening to others. The main
potential challengers to its unipolarity, meanwhile— China, Russia, Japan, and
Germany—are in the opposite position.”144
Endogenous factors enter the equation as well, including uncertainty combined
with risk-loving preferences, conflict-averse preferences, offensive technological
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advantages, economic growth, and technological and political rigidities in the formation
of alliances and rivalries.145 The novelty of unipolarity also is cited as a factor for the lack
of hard balancing against the Untied States. Indeed, “The world is in a great geopolitical
adjustment process [emphasis in the original],” writes G. John Ikenberry, who finds that
great power reactions aimed against the United States have been ad hoc because they are
still learning and adapting to a new international system.146 Uncertainty also arises from
the inability of actors to immediately assess all the variables that make up national power
(such as national will and morale and effective government). As Morgenthau notes:
It is impossible for the observer of the contemporary scene or the explorer
of future trends to assess even with approximate accuracy the relative
contributions of these elements may make to power differentials.
Furthermore, the quality of these contributions is subject to incessant
change, unnoticeable at the moment the change actually takes place and
revealed only in the actual test of crisis and war. Rational calculation of
the relative strength of several nations, which is the very lifeblood of the
balance of power, becomes a series of guesses the corrections of which
can be ascertained only in retrospect.147
Structural realists attempted to streamline theory by removing many of the
endogenous variables of power cited by Morgenthau, Kissinger and other classical
realists. Such abstract models explain how structure constrains units and shapes behavior
of actors over the long term, but cannot adequately address how individual units will
respond to barriers at any given moment. Structural theories, specifically Waltz’s
mechanistic version, have often been cited as the embodiment of the balance of power in
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the realist tradition. This is unfortunate because Waltz’s sparse model is the start for
much realist theorizing, not the end. Waltz’s archetype resulted in a rigid view of balance
of power, but others have demonstrated that balancing in the international system is
fluid.148 Recent neoclassical reformulations have expanded the view of balance of power
to account for the fluidity of systemic outcomes. Indeed, if balance of power is viewed as
a continuum, a dynamic rather than static process is conveyed. State policies could range
from soft balancing to soft bandwagoning (see figure 3-2).149 The remainder of this
chapter develops a framework that can be used to determine whether states such as China
and Russia indeed are soft balancing against the United States.
Soft Balancing as a Hard Concept
Balancing of the hard variety is a core tenet of the realist research program.
Unlike hard balancing, however, soft balancing is likely to involve alignments rather than
arms buildups and formal alliances. Glenn Snyder’s definition of an alliance provides a
strong description of what is generally thought of as traditional external balancing:
“formal associations of states for the use [or nonuse] of military force, in specified
circumstances, against states outside their own membership.”150 Snyder’s theory of
alliance politics is based on the Austro-German alliance of 1879, which was targeted at
France, and the Franco-Russian alliance of 1891-1894, which countered the Austro-
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German pact. Although Snyder’s work is more about alliance formation than balancing
itself, it does demonstrate what external balancing behavior might look like.
Another form of hard balancing is an arms buildup by one or more states to
roughly match the power of the targeted state, or to at least develop defenses effective
enough to make invasion cost prohibitive.151 Neither of these versions of hard balancing
appears to be relevant to contemporary international affairs. No state has undertaken a
massive arms buildup to match the military might of the United States and no formal
alliances have been established against the U.S. because of the high costs.
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Table 3-2: Model of the Balance of Power Continuum

Bandwagon

Soft/Bandwagon

Neutrality

Soft/Balance

Balance

57

Alliances in favor

Alignments in favor

Buck passing

Alignments against

Alliances against

Accommodation**

Incentives

Avoidance

Coercion, bribes

Arms buildups

Formal treaties for

Indirect, non-military
means
Baiting*

Neutrality
Hiding

Indirect, non-military
means
Buffering*

Formal treaties
against

Bonding*

Hedging**

*The terms engagement, resistance, baiting, buffering and bonding come from Ikenberry, “Strategic Reactions to American Preeminence.”
**The terms accommodation and hedging comes from Foot, “Chinese Strategies in a U.S.-Hegemonic Global Order.”

Strategies of Engagement*

Strategies of Resistance*
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New “balancing” strategies
Soft balancing began to surface as a concept in the mid-2000s to account for the
conspicuous absence of hard balancing against the United States after the demise of the
Cold War. Proponents of soft balancing argued that, contrary to predictions that the
“balance of power” had no utility in a post-Cold War world, balancing strategies were
indeed emerging. Supporters maintained that the balance of power dynamic still persisted
in international politics, but that changes in the configuration of the international system
required new balancing logics. They also argued that the absence of strategic balance as
an outcome did not mean that states were abandoning balancing as a strategy because
balancing is not always a successful policy. Furthermore, balancing strategies in a
unipolar world would require new tactics to deal with an existing hegemonic power, a
rare phenomenon in world history.152
Soft balancing theorists describe that strategy as the adoption of indirect tactics to
counterbalance U.S. interests. Robert Pape, a leading soft balance theorist, defines it as:
“Actions that do not directly challenge U.S. military preponderance but that use
nonmilitary tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine aggressive unilateral U.S. military
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policies.”153 This can be through international institutions, economic statecraft and
diplomatic arrangements. T.V. Paul offers a similar description, concluding that “in the
post-Cold War era, second-tier major power states have been increasingly resorting to
soft balancing strategies to counter the growing military might and unilateral tendencies
of the United States without harming their economic ties to it.”154 Regionalism is a major
component of the soft balancing concepts laid out by Pape, Paul and Robert Art, each of
whom argues that soft balancing encompasses regional security concerns great powers
face from the power projection capabilities of an off-shore hegemonic power.155
Another major proponent, Stephen Walt, amended soft balancing concepts by
incorporating them within his “balance of threat” paradigm. According to Walt, hard
balancing focuses on the overall balance of power and seeks to assemble a countervailing
coalition that will be strong enough to keep the dominant power in check, whereas soft
balancing does not seek or expect to alter the overall distribution of capabilities. Instead,
a soft balancing strategy accepts the status quo, but seeks to obtain better outcomes
within it. In the current era of U.S. dominance, therefore, soft balancing is the “conscious
coordination of diplomatic action in order to obtain outcomes contrary to U.S.
preferences – outcomes that could not be gained if the balancers did not give each other
some degree of mutual support.”156
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Christopher Layne’s calls such behavior “leash slipping” when states try to free
themselves from the yoke of the U.S. liberal order.157 Layne’s notion of “leash slipping”
is crucial because it imbeds a normative component into the soft balancing framework.
As Layne points out, the U.S. “quest for hegemony is driven instead by an ideational,
deterritorialized conception of security divorced from the traditional metrics of great
power grand strategy: the distribution of power in the international system and geography
[emphasis mine].”158 In the liberal economic order established by the United States after
World War II, leash slipping is less about the fear of being attacked by a “predatory landgrabber” than a way for states “to conduct an independent foreign policy.”159
As a liberal and maritime hegemonic power, the United States is unique. British
hegemony and naval supremacy in the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth centuries,
though similar, does not compare to American hegemony in a unipolar system because
U.S. capabilities relative to its challengers are far more superior than Britain’s
capabilities compared to its rivals at the time. Nevertheless, both states faced no serious
balancing coalitions because their goals were generally to extend control over markets
rather than territory.160 The wealth and power of these liberal hegemons allowed them to
create normative structures that benefited their interests. Although the concerns some
great powers have about U.S. hegemony are in many cases ideational or normative, these
are effects rather than causes. Normative threats emanate from domestic sources, but their
157
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gravity is the result of a state’s position within the international system, a central tenet of
structural realism.161
Theoretical limitations of soft balancing
Kenneth Waltz viewed unbalanced power as threatening in itself, and posited that
such a threat will provoke a reaction from other actors within the international system.
Smaller states are likely to bandwagon with the hegemon, but other great powers have
more options at their disposal. Walt’s addition of “threat” to the soft balancing
framework, however, rectifies some of the anomalies in Waltz’s theory because it
explains why the American military presence in Europe is not considered menacing by
the states in that region, whereas a smaller U.S. footprint in Central Asia has provoked
consternation among the Russians and Chinese.162 Walt’s concept of soft balancing,
however, is so broad that it covers issue areas ranging from global climate change to
international trade; any act that seeks to undermine American policy, from European
objection to genetically modified foods to French/German/Russian opposition to the
Second Gulf War is tantamount to balancing. This expansive view limits the utility of
Walt’s version of soft balancing because it does not offer criteria to distinguish between
soft balancing and diplomatic bargaining or friction among states; even allies at times
have conflicts and try to block the interests of one another. Furthermore, including such
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“low politics” under the rubric of balancing diminishes the stature of balance of power,
which generally has been limited to the arena of “high politics” and security.
Other formulations of soft balancing also lack some theoretical cohesion at one
level or the other. Paul’s notion of soft balancing involves “the formation of limited
diplomatic coalitions or ententes, especially in the United Nations, with the implicit threat
of upgrading their alliances if the United States goes beyond its stated goals.”163 Pape
characterizes balancing as the use of “assets [which] include military forces, economic
power and leverage, formal alliances, informal alignments, and voting or veto power in
international organizations. The first three can be conceived of as hard assets; the last two
as soft assets.”164 According to Pape, these “assets” can include territorial denial
(especially basing rights), entangling diplomacy, economic strengthening (regional
trading blocs, e.g.), and signals of resolve to balance.165
Although these definitions broadly describe what can be considered soft
balancing, critics rightfully argue that the tactics they suggest, by themselves, are hard to
distinguish from other state behavior and are not formulated in a manner that can be
systematically tested. Indeed, how can one differentiate the denial of basing rights as a
measure of soft balancing from a maneuver by a government to quell public displeasure
with a foreign military force stationed in its country? And by what mechanism can the
United Nations be used to balance against U.S. power other than a possible Security
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Council veto given that little authority resides in the General Assembly?166 Nevertheless,
proponents of soft balancing have laid the groundwork for a fruitful theory, even if their
conceptions suffer from imprecision. Below, combined is what the author believes to be
the most important elements in determining a soft-balancing strategy.
Analytical Framework
A review of soft balancing literature finds that it is largely a regional strategy
designed to counter American influence in geographic areas proximate to other great
powers. Regionalism is a central aspect of soft balancing because great powers need not
exert themselves challenging the United States at the systemic level. In this study, soft
balancing is defined as nonmilitary alignments of at least two states (external) and/or the
increase of soft power by one state (internal) designed to reduce or remove the military
presence and external influences of another power at the regional or global level.
Analytically, a state’s increase in soft or normative power to counter that of another state
or states could be considered soft balancing. Additionally, an alignment that adopts the
three following tactics can evince soft balancing behavior: attempts to reduce the military
presence of the external actor from a specific region; the removal of any local actors
allied politically with the external great power; and decreasing economic, cultural and
normative influences associated with the outside great power from the region. The first
tactic is necessary to identify a soft-balancing strategy, the latter two sufficient for soft
balancing. Below, the framework’s terms and concepts are further explicated.
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Systemic Configuration: Hegemonic and Unipolar

Proponents of soft balancing argue that it is most likely to be practiced in unipolar
systems. A unipolar system is hegemonic because it consists of only one superpower.
Multiple regional hegemons could exist at one time, but such a system would be
multipolar rather than a unipolar at the global level if the regional hegemons were
relatively close in their material capabilities. Nevertheless, there is vigorous debate
among scholars and analysts over whether the United States is actually a hegemonic
power.167 A number of terms have been used to describe America’s current
preponderance in the international system – superpower, hyperpower, hegemon and neoempire are some examples. Substantively, there is little that distinguishes these terms and
they generally convey the concept of hegemony adopted in this study: a state that not
only can project its military capabilities abroad, but economic and cultural norms, too.168
Some scholars maintain there can be unipolarity without hegemony, but this
position appears untenable.169 A unipolar system is by default a hegemonic system
because only one state has the means to project power globally. Furthermore, hegemony
is about leadership and establishing rules and norms to govern the world political
167
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economy.170 Nevertheless, brute material capabilities are necessary to establish what
Gramscians refer to as a “hegemonic bloc” or “dominant ideology.” In the current
international system, the United State is the only power capable of establishing such a
world order. William Wohlforth makes a strong case for this viewpoint: “To qualify as
polar powers, states must score well on all the components of power: size of population
and territory; resource endowment; economic capabilities; military strength; and
‘competence’ … Two states measured up in 1990. One is gone. No new pole has
appeared: 2-1=1. The system is unipolar.”171
Analytically, hegemony can be examined over three dimensions of capabilities:
military, political/economic and normative. A state that can project power across these three
planes of capabilities could establish hegemony in a regional or international system. Power
projection is the ability of a state to effectively deploy its assets across international borders.

From a military standpoint, this means a state that can invade and occupy territory that is
non-contiguous and maintains a global network of bases on foreign soil. From a politicaleconomic standpoint, this means a state that takes the main role in creating international
institutions that govern different issue areas in international politics, such as trade,
monetary and security affairs; examples would include institutions in the economic realm,
such as the WTO and IMF, and political realm, such as the United Nations, and security
170
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realm, NATO as well as bilateral treaties with other major powers. In these organizations, the
hegemonic power should have the leadership position. In the normative realm, power
projection would be the creation of the “rules of the game” established by the hegemonic
power. These rules can be codified in international institutions, treaties, law, organizations
and regimes.172

A hegemonic state also should have the world’s leading currency and can use its
economic and political might to punish states bilaterally or through multilateral
diplomacy and institutions.173 Projecting economic and political power also could be viewed
as the “vanguard of globalization,” 174 for example, when multinational corporations from a
home country are dominant around the globe and have a number of subsidiaries or affiliates
in a host country on multiple continents. By projecting power in the normative sphere, a

great power must play a prominent role in establishing international law and regimes; for
example on human rights and democracy, but also through the globalization and
propagation of its culture, which can include consumerism, sports and entertainment.175
The normative sphere also could be disseminated through non-governmental
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organizations (NGOs), which like militaries and multinational corporations are the
gendarmes of the hegemonic power. A state that is dominant in all three faces could be
considered hegemonic.
Although hegemonic powers must have sufficient military capabilities to protect
the international political economy that it dominates and rebuff challenges from
adversaries, systemic-level factors are not sufficient alone. Indeed, “a great power “must
have control over raw materials, control over sources of capital, control over markets, and
competitive advantages in the production of highly valued goods. … The importance of
controlling sources of raw materials has provided a traditional justification for territorial
expansion and imperialism.”176 But as Robert Keohane argues, hegemony should go
beyond the “crude” power theory of the strong state. “Strength alone does not give a
hegemon the incentive to project power abroad. Domestic attitudes, political structures,
and decision making processes are also important.”177 Even in decline, a state can remain
hegemonic if the status quo is locked into place through extant institutions.178
Regions in the Balance
Because the hegemonic power’s capabilities at the global level are much greater
than its closest competitors, attempts at balancing in a unipolar system are likely to occur
at the regional level. “Although not stated in so many words, the military doctrines and
defense plans of second-ranked powers, including those of China and Russia, rule out a
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major war with the United States and increasingly focus instead on regional and internal
security challenges.”179In fact, regions can become a balancing mechanism distinct from
traditional alliance politics and arm buildups. Regional powers view the intrusion of a
superpower into their sphere of interest as threatening. “In order to attain international
significance, regional systems must be able to refract power projected by external actors
from the larger global environment.”180 Indeed, regional security complexes can be
viewed as poles of powers themselves and “in that context, they may get treated is if they
mattered to the global balance of power.”181
Regions have been important to international politics longer than superpowers
because no states or polities were able to project power globally until recently.182 In
antiquity, the Persian invasion of the Greek city-state system in the Fifth Century BCE
led to the temporary formation of a regional balancing strategy, including alliance
between future rivals Athens and Sparta.183 More recently, scholars have looked at the
role of regions in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, East Asia, Central Asia and across
Africa and Latin America.184
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Regions also can be viewed as sites of contestation in the international system.
According to John Mearsheimer, regions are a major variable in the international balance
of power. Powerful states attempt to dominate their regions because domination is the
most optimal way to ensure survival. If a great power establishes regional hegemony, it
can use that as a launching pad for global dominance. However, hegemony could lead to
a security dilemma because “regional hegemons in one region of the globe will attempt to
check aspiring hegemons in other regions because they fear that a rival great power that
dominates its own region will be an especially powerful foe.”185 Yet attempts at offshore
balancing, or the strategy adopted by a regional hegemon to keep others from achieving
the same status, is likely to be met by countervailing coalitions.186 Nevertheless,
Mearsheimer’s theoretical implications are supported by U.S. defense policy on peer
competitors and the possible use of nuclear weapons; the Pentagon’s concern with
emerging powers such as China, and Iran in the Persian Gulf, for instance, can be
discerned in its development of offensive nuclear weapons.187
The formation of regional spheres of influences or regional security complexes is
an important element of soft balancing. However, these complexes do not have to be
formal arrangements or explicitly aimed at rebuffing the encroachment of a hegemonic
power. In fact, any coordination between great powers to use a region as a buffer in a
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unipolar system is likely to be in the form of indirect alignments or partnerships rather
than formal alliances as was the case in past balancing strategies.
Non-military alignments
In contrast to formal alliances, Glenn Snyder defines alignments as tacit
agreements “based solely on common interests, although the latter can be as
consequential as formal arrangements.”188 For Snyder, alliances are ways of
strengthening alignments and are based on elements of specificity, legal and moral
obligation, and reciprocity that are usually lacking from informal alignments, which
generally don’t have an explicit pledge of military support. Applying Snyder’s work to
balancing provides a demarcation between the soft and hard varieties.
Strategic Partnerships as Soft Balancing
The strategic partnership between Russia and China follows the logic of
alignment patterns and thus can be an important element in soft balancing. From a
bilateral standpoint, strategic partnerships are simply about achieving mutual interests,
for example improving trade and security relations. However, from geopolitical
perspective, strategic partnerships can help weaker states gain leverage against a
hegemonic power by joining forces in international institutions or through regional
complexes. In this case, the axiom “two is better than one” counts. Furthermore, strategic
partners can lessen the influence of the hegemon by offering another axis or pole of
power for smaller and emerging powers dissatisfied with the status quo. By forming a
strategic partnership at the geopolitical level, states can increase their influence greatly.
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Unlike traditional alliances, however, the Sino-Russian “strategic partnership” is
more about political, rather than military, deterrence, an association that corresponds to a
soft balancing strategy. For the partnership to be “strategic, it must entail building a
larger framework for global and regional security, rather than just bilateral
cooperation.”189 According to Sangtu Ko, the strategic component of the Russian-Chinese
relationship was institutionalized and extended beyond bilateral relations when the two
powers cooperated to create the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which added a
regional dimension to the partnership in Central Asia. As Ko notes, “the SCO’s creation
might be seen as the first step in a Chinese and Russian policy of renouncing the U.S.
vision of a world dominated by a single pole.”190
Although not a formal defense treaty, the “strategic partnership” between Russia
and China falls under the alignment concept and goes further than a simple regional
security regime or bilateral coordination. Forming a partnership “implies a long-term
reciprocal commitment” and “broad consistency of purpose.”191 In addition, the
partnership must be vital to each member’s mutual interests and both sides must attach
great importance to it.192 The partnership allows both sides to coordinate their
expectations while at the same time offering each considerable freedom of action to
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pursue other interests. In this case, the partnership combines tactical expediency with
strategic calculus and provides a unified front internationally.193
Indeed, the “strategic partnership” could be conceived of as a new model in
contemporary alliance formation. The partnership or alignment is as much about gaining
leverage against the United States as it is about bilateral relations. For example, in 2006
and 2007, there was near 100 percent similarity in Chinese and Russian votes in the
UNSC, including vetoes.194 “For China, cooperation with Russia helps to promote
greater multipolarity and multilateralism, lessening U.S. influence. Russian leaders share
Chinese elites’ discomfort with U.S. power and relative predominance, in particular with
the U.S. perceived penchant for military alliances, regime change, democracy promotion,
and unilateral diplomatic and military actions. “195
Tactics
The main goal of soft balancing would be an attempt by the alignment or
partnership to reduce or remove any military bases, garrisons, air fields or naval ports
maintained by the outside hegemon or great power. Secondarily, a soft-balancing
alignment could seek to co-opt, and if unable, to remove or replace, any head of a state
(party or individual) in the specific region which has aligned or allied with the outside
actor. Of tertiary concern, the members of the alignment or partnership might seek to
remove or eliminate indirect influences in a specific region associated with the outside
great power, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) supported by the outside
193
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actor, multinational corporations (MNCs) based in the great power and cultural
institutions (subversive elements of cinema, media, artwork, music, etc.) derived from the
outside actor (see table 3-3).

Table 3-3: Instruments of Soft Balancing

Goals
Tactics

Military

Political

Economic

Reduction of outside
military forces
Pressure on regional
leaders to remove foreign
troops from region
Support for non-state
actors or proxies to
harass outside military
forces or remove bases
Military support to
opposition forces of
external power

Reduction of outside
normative influence
Pressure on regional
leaders to break ties
with outside power
Covert ops to remove
leaders tied to outside
power; use of bribes or
coercion to break ties
Political support to
opposition forces of
external power;
creation of alternative
norms and institutions

Reduction of outside
economic influence
Pressure on regional
leaders to break ties
with outside power
Use of bribes, coercion
to reduce outside
influence and make
favorable conditions for
Use of institutions or
organizations to create
favorable conditions for
alignments MNCs and
other economic actors

These ends can be achieved by a number of means: the use of covert operations,
coercion or military assistance to opposition forces to remove regional officials who have
allied with the outside hegemonic power; bribes or other incentives to buy the support of
regional political, economic, cultural and religious leaders; the use of proxies or non-state
actors to attack or harass U.S. facilities in the region; and the use of other inducements,
such as economic and military aid to autocratic rulers with “no strings attached,” and
providing cover for autocratic leaders in international institutions such as the United
Nations. Each tactic singularly could be used to pursue a myriad of state interests.
However, if these tactics are combined systematically in the presence of an external
actor, those tactics could be taken as evidence of the formation of a soft balancing
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alignment. The overarching goal of this strategy would be to increase the costs of
intervention by a hegemonic power, which would reduce its capabilities over the longterm.
Geopolitical and Strategic Objectives of Soft Balancing Alignment
Although a soft balancing strategy utilizes non-confrontational means to
counteract hegemonic power, the goal is to achieve tangible outcomes.196 Unlike hard
balancing, soft balancing is not adopted by great powers seeking security from
hegemonic attack; for them the United States is not an existential threat. Strategically,
however, soft balancing alignments are formed to create more favorable conditions for
great powers to obtain interests at odds with the reigning hegemon. For example,
removing American political influence and military forces from Central Asia could help
China and Russia obtain major geopolitical and geostrategic interests in the region. A
significant strategic objective for Russia is to limit any American role in deciding the
routes of gas and natural oil pipelines through Central Asia and the Caucuses. The United
States prefers pipeline routes to Western allies bypass Russia and attempts to bolster the
independence of the smaller republics from Moscow to increase American leverage in the
region.197 Such an outcome could severely reduce Russian revenues from energy rents
and weaken the Russian economy and defense sectors. Energy security, too, is a longterm concern to the Chinese defense sector and economy, and procuring adequate
supplies from Central Asia is a strategic priority.198 To be sure, China and Russia
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approach Central Asian energy resources from different perspectives – China as an
importer and Russia as an exporter – yet they share a common interest in
counterbalancing U.S. influence in the region and cooperating on energy matters.199
Broadly, great powers mainly pursue soft balancing because it can create
conditions favorable to obtaining preferences contrary to those of the hegemonic power
without direct confrontation. Soft balancing is done largely through diplomatic
maneuvers and in institutional arrangements (states also can incorporate soft balancing
measures into their military doctrines, which are taken up in Chapter Six). Like other soft
balancing theories, under this framework, the alignment does not confront the outside
great power/hegemon directly (it doesn’t even have to be named), and therefore, is
unlikely to be subject to military reprisals.200 The balancing effort is localized to a
specific region (sphere of influence or regional security complex), and if successful, the
removal of the great power’s influence (hard and soft power) opens space for members of
the regional alliance to “conduct an independent foreign policy” outside the framework of
the normative and rule-based liberal order managed by the United States. These tactics
also follow the logic of offensive realism of Mearsheimer. If hegemons (e.g., the United
198
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States) in one region of the world are expected to balance against potential hegemons
elsewhere (e.g., China or Russia), one should logically expect a counteraction by the state
or states being off-shore balanced against (an “off-shore defense”). In an era of
unipolarity, great powers do not have the material capabilities to physically evict a
hegemon or superpower from their region. Therefore, states that wish to achieve their
strategic interests must resort to soft balancing if they “wish for ways to fend off
[America’s] benign ministrations.”201
Conclusion
This chapter endeavored to explain how different systemic configurations affected
the balancing strategies adopted by great powers. It also aimed to develop a more
rigorous framework that could test whether states are using a soft balancing strategy to
counteract U.S. hegemonic ambitions. When determining whether states are utilizing a
soft balancing strategy, the level of analysis should focus on regional systems rather than
at the international level because of the limited capabilities great powers have in carrying
out a global balance-of-power strategy against the reigning hegemon. Soft balancing also
relies on balancing against “soft power” capabilities rather than traditional military
balances. An expanded and more sophisticated conception of hegemony reveals that it is
open to challenges on three fronts and that countering one dimension can reduce the role
of the others, or at least restrain them. Finally, from a theoretical standpoint, the
framework outlined in this study also integrates soft balancing into the realist paradigm.
Security is a main interest of states, but insecurity does not come solely from existential
threats. Access to energy resources and a climate of political stability are important
201
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priorities, too, and each can be undermined by outside powers. Realist theories focus on
competition for security and power, and it matters only by degree whether that
competition is in the form of military confrontation or normative rivalry.
The next chapter examines Central Asia as a regional security complex, which is
the main unit of analysis in a soft balancing strategy, and the strategic vision each of the
major players have for the region. The chapter provides a contextual backdrop for the
contemporary chess game in Central Asia and links the theoretical insights expounded
upon in this chapter to the geopolitical realities currently faced by China and Russia.
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CHAPTER IV
THE EVOLUTION OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN SECURITY COMPLEX
The current study argues that regional security complexes are likely to be a main
component of soft balancing. Indeed, soft balancing theorists have maintained that
regionalization is an appealing strategy for great powers trying to insulate themselves
from U.S. hegemony (see Chapter Two). Nevertheless, soft balancing theories have taken
regionalization as given and provide cursory, if any, analysis of regional dynamics and
formation. An underlying assumption of regions as a “balancing” mechanism, thus, is
that regions can be conceived of as autonomous units. Construing regions as autonomous
does not mean that regions themselves can act or have agency, but that regions can serve
as a focal point for balance of power behavior separately from the systemic level. To
claim that regions are a “unit of analysis” is significant and must be examined. For the
purposes of my study, this chapter utilizes the Regional Security Complex Theory
(RSCT) developed by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver to establish Central Asia as a distinct
regional security complex (RSC).
Regarding Central Asia as a RSC is important for three reasons. First, it allows
for the study of Central Asia as an autonomous unit separate from the individual states
that constitute it; in other words, Central Asia as a whole can be viewed as analytically
distinct from its parts. Second, regional security complexes are sites of contestation
between great powers and serve as an intermediary between domestic and international
levels. From this standpoint, Buzan and Wæver’s conceptual framework parallels that of
neoclassical realism, which also focuses on the dynamic between domestic, regional and
systemic levels. Third, “the regional level is where the extremes of national and global
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security interplay, and where most of the action occurs.”202 Theorists must go “where
most of the action occurs” to test their assumptions and propositions.
The first part of this chapter will review Buzan and Wæver’s RSCT and fit it
within the overall soft balancing framework. The second section provides a brief
historical overview of Central Asia and its evolution over time. The third section outlines
the geopolitical objectives China, Russia and the United States have in the region as well
as areas of convergence and divergence among the three great powers. That is followed
by an analysis of the internal and external factors that have established Central Asia as its
own distinct RSC.203 It concludes with an assessment of the causal mechanisms driving
regionalization and the role external pressures have played in forging a “strategic
partnership” between Russia and China.
Regional Security Complex Theory
Regional security complex theory (RSCT) is a useful complement to soft balancing
theory and parallels neoclassical realism in many of its theoretical assumptions. In
regards to soft balancing, RSC is also complementary because it demonstrates how
regions are affected by, and affect, systemic outcomes. “What links the overarching
pattern of distribution of power among the global powers to the regional dynamics of
RSCs is the mechanism of penetration. Penetration occurs when outside powers make
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security alignments with states within an RSC.”204 As a theoretical concept, RSCT draws
on an eclectic array of thought, which is similar to the approach taken in this study. As
Buzan and Wæver write, “RSCT uses a blend of materialist and constructivist
approaches. On the materialist side it uses ideas of bounded territoriality and distribution
of power that are close to those in neorealism. … On the constructivist side … RSCT
focus[es] on the political processes by which security issues get constituted.”205
Regional complexes are playing an increasingly important role in contemporary
international affairs and have become much more commonplace since the end of the Cold
War; they include such diverse groupings as the Baltic Council of Ministers, the Visegrad
Group, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Mercosur. During the Cold War,
“local security systems existed, but they were overshadowed by the ability of external
powers to move directly into the local [security] complex with the effect of suppressing
the indigenous security dynamic.”206 The reemergence of regional complexes as a major
factor in global politics is largely the outcome of changes at the systemic level, although
each individual RSC has evolved individually to address local peculiarities. “This trend
is, in part, a response to the fragmentation of great-power blocs, especially in Eastern
Europe and Central Asia, but it also reflects the need to react to the pressures created by
economic globalization through local means.”207
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Buzan and Wæver define a regional security complex as “a set of units whose major
processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security
problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another.”208
Territoriality is an important part of this definition because threats travel more rapidly
over shorter distances than others. Although RSCs do not have to be contiguous, “simple
physical adjacency tends to generate more security interaction among neighbors than
among states located in different areas. ... The impact of geographical proximity on
security interaction is strongest and most obvious in the military, political, societal, and
environmental sectors.”209 Nevertheless, “regions do not just exist as material objects in
the world. Geography is not destiny. Instead, regions are social and cognitive constructs
that can strike actors as more or less plausible.”210 To be sure, RSCT recognizes the roles
identity plays in regional formation. Polarity, for instance, might affect, but it does not
determine, the character of security relations between states. The processes of
“securitization” are essentially open, and subject to influence by a host of factors.211
These factors include the domestic politics of the states within the region; the state-tostate relations within the region; the region’s interaction with other regions; and the
region’s interaction with global powers. Conceptualizing regions along these analytical
lines provides a two-way examination of regional formations; RSC creation can be topdown or bottom-up or a combination of both. For example, the motives behind the
208
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formation of a RSC could be to combat regional security threats or counter the threat of
intervention by a hostile external power. Nevertheless, once established, the RSC could
be used to contain either or both threats, even if that was not its initial purpose. Normally,
the pattern of regionalism stems from endogenous factors “and outside powers cannot
usually define, desecuritize, or reorganize the region. Unipolarity might in its extreme
form be an exception to this rule.”212 Yet, “other things being equal, the expectation is
that outside powers will be drawn into a region along the lines of rivalry existing within
it. In this way regional patterns of rivalry may line up with, and be reinforced by, global
power ones, even though the global power patterns may have had little or nothing to do
with the formation of the regional pattern [emphasis mine].”213
Structural realism’s emphasis on systemic variables can help to explain why external
great powers intervene into regions outside their sphere of influence. The rise of a peer
competitor is a strong cause for regional intervention. As Mearsheimer argues, a
hegemonic power in one region will likely intervene to check the rise of a potential
hegemon in another region.214 “Regional hegemons attempt to check aspiring hegemons
in other regions because they fear that a rival great power will be an especially powerful
foe that is essentially free to cause trouble in the fearful great power’s backyard. Regional
hegemons prefer that there be at least two great powers located together in other regions
because their proximity will force them to concentrate their attention on each other rather
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than on the distant hegemon.”215 Such a policy of pitting two nearby powers against one
another could be doomed to failure, however. The presence of an offshore hegemonic
power could lead to the formation of regional alignment if the external hegemon’s
intentions are perceived to be aggressive or threatening by regional actors.216
Constraints and incentives are two other important variables that drive external great
power intervention into regions outside their geographical sphere. When constraints are
low and incentives are high, great powers are likely to intervene; if constraints are high
and incentives low, intervention is unlikely; if constraints are low and incentives are low,
intervention is generally unnecessary; and if constraints are high and incentives high,
non-intervention or limited intervention is more likely with the exception of occasional
limited use of airpower.217 For example, the existence of the Soviet Union was a barrier
to U.S. entry into Central Asia, which was not high on America’s strategic radar in the
first place. The collapse of the Soviet Union removed the structural obstacle of another
superpower. Furthermore, American interest in the region was heightened after the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks because Central Asia served as a nexus for
transnational terrorist groups operating from the Middle East to Afghanistan.218
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Historical Evolution of Central Asian Security Complex
Central Asia continues to be shaped by its ancient, imperial and colonial histories.
The region is a complex mixture of Persian, Turkic, Mongolian, Slavic and Chinese
ethnicities, religion, art, language and culture. The introduction of Islam organized the
fragmented and nomadic tribes of the Eurasian steppe into a semblance of a regional unit,
although this was contingent on the vagaries of empire. For example, the region could be
treated more or less as a unit under the imperial rule of Genghis Khan or Nineteenth
Century Muscovy, but was much more inchoate and fractious under the numerous petty
khanates that ruled intermittently in the absence of empire. Islam remains central in
forming the identity of Central Asian peoples and the rise of “radical” Islam continues to
be a threat to China and Russia (and more recently, the United States). In fact, Islam
could be considered a centripetal force that organizes Central Asia into a locus of
engagement for external and internal actors, both state and non-state (e.g., as an
organizing identity for the peoples of the region and as a source of threat for the great
powers within and without).219
China and Russia have ties to Central Asia that date back millennia. China had
intermittent suzerainty in the eastern regions of Central Asia for more than 2,000 years,
beginning with the Han dynasty, as caravan traffic carrying Chinese silk to the Roman
Empire carved out what eventually became known as the “Silk Road.”220 China’s grip on
the Eastern reaches of Central Asia ended when the Tang dynasty lost control over
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Sinkiang to the Abbasids, but was restored in modern-day Xinjiang under the Manchus
and incorporated into the PRC shortly after World War II.
Central Asia long had been an integral part of Russian strategic calculations from
the tsars to the Bolsheviks, although Muscovy’s entrance postdated Han incursions.221
The region was a chessboard of the Nineteenth Century imperial rivalry between Great
Britain and tsarist Russia in what was called the Great Game. During the Game, Britain
feared St. Petersburg had designs, via Afghanistan, on the British crown jewel of India.222
As a prelude to the Twenty First Century rivalry between the SCO and the United States
in Central Asia, the Great Game similarly contributed to the formation of a regional
security complex through the policies of extra-regional actors, which generally ignored
the internal makeup of the region or the conception its inhabitants had of themselves.
“The grand eighteenth- and nineteenth-century concept of Central Asia envisioned the
region as a distinct geopolitical whole: Iran, Afghanistan, inner [or western] China, and
the territory of the present-day Soviet Central Asian republics, all divided into local tribal
domains and khanates.”223
For analytical purposes, the region can be examined over five historic epochs:
pre-Islamic, Islamic, post-Islamic, Soviet and post-Soviet.224 Through most of these
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major historical periods, Central Asia served as nexus between steppe and pastoral
peoples, and the main east-west trade route, the Silk Road, intersected the northern and
southern routes connecting the Middle East to India and to the northern forest-steppe
region. “In this way Central Asia became heir to both Perso-Islamic tradition of the
Middle East and Mongol heritage of the steppe, and was open to the influence from major
cultural regions of the pre-modern world – China, India, and the Islamic world.”225
Although the region was divided throughout history by culture, language,
religion, nationality, empire and statehood, Hooman Peimani argues that the history of
modern Central Asia is that of a region, not of five separate political entities (or states):
Over time Central Asia has been ruled either by foreign empires, which
incorporated the region into their territories as a single political unit, or by
a few regional multiethnic states. Rulers of these states never identified
themselves with specific ethnic groups. As a result, for most of their
history, the indigenous ethnic groups of this region have seen themselves
as members of a regional community sharing the same fate, rather than as
citizens of different states. Despite their recent independence, there are
indications that Central Asians will share more or less the same fate,
which will be that of the region.226
If past is prelude, then the people of Central Asian will continue to share the same
fate, at least for the present. As in the past, the region continues to be shaped by extraregional actors, which include both familiar and new faces. Since its beginnings as a
region, complexity has marked the evolution of Central Asia, but external forces have
continued to bind it into a complex.
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Pre-Islamic Period
The settled areas of Central Asia have been civilized for more than 4,000 years.
The Persian Achaemenid Empire (330-59 BCE.) was the first recorded political unit to
rule the region in the pre-Islamic era.227 The region played a significant role in the
political affairs of Persia, including its ancient rivalry with Macedonia, under Alexander
the Great, for control of trade routes linking India and China to the classical
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Mediterranean. After the invasion of the Huns in the Sixth Century C.E., the areas that
make up modern Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan were the only remaining part
of the Persian Empire under the Sassanid dynasty.228 The arrival of Turkic-speaking
peoples from Inner Mongolia in the Sixth Century “Turkified” the region and brought
nearly the entire Eurasian steppe under Turkic rule for three centuries.229 Under the
Seljuk Khanate, the Turkic tribes established control over the major cultural centers along
the Silk Road until the khanate’s downfall at the hands of the Mongol Golden Horde in
1141.230 As an ancestor to the Turks, the Seljuks established an ethnic link between
Central Asia and modern-day Turkey. 231 Finally, from the Fifteenth to Sixteenth Century,
the ethnolinguistic trend in Central Asia transformed the predominantly Persian-speaking
region into a Turkic-speaking one. “The last great nomadic wave from the Kipchak
Steppe introduced a critical mass of Turkic and Turkicized Mongolian nomads into
Central Asia, a portion of whom eventually settled in the oasis towns and merged with
the sedentary population.”232
Islamic Period
The Arabs entered Central Asia after their rapid conquest of the Sassanid Empire
in 651 CE and until the arrival of the Golden Horde in the Twelfth Century. After nearly
a century of dominance, the Arab conquerors brought the region firmly into the Islamic

228

Ibid.

229

Manz, Central Asia in Historical Perspective, 6.

230

Peter L. Roudik, The History of the Central Asian Republics, (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press,
2007), 35
231

Peinmani, Regional Security and the History of Central Asia, 25.

232

Maria Eva Subtelny, “The Symbiosis of Turk and Tajik,” in Central Asia in Historical Perspective, 50.

88

fold and the institutionalization of Sufi Islam became an integral part of the political,
social and cultural life of Central Asia.233 With Central Asia in its grasp, the Abbasid
Caliphate expanded Islamic rule to the borders of modern Mongolia and Sinkiang,
converting the Turkic-speaking peoples in the region and bringing Islam to the doorstep
of Tang China.234 The continued expansion of Islam to the East erupted into battle in 751
CE between the Tang dynasty and Arab forces under Ziyad ibn Salih, the governor of
Samarkand. The resulting Arab victory changed the regional dynamics for centuries, and
established the region’s Islamic identity among the Turko-Mongolian peoples, which
outlasted Soviet communism. “The Arabs’ victory had more lasting and far-reaching
consequences than this relatively obscure battle [in 751] seemed to promise, for China
never again ventured to claim mastery of territories beyond Sinkiang – with the minor
exceptions of the Ching (Manchus).”235
The Arabs Islamicized the Turkic, Mongol and Persian ethnic groups of the
steppe, but the Abbasid Empire was eventually overrun in the Twelfth Century by the
nomadic tribes of the Golden Horde, led by Genghis Khan. Unlike the Arab invasion five
centuries earlier, “the Mongols did not impose their culture, religion, language or
government on the people of Central Asia. Soon after the Mongol invasion, the initial
destruction and shock of conquest were substituted by unprecedented rise in cultural
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communication, expanded trade, and improved civilization.”236 Tamerlane, a descendant
of the Genghissid dynasty, reinforced the Turco-Mongolian tradition of the steppe, with
Samarkand as its seat. Bound to the East by Sinkiang (Xinjiang) on the Chinese frontier
and to the West by Arab and Persian lands of the Middle East, the region became a center
of civilization in the ancient Islamic world. Islam also served as an organizing force for
the conquerors of the region. Although the Turco-Mongolian tribes shared common
cultural, linguistic and religious histories separate from the Arabs, the heirs of the Great
Khan continued their conversion to Islam that began under the Abbasids in an effort to
unify a diverse group of people. Nevertheless, the nomadic lifestyle of the steppe made
unification extremely difficult.
Post-Islamic Period
Although organized under the rule of the descendants of the Great Khan, the
nomadic lifestyle of the steppe did not lend itself to unity and the khanates failed to join
together, leaving them vulnerable to colonization by Russia and Manchu China in the
Nineteenth Century. By the late Eighteenth Century, Russia had occupied the khanates of
Khiva, Bukhara, and Kokand and began to incorporate them into the Russian empire
while China completed its annexation of the Uighur-inhabited territories of Xinjiang.237
The rapid colonization of Central Asia by the two great powers, particularly Russia,
touched of the mad imperial scramble historians later termed the Great Game.
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During the Great Game, Mackinder’s logic of the Heartland as the “geographical
pivot of history” governed the region’s dynamics.238 Russia’s expansion into Central Asia
ultimately placed the Russian Tsar in conflict with the British Crown, sparking a rivalry
that endured for decades. During the scramble for Central Asian supremacy, the region
was shaped largely by outside forces jockeying for position within the larger geopolitical
balance of power. “British India was by the mid-nineteenth century stretching ever
northward towards the great barrier ranges. On the other side of the mountains, another
power, Imperial Russia, was advancing inexorably towards the same lofty peaks, and fear
of foreign invasion was another prime cause for territorial aggrandizement. It can be said
with considerable assurance that anxiety, first over French and then over Russian
invasion, was the chief influence on British Indian foreign policy throughout the
nineteenth century.”239 In fact, many of the same concerns the Russian foreign policy and
military establishment has about the United States today – military, economic and
normative – applied to Britain of the Nineteenth Century.
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The Great Game in Asia was played by the British for two reasons, one
strategic, the other cultural. By 1829, Lord Ellenborough and the Duke of
Wellington, the two men who began the game, were alarmed by the
expansion of the Russian empire in Asia; fearing that whenever Britain's
interests were opposed to Russia's in Europe, the Russians would threaten
to invade India. They wanted both to contain this expansion, and to
counter any threat of invasion, as far from India as possible. The means
they chose were commercial, to open the Indus to navigation in order to
flood central Asia with British goods. In the heady atmosphere of the early
Nineteenth Century they assumed that Britain's goods would be followed
by her values; what interested Ellenborough was the political not the
commercial gain. Khiva and Bokhara would prefer to associate with
progressive Britain rather than backward Russia. They would appreciate
that Britain, unlike Russia, wished to preserve and not to threaten their
independence.240
Although nowhere near as acute as the Great Game, the current regional balance of
power shares many of that period’s characteristics. The region was a site of contestation
between the major powers of that day, including extra-regional actors such as Britain,
Persia and Germany, and the outcome of the regional balance had an effect on the larger
systemic balance of power. Geopolitics, economics, norms and the military balance
played a role in externally forging a regional security complex.
As Bruce R. Kuniholm maintains, the scramble of the Great Game period offers
lessons about contemporary dynamics in Central Asia. The history of the region’s
geopolitics, he agues, could provide a “sea change in perspective and offer some
instructive cautionary observations to U.S. officials.”241 For example, in the Nineteenth
Century, Kuniholm writes that “the expansion of British sea power in the Indian Ocean
and Persian Gulf and the expansion of Russian troops into the Transcaucasus and Central
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Asia eventuated in a struggle for power across a region that stretched from the Balkans to
Afghanistan. Each great power – driven by the dictates of empire, motivated by fears of
dangers both imagined and real, or trying to ‘contain’ a rival by defensive action – sought
to serve its perceived interests and clashed with the other.”242 Indeed, similar fears
resonate today.243
The Soviet Period
During the period of Soviet rule, the Central Asian republics were basically an
appendage of the Russian state. Although technically independent, and like the other
republics, constitutionally allowed to secede from the Union, the five republics of
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were thoroughly
under the iron fist of Stalin by the time of the Second World War. The Communist Party
monopolized all aspects of social and political life in Central Asia, while culture and
economic development were subjected to communist ideology from Moscow.244
Attempts by the indigenous people of the region to maintain their historical roots or
national identities were declared signs of backwardness by the Bolsheviks. Russification
was the primary policy used by the Soviet Union to suppress religion and bring European
family patterns, particularly emancipation of women, to the region. The imposition of the
Cyrillic alphabet and Russian language “helped to establish cultural ties between Russia
and Central Asia and performed an ideological function of making all previously
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published books, mostly of religious and anti-Soviet content, obsolete and not available
to the mosques.”245
Soviet leadership also sought to reinforce its rule in the region through cultural
hegemony, a theme that echoes to the present. Michael Rywkin, for example, called
Stalin’s nationality policy in the region the “teacher-pupil relationship,” because, in 1929,
one of the Soviet leaders explained the aims of Soviet policy in Central Asia as “teaching
the people of the Kyrgyz Steppe, the small Uzbek cotton grower, and the Turkmen
gardener the ideals of the Russian worker.”246 The paternalistic relationship continues
today, with Moscow still the major political, economic and military influence in the
region and the Central Asian republics still subordinate to a neo-colonialist Russia.
The Post-Soviet Period
The dissolution of the Soviet state is a unique phenomenon in history given that
the center was not pulled apart from the periphery, but rather imploded on itself.247 This
historical peculiarity left the small Central Asian republics responsible to govern
themselves, a role they had little experience in carrying out. The confusion in the
aftermath of dissolution unleashed a number of crosscurrents in Central Asia. Submerged
nationalistic aspirations, including pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic movements, had been
growing throughout the post-Cold War period. The transformation from Soviet identities
to nationalists ones, however, crosscut the former Republics’ reliance on Russia in the
245
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military, security and economic sectors. “The initial euphoria of independence was
coupled with a sense of bitterness and distaste at being treated by Russia in the early
stages of forming the Commonwealth of Independent States as secondary partners of
lesser importance than its Slav European neighbors. In a bid to stand on its own, the
Central Asian leaderships preferred to not follow the Russian ‘jump into economic
uncertainty,’ and endeavored to preserve in a slightly modified form the old Soviet-type
economy.”248
The ethnic and national fallout from the breakup of the USSR were of severe
concern for the Kremlin, which feared for the safety of Russian ethnics living in the
former republics. An advisor to then-President Boris Yeltsin lamented that one Republic
with a sizeable Russian population, Kazakhstan, “could soon degenerate ‘into one
thousand Yugoslavs.’”249 Ethnic and civil flareups did erupt in the post-Soviet period,
most noticeably the Tajik civil war from 1992-1997 and deadly Osh riots of June 1990 in
Kyrgyzstan between irredentist Uzbek factions and Kyrgyz nationals. Despite
independence, the smaller states remained reliant upon Moscow. The Soviet Union
created the Central Asian republics in part to destroy the old identities that followed the
trade routes and waterways, a practice continued by modern-day Russia. The objective
was partly a failure because the old identities are still crucial in defining a Central Asian
identity, but also a success because the new states help determine the discussion about
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regional entities today.250 “The combination of these factors has proven to be problematic
as the Central Asian states are too weak to consolidate all the ethnic groups within their
borders and the ethnic borders are so diffuse that they can not provide a base for a strong
nation-state.”251
Although ethnic tensions at times have been high, and national and religious ideals
among the smaller republics endure, they should not be exaggerated. Centrifugal forces
are unlikely to break up the security complex as long as its affairs are tightly interwoven
with those of its larger neighbors. Furthermore, Russia remains a major pole of power in
the region and main guarantor of security in post-Soviet space.252 The next section
explores the role Russia, and increasingly China and the United States, play in organizing
the Central Asian security complex.
Central Asia as a Regional Complex
If a regional security complex is defined as a set of units whose security interests are
so interlinked that they cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one
another, then Central Asia clearly meets the criteria. Initially, as Buzan and Wæver point
out, Central Asia was a subcomplex of the Russian super-RSC, which included most of
the former Soviet republics under the auspices of the Commonwealth of Independent
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States (CIS).253 However, the CIS regime was ineffective in maintaining regional order
and quickly became obsolete. As one observer put it: “one problem with the CIS was that
European, Caucasian, and Central Asian sections had virtually no common interests.
Plans for economic integration could never be realized; some states like Belarus and
Kazakhstan sought closer economic integration with Russia, while others looked to
Europe or the U.S.”254
The creation of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which became
effective on 28 April 2003, delinked Central Asian security from the overarching Russian
RSC, and established the region’s autonomy separate from its predecessor, the Collective
Security Treaty (CST). The CSTO’s “mission was to combat terrorism, drugs trafficking,
and Taliban influences from Afghanistan. Moreover, it was a response to what was
perceived as American intrusion into Russia's security zone in Central Asia.”255 With the
disintegration of the CIS apparatus, which was mainly the result of Russian weakness in
the 1990s, the CSTO became the major vehicle for Russian influence in Central Asia and
the umbrella for which a regional concert was developed.256 Unlike the SCO, however,
the CSTO is a formal military alliance.
Whereas the CSTO is a vehicle for Moscow to protect its periphery, it is also
considered another buffer to U.S. penetration of the former Soviet sphere. Furthermore,
the organization has bound Central Asian military elites closer to their Russian
253

Leszek Buszynski, “Russia and the CIS in 2003: Regional Reconstruction,” Asian Survey 44, no. 1,
(Jan.- Feb., 2004): 158-167
254

Ibid, 161.

255

Ibid.

256

Gregory Gleason, “Inter-State Cooperation in Central Asia from the CIS to the Shanghai Forum,”
Europe-Asia Studies 53, no. 7 (Nov., 2001): 1077-1095.

97

counterparts and given Moscow greater control over the members’ military
establishments. “The CSTO since its formation in 2002 has served not only to train
Central Asian officers in Russian military academies and the Central Asian militaries in
anti-insurgent tactics at its Rubezh (frontier) military exercises but is also a framework
for delivery of both Soviet-era and more modern military equipment to the Central Asian
militaries at Russian internal prices.”257
Some critics of the Sino-Russo axis argue that Russia uses the CSTO not only to
counter American influence in Central Asia, but to limit Chinese advances in the region
via the SCO as well. However, the CSTO has been much less effective than the SCO at
excluding American influence from Central Asia. Moscow’s weakness in this regard has
pushed it to rely more on the SCO.258 “Russia’s failure to maximize the CSTO’s role in
removing American influence from the region has been offset by its success in creating a
multilateral opposition to America’s presence in the region inside the SCO.”259
The specter of terrorism and Islamic radicalism also has been a main organizing
principle for the Central Asian security complex since the end of the USSR. The five
smaller republics, China, India, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Turkey and the United States all
view the region as wellspring of instability and extremism.260 The attacks of September
11, 2001 changed the power relations within the region and “made Central Asia the
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epicenter of geopolitical shocks on a global scale and redefined the political situation
surrounding Central Asia.”261
However, regional formation in Central Asia is not limited to the threat of terrorism
and radicalism alone; energy security, pipeline politics, trade and economic development
also factor heavily into the equation.262 Geopolitical rivalry also centered on the
normative agenda that would define Central Asian ideology and political identity. For
much of the first decade of Central Asian independence, Western policies have been
driven largely by energy. This focus was also defined in a zero-sum, geopolitical context,
with an emphasis on securing export routes along a “carefully constructed strategic map
aimed at bypassing Russia and isolating Iran.263 “Through the 1990s, the promotion of
Turkey as a key U.S. proxy force in the region was also designed to bolster broader
geopolitical objectives of countering Russia and Iran and campaigning for pro-western,
secular democratization.”264
The remainder of this chapter examines the interplay between the domestic, regional
and international dynamics that have forged the Central Asian RSC. First, it investigates
the domestic interests of China, Russia and the United States in the region. That is
followed by a review of the external factors that have reinforced the Central Asian
complex into one of the world’s most complex and contested regions. Lastly, it
demonstrates that, despite divergent interests among China and Russia, the presence of
261
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even a small American footprint in Central Asia has pushed Beijing and Moscow to soft
balance the United States.
Domestic Interests
China
China’s broad goals in Central Asia are to strengthen security cooperation, fight
terrorism, promote regional stability, extend economic and trade relations, broaden
cooperation with Russia, create a new diplomatic image of China and promote
multipolarity.265 Increasingly, water security is becoming a strategic concern for the PRC
as well, and Central Asia will be looked to as source for dehydrated regions of inner
China.266 Central Asia also is viewed as an important future source of energy for China’s
rapidly growing economy. “China’s rising imports of oil at present and natural gas in the
future have made energy security one of the top concerns for the government.”267 For
some analysts, the formation of the SCO can be interpreted as an effort by Beijing to
secure energy security in Central Asia.268
Equally important for China is the rise of separatism in its restless Xinjiang
province, which makes up one-sixth of China’s territory and holds natural resources
critical to the PRC’s development. In fact, pacifying the region is a necessary component
of China’s geopolitical interests in Central Asia. Any pipeline infrastructure from Central
265
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Asia would have to pass through Xinjiang, and thus is susceptible to sabotage from
Uighur separatists.269 Uighur secessionists also are linked to transnational terrorist
organizations such as al Qaida and frequently find sanctuary with their co-ethnics in
border zones along Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. “The region has historically shielded
China from invasion from the Central Asian steppes and today provides areas of low
population where military maneuvers and nuclear testing can be conducted.”270
Furthermore, China’s “strategic rear” is crucial to its overall state security. “China’s
strategic focus will remain in the southeast in the foreseeable future, with western China
continuing to be the ‘rear’ in China’s master strategy for many years to come.
Nevertheless, only if the rear is secured will the strategic frontline be free from worry ...
As the squeeze on China’s strategic space intensifies, a stable western region takes on
additional importance as a strategic support for the country. The strategic significance of
western China is self-evident [emphasis mine].”271
Finally, identity plays a role in reinforcing Central Asia as a strategic locale in
Beijing’s strategic vision, which demonstrates the significance norms play in the national
interest of states.
For over 2,000 years, control over the region has been perceived by the
ruling powers of China as their “right,” an assertion of sovereignty which
is today every bit as emotion-ridden as the PRC's claim to Taiwan. This
position illustrates Chinese self-identity, another important ingredient in
Xinjiang's importance to China. Secondly, Central Asia has historically
been a stage upon which the heirs of Confucian civilization have played
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out their image of themselves, an image of cultural superiority, benevolent
rule and civilizing mission. … Suppression of ethnic languages and
history in Xinjiang is not related to political expediency alone.272
Russia
Similar to Beijing, Moscow has sought to combat Islamic terrorism and
radicalism and foster stability along its southern flank.273 Viewing Islam as a threat is not
a new phenomenon, however; since the tsarist period, Russia has been concerned with
pan-Turkic and/or pan-Islamic movements in the region.274 Russia also wants to reassert
its influence in the region and maintain control over Central Asian pipeline routes for
transportation of oil and gas from the Caspian Sea basin.275 Furthermore, the region
remains central to Russian military strategy. Under the CSTO, for example, Moscow
continues to train, arm and station troops in the region.276 Indeed, the CSTO has allowed
Russia to increase its control over Central Asian military elites through its joint staff and
command structure. On a planning level, all CSTO military exercises are proposed and
planned by the Anti-Terrorism Center (ATC) in Bishkek, which is officially supervised
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by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) director. “Given the role of former
security officials in Russia and their personal sense of loyalty to Russian Prime Minister
Vladimir Putin, clear formal and informal links exist between the ATC and the highest
members of the Russian government.”277
Regional concerns go beyond the military and security sectors. Russia is reestablishing strong economic and political links to the region that frayed after the
implosion of the Soviet Union by defining Central Asian interests and priorities and
concentrating the region’s resources in Moscow’s favor. To do this, Moscow has sought
to develop pro-Russian integration projects and to overcome the inefficient forms of
cooperation within the CIS framework.278 However, the CIS arrangements did not fully
realize the objectives of promoting regional Eurasian cooperation. Since 2000, the
Central Asian states had made efforts to improve the CIS in an effort to create a more
stable regime for post-independence inter-state cooperation. Irrespective of these efforts,
“outbreaks of insurgency and terrorism have created a region-wide sense of alarm that
has, in turn, contributed to a renewed sense of urgency to find formulas to enhance
cooperation in the region.”279
Geopolitically, Central Asia could link Russia in a “triangle” consisting of China
and India that could form a competing bloc with the United States and EU. Such a
strategic alliance would buoy the Russian arms industry – China and India purchase
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approximately 70 percent, or $3 billion annually, of total Russian arms exports.280
Although such prognostications might be premature, India could play a pivotal swing role
in the Central Asian balance of power by becoming a rival or a partner of China and/or
Russia or shifting to the West. “This is why Indian commentators consider that ‘India can
be an important swing player’ in the evolving international system; able to cooperate with
Russia and to an extent China in their strategic trilateral arrangement; yet also courted by
the United States and Japan in their particular alignments.”281
Finally, similar to China, the civilizing mission plays a strong role in Russian
policy in Central Asia. Moscow views itself as a uniquely Eurasian actor, which can be a
dynamic agent of ideational change in the region. Mesbahi makes this case when he
describes how Modern Russia seeks to transform the ‘Asian wing’ of the Eurasian entity
into a pan-Euro-Atlantic one. “The ‘immature’ states of the former Soviet Union (i.e.
Central Asia) … which ‘belong to another world,’ will by the persistence and dynamism
of an ‘enlightened Russian big brother’ become part of the Euro-Atlantic family. The
‘continuer state,’ now ‘civilized’ and ‘normal,’ will shed not only her Asiatic baggage but
will become the bridge that transforms the Central Asian part of the Union.”282
United States
For much of American history, Central Asia has not registered on the strategic radar
of U.S. officials. Remote and inscrutable, the region was too distant to matter much for
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American security and too impenetrable during the time of the Soviet empire to be of
interest.283 Yet, after the demise of the Soviet bloc, the region slowly began to open to
American capital and, much later, political and military objectives.284 American strategic
interest in Central Asia underwent a radical transformation after the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks. “Some in the United States, as elsewhere, see Central Asia as a pivotal
point in global politics, a bridge between east and west and between north and south, as
well as, in the terms of Mackinder, the heartland of the heartland. Some have seen it, in
contrast, as a backwater lying between essentially marginal regions-the periphery of the
periphery. Perspectives on the centrality of the region shift over time. For the United
States, the attacks of September 11 shifted Central Asia from the marginalia of foreign
policy to its centre.”285
As suggested by Miller, constraints and incentives factor into the calculus of
American strategic interests in Central Asia. During the Cold War, the cost of intervening
in the region was prohibitive. The collapse of the Soviet Union significantly lowered the
costs of intervention, and the strategic necessity to base troops in the region to fight the
war in Afghanistan greatly raised incentives.286 Currently, U.S. objectives in the region
are to fight terrorism, open the energy-rich Caspian basin to American capital and
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development, support human rights and foster democratization.287 Key to this strategy has
been the stationing of American troops in Kyrgyzstan, which has been an important
command post for antiterrorist operations in Afghanistan. American security concerns,
too, are tightly interwoven into its normative agenda, although some might question the
sincerity to which the United States values human rights and civil liberties when
juxtaposed against its core national interests.
The primary strategic goal of the United States is to see the development of
independent democratic and stable states, committed to the kind of political and
economic reform that is essential to modern societies and on the path to integration and to
the world economy. The United States follows a strategy in Central Asia (and elsewhere)
that is based on simultaneous pursuit of two related goals. The first of these goals is
security. The United States cooperates with the Central Asian republics to provide them
with an alternative to their Russian security umbrella. U.S. policymakers believe that
American models of democratization could bring stability to the smaller states, and thus
open them to Western norms and investment, particularly in the energy sector. Second,
the development of Central Asia’s economic potential, including its extensive natural
resources, requires free market economy reforms and foreign direct investment. Such a
normative agenda would integrate Central Asia into the world economy.288
More disturbing for Moscow and Beijing, however, is the potential for the American
presence in Central Asia to function as an offshore balancer against Chinese hegemony
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and a revanchist Russia. Ren Dongfeng asserts this point when he writes: “The USA
appears to have at least a potential objective of containing both China and Russia in
geostrategic terms by its military presence (especially its long-term presence) in Central
Asia, even if the primary purpose of its deployment was to combat terrorism.”289 Many
observers view coordination between Russia and China via the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization as a counterforce to this trend. The SCO was created in part as a “politicosecurity bulwark” against NATO expansion into Central Asia and U.S. military aid to
regional governments, “which China and Russia feared would have worked against their
geo-political interests as great powers bordering the region.”290
External Pressures and Regional Formation
A number of scholars have argued that endogenous factors are the main causes
behind the formation of the Central Asian RSC in general, and the SCO and CSTO in
particular. More specifically, they argue that the regional groupings such as the SCO and
CSTO were mainly to address the internal security concerns faced by China and Russia,
respectively (see Chapter Six).291 That view is indeed true. However, regional security
complex theory suggests that RSCs can evolve over time and change focus. Neoliberal
institutional theory also has demonstrated that evolutionary nature of international
institutions, including security organizations such as NATO.292
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The intervention of an external power can greatly alter the dynamics of a RSC, even
if there is a great deal of underlying tension among regional members. In the case of
Central Asia, the stationing of American forces in the region has intensified and
amplified the Russia-China “strategic partnership.” Indeed, regional cooperation can be
affected – positively or negatively – by actors outside the region. A history of
intervention by an external power might generate a shared sense of threat that produces
efforts to create and sustain a collective defense. In some cases, “the absence of threat
emanating from outside powers removes an often potent incentive to cooperate.
Moreover, outside powers may seek to structure cooperation within a particular region in
a manner consonant with their perceived interests, either to deny influence in the region
to an adversary or to establish control over the region's affairs.”293
In fact, many scholars argue that the U.S. presence in Central Asia is a main causal
mechanism solidifying their partnership, despite the latent conflict between Beijing and
Moscow – at least for the present. This was made clear during a joint appearance between
Chinese premier Hu Jintao and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in May 2008.
“China welcomed the fact that the newly elected Russian president chose China for his
first foreign visit outside the CIS. The significance of Medvedev’s visit to China, held on
23–24 May 2008, was highlighted by the signing of a Joint Declaration outlining their
agreement on major international issues. The joint declaration reaffirmed the
commitment of both countries to civilizational and cultural diversity within the world
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community and to the formation of a multipolar world.”294 In fact, as Vladimir Portyakov
points out, “relations with Washington will most likely have a greater impact on RussianChinese cooperation in the future than it has played before.”295
The SCO has reinforced the Central Asian security complex. Initially, the Shanghai
Forum (or Shanghai Five), as it was originally known until 2001, was designed to
delineate borders among the former Soviet republics and China following the collapse of
the Soviet Union. The forum also urged cooperation to combat the “three evils” of
terrorism, separatism and extremism that engulfed the region after the collapse of the
USSR. Each individual state had its own self-interest in strengthening regional
cooperation. Russia, as explained above, wanted to secure its southern flank and China
wanted to discourage separatism among the Uighur Turkic ethnic group in its restless
Xianjiang province.296 With little experience in self-governance, the smaller states of
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan also viewed regionalization as
crucial to their regime survival and economic and energy security because threats such as
“terrorism, extremism and separatism” crossed their porous borders with relative ease,
given the common linguistic, ethnic and religious bonds among the region’s peoples.

294

Vladimir Portyakov, “Russian-Chinese Relations: Current Trends and Future Prospects,” Russian
Analytical Digest 73, no. 10, (Feb. 2010), 2.
295

Ibid. 4.

296

In fact, transnational Islam could be viewed as another external factor organizing the Central Asian
security complex, although the broader topic of transnational Islam is beyond the scope of this study.
Nevertheless, “the Islamic threat, exaggerated or not, has shaped geopolitics of international and regional
actors since the early 1980s, and now, in the absence of Communism, will be the major factor in future
developments. From China’s Xinjiang Muslim region to India’s Kashmir and to Algeria in North Africa,
the Islamic factor has occupied a key place in geopolitical calculations” in Mesbahi, “Russia and the
Geopolitics of the Muslim South,” 308.

109

For the major actors, regionalization goes beyond shared threats of the “three evils”
or concerns of external influence. Economic development and energy security also have
played a major role in the development of the Central Asian RSC and is another source,
for now, of cooperation between Beijing and Moscow in the region. In fact, soft
balancing theory suggests that these sectors are more likely to be used to offset or
counterbalance American encroachment in the region.
Irrespective of the global economic crisis of 2009-10, economic ties between China
and Russia have made progress. Indeed, economic cooperation between the two countries
continues to be significant, with cooperation on energy improving from 2009 to 2010.
According to some analysts, future developments look promising as well. For instance, in
2009 China and Russia signed formal agreements exchanging loans for oil. “China will
provide long-term loans of $25 billion to Russia, with $15 billion going to the Russian oil
company Rosneft and $10 billion to the Russian oil transportation company Transneft. In
return, Russia will repay the loans by providing China with 300 million tons of oil, at an
average annual volume of 15 million tons, from 2011 to 2030.”297 Notwithstanding the
worldwide financial recession that impacted the economies of many world capitals, such
cooperation between the two regional powers is expected to continue in the absence of
transformational change at the systemic level.
Regionalization and the Military Balance
The regional politics of Central Asia has had an impact on the long-term strategic
military calculus of each major power (See Chapter Six). Consistent with offensive
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realism, the United States has begun to slowly encircle the PRC with military bases and
instillations in East Asia (Japan and Korea), South Asia (ASEAN members Singapore
and the Philippines and commitment to Taiwan), and now in Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan
and until recently, Uzbekistan). Offensive realists have argued for the past decade that
Beijing views American foreign policy in the Pacific and Northeast Asia as a long-term
threat to China’s national security, national unification and modernization.298
Whether or not Washington consciously seeks to constrain the rise of a hegemonic
China in Asia, the growing American military presence on the Eurasian landmass is
viewed by China as a long-term threat. For one, Beijing fears that the U.S. military’s
presence in Central Asia could inhibit its access to energy resources in the region in the
event of a confrontation, for example over Taiwan. To counter this threat, China would
like to diversify its energy imports from the Middle East and establish energy
independence in the region.299 Militarily, the PRC has purchased naval ships, including a
refurbished Soviet Kuznetsov-class carrier, from Russia specifically because of its
concerns that the United States could strategically deny China access to energy, for
example, via a naval blockade of the Straits of Malacca.300 China also has an active
aircraft carrier research and development program and the PRC’s shipbuilding industry
could start construction of an indigenous platform by the end of [2010] with the goal of
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having multiple operational aircraft carriers with support ships in the next decade.301 As
Evelyn Goh points out, China has created an “inside-out” model of Asian regional
politics in which an indigenous state – rather than an outsider [i.e. the United States] –
has become the primary security focus.302 Additionally, Chinese strategy of sea and air
denial is designed with an armed conflict against the United States in mind.303 “One
theme that continues to underlie many of the relationships China has established has been
the perceived need to act as a counterbalance to the U.S. In China’s eyes, the U.S. is not
only a global hegemon that needs restraining, but may also pose a threat to the stability
and status of China itself.”304 In order for China to assert its dominance in the region, it
must first remove the U.S. presence.305
Russia shares with China the fear of U.S. encroachment on its borders. NATO
expansion to the east and the U.S. establishment of bases in Central Asia has placed the
American military directly in Russia’s strategic backyard. In its weakened state, Russia
no longer possesses the military capabilities to internally balance against the United
States through an arms buildup. Its current strategy, therefore, is to rely on China, a
301
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policy that Dmitri Trenin describes as “leaning on the east to raise its stakes in the
west.”306 Although a number of scholars and policy analysts have argued that the SinoRussian tensions outweigh their respective fears of U.S. hegemony, such concerns were
for the time muted by American unilateralism, particularly the previous Bush
administration proposal to install a theater missile defense system based in Poland and
Czech Republic, a plan that the Obama administration has adopted with a few changes.307
Russia considers the growing American influence in Eurasia as more threatening to its
interest than a rapidly growing China. Thus, China and Russia are eager to foster a
stronger relationship to block American ability to extend its global dominance in the
region.308 Such thinking is made clear in Russian military strategy. The National Security
Concept of February 2000, for example, “reflected Russian reaction to the changing
strategic scene. With the new keywords of ‘multipolarity’ and ‘unipolarity,’ these
documents provided a conceptual basis for criticism of US policy and in favour of tactical
alliances in order to counter a growing US and Western influence in the Caucasus and
Central Asia.”309

306

Trenin, “Russia and Central Asia,” 83

307

The current administration of U.S. President Barack Obama scrapped the original plans for basing longrange interceptors in Poland and a radar system in the Czech Republic. The new system would focus on
short- and medium-range interceptors in a reconfigured missile defense plan. Romania and Bulgaria also
have offered basing for interceptor missiles and radar equipment for missile defense. See Karel Janicek,
“U.S. Wants Missile Defense Center in Czech Republic,” Associated Press, 30 July 2010. Accessed from
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100730/ap_on_re_eu/eu_czech_us_missile_defense_2
308

Subodh Atal, “The New Great Game,” The National Interest 81, (Fall 2005),103. Also see Buszynski,
“Russia and the CIS in 2003,” 163.
309

Lena Johnson, “Russia and Central Asia,” in Central Asian Security: The New International Context,
(London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2001), 99.

113

Conclusion
Viewing Central Asia as a regional security complex provides a strong reference
point for discussing the contemporary mechanics of balancing behavior. Even if a Central
Asian security complex organized around the SCO or CSTO is the result of endogenous
factors, as skeptics of soft balancing often point out, external pressures have hardened it.
Indeed, as RSCT and neoliberal institutional theory have shown, states can use regional
organizations for tasks beyond those for which they were envisioned.
In fact, the history of Central Asia, in specific, demonstrates the role external
powers play in heightening regional tensions. During the multipolar European system of
the early Twentieth Century, Mackinder feared a continental alliance between Russia and
Germany because “the oversetting of the balance of power in favour of the pivot state,
resulting in its expansion over the marginal lands of Euro-Asia, would permit the use of
vast continental resources for fleet-building, and the empire of the world would then be in
sight. This might happen if Germany were to ally herself with Russia.”310 Fate, ironically,
has turned Mackinder’s logic on its head. In the past, the people of the Eastern and
Western rimlands trembled at the thought of the Horde storming like a bolt of lightning
from the steppe. Those ancient fears have subsided and the threat now is penetration of
the Heartland by a great maritime power from the Rimland.
Regional coordination, i.e., soft balancing, between China and Russia is
predicated on their anxieties of American penetration into their sphere of influence and
encroachment on their borders. Although endogenous factors have contributed to the
formation of the Central Asian security complex, it is structural considerations that play
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the greatest role in the “strategic partnership” between Chinese and Russia. Analytically
and theoretically, it would be difficult to explain why two powers with so many divergent
interests would coordinate their expectations to frustrate the United States in the absence
of structural considerations. Soft balancing offers much insight. There is a convergence
of interests between Russia and China due to their shared suspicion of the American
military presence in the region, their common concern about Islamic radicalism in
Central Asia, and ‘the strategic partnership’ formed in response to a U.S.-dominated
unipolar world. “But this could change, and probably will. In time, the U.S. military
presence is bound to be scaled back, perhaps even eliminated; Central Asia is quite
unlikely to become a region of abiding strategic centrality in Washington’s eyes; indeed,
absent 9/11 it would have not. An American disengagement and the continuing shift in
the balance of power between Russia and China in the latter’s favor in the decades ahead
could alter the calculations in Beijing and Moscow.”311
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CHAPTER V
THE NORMATIVE VISION OF CHINESE AND RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY
Regional Institutionalism, Multilateralism and Democratic Pluralsim
If the Western vision of global norms is developed from the concept of solidarism
grounded in the universality of liberal values, Russian and Chinese views rest on the idea
of pluralism, or the view that the good life can be achieved through a diversity of political
and cultural traditions. The former has framed the global discourse since Bretton Woods;
the latter, though maybe much older, has resurfaced as a challenger to the established
normative order. In the contemporary international system, the pluralistic tradition has
reemerged as a rival to the dominant liberal order championed by the United States.
Unlike the Western concept of institutions, with their formal procedures, binding rights,
rules and obligations, the new pluralist model avoids legalistic rules, is informal and
decides by consensus rather than majority vote.312 In contrast to the Western concept of
democracy, which focuses on the right of citizens, either directly or through
representation, to determine their fate, the pluralistic view of asserts the right of states to
pursue governance models that they believe best help them best position themselves
within the system.
For the past century, the liberal model advocated by Western powers has largely
been responsible for shaping the contemporary global landscape. Although these policies
– in recent years termed neoliberalism or the “Washington Consensus” – have served
some developing nations, the promulgators of liberalism have been the main
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beneficiaries, despite the economic downturn that hit world financial markets in 2009.
Emerging powers recognize that their interests are not always in harmony with the norms
of the hegemonic system. The recourse for emerging powers, therefore, is to develop new
norms that can help them achieve their own preferences.
This chapter analyzes how China and Russia view Western norms in general, and
American ones in particular, while exploring their own unique perception and utilization
of soft power. Attempts to develop normative capabilities are essential for a soft
balancing strategy because they could attract allies alienated by the hegemonic bloc. In
the Twenty-first Century, the power of persuasion will be as critical, if not more so, than
military power or economic prowess. States that effectively harness their soft power will
have substantial opportunities to alter the normative structure of the international system.
Building new alliances, opening up new areas for capital investment and resource
extraction, and creating new institutions without Western input, might not only increase
Chinese and Russian prestige, but substantially improve their hard power, putting them in
a better position to hard balance the United States.
It is necessary to understand the strategic vision of Chinese and Russian foreign
policy to grasp the indirect role soft power plays in their partnership. The Russian and
Chinese regional institutional model, for example through the SCO, is viewed as
inefficient by many critics because it lacks formal protocols and transparency. However,
what Western observers view as informal and opaque, China and Russia consider flexible
and adaptable.313 The Chinese and Russian norm of “non-interference,” slammed by
many liberals as irresponsible, is nevertheless considered a strategic advantage by the
313
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thinkers in Beijing and Moscow. As argued in Chapter Two, such tactics are part of an
overall soft balancing strategy because they allow China and Russia to challenge the
United States indirectly and without recourse to military measures.
The rival Eurasian normative model rests on three main precepts: the promotion
of Chinese and Russian soft power (e.g., through culture and language); the creation of
regional institutions to limit American influence (both hard and soft) in their “spheres of
influence;” and support for alternative concepts of democracy and the rule of noninterference. Each of the three is an indirect challenge to the American grand strategy of
primacy (unipolarity), globalization of universal liberal norms, and intervention in cases
of gross human rights violations.
By attempting to reshape the normative order, China and Russia are setting what
Arnold Wolfers referred to as “milieu goals,” which can create an environment that is
more conducive for states to pursue their social or economic progress.314 The rivalry over
these goals can be intense because they help set conditions for states to achieve their
preferences. Additionally, identifying the “milieu goals” of great powers can lead to a
greater understanding of soft balancing. Milieu goals are the underlying – or latent –
source of a state’s normative capabilities; they link the domestic characteristic of a state
to its foreign policy and, thusly, to the international level. The greater a state’s material
capabilities, the greater opportunities to project its soft power abroad. However, a state’s
soft power is a reflection of its own internal makeup.
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Although late to the game in recent times, China and Russia are rapidly trying to
advance their global vision in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Southeast
Asia.315 To be clear, however, this study does not make the case that China and Russia
are functioning democracies, regardless of the definition, or are spreading a truly
democratic doctrine. Rather, it maintains that both countries use the language of
democracy to present their own global outlook in accord with extant global norms. The
discourse about democracy is a form of “strategic language politics” in which actors
compete over the meaning of words and their functional usage.316 “Strategic language
politics” is not a simple debate over words, but an important struggle to frame the global
agenda. The remainder of this chapter assesses how thinkers in Beijing and Moscow
conceive of norms as a strategic asset to balance the United States and restore the system
to multipolarity. That assessment, however, is preceded by a brief discussion of the role
soft power played in Soviet and Maoist China foreign policy.
The historical use of soft power in China and Russia
Historians have pointed to the successful use of culture in diplomatic relations
over time, from ancient Persia to the British Empire.317 Like their predecessors, modern
Russia and China are rediscovering the utility of culture, ideas and norms as an
instrument of power. To be sure, soft power was an integral part of Soviet and preCommunist Chinese foreign policy. For example, in addition to offering military and
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economic aid to allies, the Soviet Union promoted socialist norms, Russian language and
culture to developing nations during the Cold War. Before “sovereign democracy” was
invented, Soviet ideologists developed the concept of "national democracy" in an effort
“to promote political and socioeconomic conditions conducive to the strengthening of
local Communist parties and [as] a means of obtaining neutralist support for Soviet
foreign-policy objectives.”318
Like their Western counterparts, Soviet officials wanted to spread their socialistinspired economic models. Nikolai Fedorenko, the Soviet ambassador to the United
Nations in 1964, described Moscow’s socialist agenda in Africa as advocating
nationalization of the properties of foreign monopolies, development of local industry,
creation and strengthening of a state-owned sector of the economy, and radical
agricultural reforms.319 To help implement these reforms, the Soviet Union would
provide credits, low-interest loans and guaranteed market access to African states.320
From the time of Lenin to Khrushchev, Soviet policy was to support various anticolonialist movements as a bulwark against expanding Western influence. This policy
was carried out through the financial and political support of local socialist and
communist organizations. “The building of communism-socialism in Communist states,
the national-liberation revolution, and the struggle of the working class in capitalist states
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were seen as comprising this process.”321 However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union,
Marxism-Leninism, the mythical raison d'être of the Soviet state322 no longer provided a
viable normative alternative at the systemic level. To redress this deficit, Russia under
Putin increased funding a number of soft power initiatives to repair its image.323
China has used cultural influence in its dealings with foreigners throughout its
long history. For instance, the Manchu dynasty absorbed tribes into their rule through
spreading language and culture.324 The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence adopted
during the Mao era are another example of Chinese attempts to spread international
norms to better position members of the non-Aligned Movement.325 In recent years, much
of China’s soft power outreach has been in developing nations, particularly in Africa.
Over the past decade, China has developed the so-called “Beijing Consensus” model as a
competing framework to the neoliberal “Washington Consensus.” The term describes
PRC investments, aid, and trade agreements with developing nations outside the purview
of Western international institutions and without the “strings attached” to Western norms,
rules and regulations.326
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Although China and Russia have long histories of using soft power (although the
term is of rather recent coinage), their capacity to project it badly trails that of Western
powers.327 Nevertheless, both states are keen to increase their capabilities across this
strategic dimension. After a period of insularity during the Cultural Revolution and
hostile relations with other powers, China has embraced a softer approach to foreign
affairs since its Open Door policy.328 Russia’s relative soft power, too, has increased
considerably. “Although Russia is hardly in a position to compete with Western nations
on a world scale for instance, it might take a long time before the above noted channel
can move closer to such heavyweights as the BBC and CNN Russia's soft power capital
in the former Soviet region is undoubtedly special.”329
The remainder of the chapter details how Russia and China have increased their
soft power to project a more positive image abroad, in general, and as method to balance
American influence, in particular. Indeed, their development of soft power capabilities in
many cases is in direct response to the influence of American norms in their spheres of
influence. “Demonstrating a heightened awareness of soft power’s potential for wielding
influence abroad, rising global players are mobilizing resources accordingly. China’s soft
power advances reflect this wider trend and the shifting diplomatic balance.”330
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The Culture of Chinese and Russian National Security
Chinese Charm Offensive: Confucianism meets Socialism
As part of its new “charm offensive,”331 China has begun to draw upon its ancient
Confucian heritage to provide an alternative cultural program to the Classical Western
tradition. This theme was expressed during the 17th National Congress of the Communist
Party of China in October 2007, when President Hu called for enhancing the “soft power”
of Chinese culture. In a keynote speech, Hu said, “Culture has become a factor of
growing significance in the competition in overall national strength.”332
To complement its “peaceful rise” strategy, the PRC has followed in the footsteps
of the British Council, the French Alliance Francaise and the German Goethe-Institut by
opening Confucian Institutes to promote Chinese language and culture abroad.333 China
has set up 320 such institutes around the world, including 10 in Africa, and plans to open
more than 500 by 2011. Beijing has spent more than US$26 million to build new
institutes,334 paltry by Western standards but a substantial sum for what until recently was
considered a developing nation. “The Chinese plan of launching Confucius Institutes
worldwide is less an attempt to use Confucius as a Father Christmas-like symbol of
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avuncular Chineseness than a pitch in forging a soft power platform modeled on the UK's
British Council.”335
For the Chinese, soft power means anything outside of the military and security
realm, including not only popular culture and public diplomacy, but also more coercive
economic and diplomatic levers such as aid and investment and participation multilateral
organizations.336 The advancement of soft power has not been limited to just the political
or cultural sphere in China. Fan Yinhua, deputy political commissar of the PLA Navy,
also called for increased spread of Chinese socialist ideology to combat the spread of
what he termed a strategy of “cultural subversion and infiltration” and “smokeless”
ideological and cultural warfare used by Western capitalism to undermine China. “We
must take the building of the socialist core values system as an important strategic
project,” Fan wrote in an essay on Chinese soft power.337
Because China is concerned that its policies will be misrepresented in Western
media, the dean of Tsinghua University’s journalism school proposed building a set of
soft power-promoting institutions, including home-grown media outlets with global
reach, NGOs, and think tanks to compete with similar Western institutions.338 In 2010,
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the Chinese Communist Party called for increasing the nation’s soft power when it
released its 12th year plan on National Economic and Social Development. According to
the plan, the PRC would increase the use of news media outlets, including the Internet, to
enhance the nation’s communication capabilities; increase support for non-profit cultural
undertakings and cultural heritage protection, and enhance international competitiveness
and influence of Chinese culture.339
The 2008 Beijing Olympics were an opportunity for China to showcase its soft
and hard power. During the Games, officials touted the “Chinese Dream.” Unlike the
“American Dream,” which focuses on individual achievements and success, the “Chinese
Dream” applies to nations as a whole and provides an attractive development model for
emerging nations.340 In fact, it was China’s close relations with African states that helped
Beijing secure the Olympics in the first place.341 According to news reports, “Beijing
appeared to receive broad international support beyond the developing nations where it
has gained favor by building sports stadiums over the years.”342 Continuing to follow in
the path of the United States, China has started its own version of a Peace Corps-style
organization to send skilled volunteers abroad and is increasing the number of
international students who attend Chinese universities, particularly those from Africa and
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Asia.343 While the Voice of America was cutting its Chinese broadcasts to 14 from 19
hours a day, China Radio International was increasing its broadcasts in English to 24
hours a day. As Joseph Nye argued in a 2005 essay on China’s soft power, “In a global
information age, soft sources of power such as culture, political values, and diplomacy
are part of what makes a great power. Success depends not only on whose army wins, but
also on whose story wins.”344
Russian Soft Power: Sovereign Democracy as a New Global Norm
Similar to China, Russia has been developing its own normative vision and is
attempting to promote it abroad. The two powers’ strategies share much in common and
often complement one another. They consistently promote their mutual visions in forums
such as United Nations and in regional organizations such as the SCO. In Central Asia,
for example, Russian authorities are aware of the possibilities of new media and have
established a state-funded international television network to broadcast in English. Prime
Minister Putin's has called for the creation of a special department for Interregional and
Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries at the Kremlin to utilize Russia’s soft power
dimension more seriously.345 In response to the “Color Revolutions” in Eurasia and
Central Asia, Putin endorsed “continuing the civilizational” role for the Russian nation in
post-Soviet space.346
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Moscow has taken a more assertive foreign policy since the U.S. entry into
Central Asia after the 9-11 attacks and the resulting influence of Western NGOs. In
response to increased Western exposure in the region, Russian has trained its own youth
organizations, restricted the activities of western NGOs in Russia and warned the United
States against interference with Russia’s domestic developments.347 Russia’s soft power
strategy was articulated in a Foreign Ministry report called “A Review of the Russian
Federation’s Foreign Policy.” Commissioned by the Kremlin and released 27 March,
2007, the report advocated for a “more equitable distribution of resources for influence
and economic growth” and defended the notion of collective leadership and multilateral
diplomacy as an alternative to unilateralism and hegemony in international relations.348
Russia has taken a greater role in developing its own version of democracy as
well. The Kremlin’s leading ideologist, Vladislav Surkov, defined sovereign democracy
as “the need to defend an intellectually determined path to political development and to
protect economic prosperity, individual freedom, and social justice from potential threats
… [such as] ‘international terrorism, military conflict, lack of economic competitiveness,
and soft takeovers by ‘orange technologies’ in a time of decreased national immunity to
foreign influence.”349 Surkov’s notion of democracy shares much in common with his
Chinese counterparts.
The renewed focus on soft power is not simply a passing fancy for the Kremlin.
Increasing Russian soft power is deemed a vital national security interest and one that is
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necessary to offset the United States’ hegemonic ambitions. “We view the appearance of
a powerful military bloc on our borders … as a direct threat to the security of our
country,” Putin said of the Western promotion of “Color Revolutions” after a 2008
NATO summit. “National security is not based on promises.”350
Non-interference as a new global norm
The role of strategic language politics
China has made great strides in transforming its international image. Indeed,
China’s increasing engagement in Africa and Asia is part and parcel of a wider policy
that manifests itself equally in China’s relations towards other regions of the world such
as Latin America and the Middle East 351 The charm offensive strategy is particularly
shown in China’s (and Russia’s) tendency to reach out to countries that have strained
bilateral tensions with Washington, Venezuela, Iran and Sudan being the most prominent
examples.352 Many of these countries have an affinity for China’s development model,
which expresses the right of sovereign states to choose their own path of development.
Rooted in Confucianism, China’s democratic model is “founded, not upon homogenizing
universalisms that inevitably lead to hegemonism, but on a simultaneous recognition of
commonality and difference.”353 Such a development route is appealing for countries that
feel straightjacketed by the one-size fit all policies of structural adjustment mandated by
the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.
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This development model is founded upon the Chinese philosophy of nonintervention as a fundamental premise of democratization. In contrast to the liberal notion
of democracy as a bottom up process, China views democracy as top down. In other
words, democratization for China resides at the systemic level and applies to the selfdetermination of states, not necessarily of citizens within those states. Beijing’s vision of
democracy corresponds with the realist notion of the “state” as an autonomous actor. For
China and many other non-Western nations, including Russia, the state is viewed as a
singular unit and development and prosperity is measured by national power. Human
security under this concept of sovereign or managed democracy emphasizes economic
well-being and stability over political or individual rights, what Fareed Zakaria calls a
form of “illiberal democracy.”354
The illiberal paradigm of democracy is attracting smaller powers to the BeijingMoscow axis. For example, “the Central Asian states, finding the American liberal
democracy a price too high, followed the Russian model … in which states, through the
vote of their people, can choose the social system they feel best for them. Unlike liberal
democracies, with institutions committed to upholding liberties through a system of
checks and balances, the Russian model is conceived of a strong elected executive who
coordinates institutions of national power.”355 This magnetic appeal is not limited to the
Central Asian members of the SCO, but also is gaining traction in other regions of the
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world, where democracy is a tertiary concern to social justice, economic security and
stability.
These language games go beyond mere rhetoric; they point to states’ broader
strategic concerns about balance of power and national interest. From this standpoint,
norms become a crucial capability that allows weaker states to engage with the
predominant rules of the system while simultaneously seeking to transform them. In this
way, China and Russia reflect the language of democracy used in the West while
refracting its usage to correspond with their own interests. Such a strategy shifts the
narrative in their favor because, although they adopt the language of the norm, they
encode it with their own meaning.356
To illuminate this point, William A. Callahan found that the meaning of
“democracy” was substantially different when he compared policy papers drafted by the
European Union and China concerning bilateral relations between Brussels and
Beijing.357 “While the EC underlines its stake in China emerging as a power that ‘fully
embraces democracy, free market principles and the rule of law’, the PRC paper repeats
‘democracy’, but in a way that shifts the meaning from domestic political reform to
safeguarding national sovereignty in international space: ‘China will, as always, respect
diversity in the world and promote democracy in international relations in the interest of
world peace and common development’ [emphasis added].”358 These “strategic language
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politics” are indicative of soft balancing because they can organize a new normative
framework into an alternative pole of power without directly challenging the hegemonic
order. They also reveal the underlying tension between great powers at the systemic
level that many analysts often neglect because of their narrow focus on material
capabilities.
Regional organizations: A Multivector approach
To increase their power, emerging states can turn to international institutions to
bind the reigning hegemon through bureaucratic inertia or denial of access. Russia and
China have sought such a strategy by increasing their leverage against the United States
in arenas such as the UN Security Council and at G-8 summits. Additionally, the two
powers have worked through regional institutions in an attempt to limit or deny American
access to geographical areas deemed sensitive by Beijing and Moscow. Working through
such institutional arrangements allows Russia and China to “play the whole field” rather
than be limited by their inability to project power globally.359 This strategy has not
always been successful – the unsuccessful attempt by the UN Security Council to deter
the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the SCO’s inability to completely dislodge U.S. forces from
Central Asia are glaring examples – but they do raise the cost of doing business for the
United States by forcing it to go alone or shoulder the burden through unilateral action.
Nevertheless, unsuccessful balancing should not be considered an absence of balancing.
The changing configuration of the international system has forced great powers to
adapt their behavior as well. Russia has followed a similar path in Central Asia, where it
359
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prefers to act in the context of multilateral regional organizations such as the SCO when
balancing U.S. power. In the past, Russia acted independently in its foreign relations with
the Central Asian republics. Today, however, Moscow’s relations with the republics are
mediated through regional organizations and treaties, such as the CSTO and CIS.360
Under Putin and his predecessor, Medvedev, Moscow considers regional institutions a
central element in the security architecture of Central Asia. Leadership positions in
regional and international institutions do more than protect Russian influence; they also
increase Russian prestige. “Another important factor that effects the Russian perception
of security was her rotating presidency of the G-8 in 2006. It gave Russia a chance to
promote her own vision of leadership in the modern world.”361
The Chinese share a similar multivector view in regards to regional institutions. In
Central Asia, Beijing recognizes that it must work through institutions to achieve its
interest, which include balancing against the United States. China also operates within
these institutional confines to alleviate fears Russia might have of Beijing’s rapid growth.
“Throughout its vast history, Chinese strategy towards its Central Asian frontier was
cognizant of the fact that the power of the center was linked to its ability to project its
influence into the distant periphery.”362 One way to connect to the “periphery” is through
the SCO, which has allowed China to deepen its ties in the region without alienating
Russia.
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At the global level, China continues to raise its profile in the UNSC and broaden
its role in regional organizations such as ASEAN. The Chinese conception of regional
organizations, however, differs markedly from that of the Western viewpoint. Whereas
the Western notion of institutions is based on liberal precepts of rule of law, transparency,
formality and efficiency, the Chinese model is guided by general governing principles
that recognize collective interests and allows actors to maneuver in concert toward a
shared goal while maintaining the freedom to pursue their agendas at different speeds.363
“This kind of flexibility permits multilateral cooperation to take root and maintains a
shared identity within a disparate group.”364 Russia also emphasizes institutional
frameworks that “create mutual respect, equality, and mutual benefit.” Such language is
usually code for obtaining a veto over American unilateralism “to ensure that any major
changes in the international system require consensus” – something that would be
unnecessary if power was more evenly distributed globally.365
Conclusion
As Zakaria notes, Russia and China’s search for political and economic systems
that work for them will have enormous ramifications for the global balance of power.366
Whether China and Russia are truly democracies – illiberal or not – is beyond the scope
of this study. From the standpoint of soft balancing, however, Moscow and Beijing’s
strategic use of the “democracy” norm is extremely relevant. An assessment of their
363

Arase, “Non-Traditional Security in China-ASEAN Cooperation,” 814.

364

Ibid.

365

Stephen Blank, “Pax Americana in the Persian Gulf and the Contradictions of Russian Foreign Policy,”
in Kaim, Great Powers and Regional Orders, 224.
366

Zakaria, The Future of Freedom, 91.

133

thinking demonstrates that developing norms is a major component of their concept of
national power. The analytic used in my study does not ignore the consequences of raw
material power. Indeed, as neoclassical realists argue, soft power is an extension of hard
power and a reflection of domestic characteristics. However, as a separate strategic asset,
soft power can be applied as a balancing mechanism when states cannot match the hard
power of a hegemon.
American unilateralism is disturbing middle and great powers and at times even
chafes U.S. allies.367 Outright violation of the hegemonic order, however, can draw the
focused enmity of the United States, something Russia and China can ill afford because
of their lack of military capabilities relative to the United States. Co-opting the language
of democracy and utilizing institutions, however, presents China and Russia as
responsible powers and potential allies for emerging powers. In the absence of vast
material or military incentives to offer allies, China and Russia provide ideological cover
for states that seek to evade the normative structure of the system, which can be as
binding as its material structure. Beijing and Moscow’s continued opposition to stricter
American-backed sanctions against Iran is a case in point. For example, Moscow’s
consistent objection to tougher sanctions against Tehran – which the West accuses of
clandestinely seeking a nuclear weapons program – could be viewed as a “declaration of
independence from the United States … [because] Russian foreign policy elites have
finally abandoned any beliefs that Moscow should work with the United States to define
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paradigms of world order in general and to influence Iranian behavior in particular.”368
Chinese support for Iran is based on similar concerns about American hegemony.
For smaller states ostracized by the hegemonic system, this new axis is a strategic
alternative to complete isolation. Nevertheless, it would be misguided to dismiss the
alignment between Moscow and Beijing as one of simple convenience. Great powers are
not “great” only because they are strong, but because they want to be leaders; and
leadership requires vision. A state’s vision is rooted in its milieu goals, which in turn is
based on its unique nature. Material capabilities remain the central concern at the
strategic level of balance of power, however, if that structure cannot readily be altered,
then the competition can shift to the normative dimension. Military strategy requires an
understanding of an opponent’s force structure, weapons systems and doctrine. A similar
approach is necessary for the study of normative strategy.
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CHAPTER VI
SOFT BALANCING AS A GRAND STRATEGY: THE SCO CASE
Proponents of soft balancing argue that the strategy uses indirect measures to
check hegemonic power. These tactics are unlikely to involve formal military alliances or
arms buildups because such measures are ineffective against a hegemon whose
capabilities far outstrip those of its nearest competitors. According to Robert Pape, the
logic of balancing against a sole superpower is about coordinating expectations of
collective action among a number of second-ranked states. “In the short term, this
encourages states to pursue balancing strategies that are more effective at developing a
convergence of expectations than in opposing the military power of the leading state.
Building cooperation with nonmilitary tools is an effective means for this end.”369
This chapter focuses primarily on the balancing methods outlined in Chapter
Three, particularly the use of “normative capabilities” to offset hegemonic encroachment
or influence in a regional security complex. Generally unable to compete with the United
States in the military and economic spheres, great powers have turned to the normative
dimension to balance U.S. hegemony. The normative dimension of capabilities should be
taken as seriously as military and economic threats, given the fear U.S. normative power
has stoked in Beijing, Moscow and other world capitals.
Soft balancing methods also include attempts at territorial denial (especially
basing rights), entangling diplomacy, economic strengthening (regional trading blocs,
e.g.) and signals of resolve to balance. These methods are most likely to occur at the
regional level, which as explained in Chapter Four, offer a ready-made buffer zone for
369
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great powers attempting to check American unilateralism and U.S. penetration into their
spheres’ of influence. While these low-level efforts are designed to balance against the
United States, they do so in a manner that will not harm economic ties or draw the
focused enmity of the hegemonic power.370 However, “if the unipolar leader’s aggressive
policies do not abate, increasingly intense balancing efforts could evolve into hard
balancing.”371
This chapter explores how China and Russia have “coordinated expectations” via
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, their bilateral relations with one another, and
their multilateral relations with the smaller Central Asian republics. It looks for consistent
behavior by the two powers to undermine the United States using primarily normative
means, both independently and through the SCO. The main focus of this chapter is how
the Beijing-Moscow axis has countered American normative power projection, including
its promotion of Western conceptions of democracy and human rights, and its support for
the varied Color Revolutions in the region. It begins with a brief overview of the SCO
and its evolution over the past two decades. Next is an analysis of Chinese and Russian
attempts, both through the SCO and in tandem with other regional actors, to soft balance
against U.S. influence in the region. The chapter proceeds with a response to the criticism
of the SCO as a balancing mechanism in Central Asia and concludes with an assessment
of the successes and failures of the soft balancing alignment and the likely causes for
those outcomes. It finds, in this case, that the intensity of soft balancing correlates with
increasing American intervention in Central Asia.
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At the outset of this discussion, a word of caution is necessary. Soft balancing
proponents, including the author of the current study, do not argue that such alignments
are deeply integrated or derived from shared principles other than those involving
measures to counteract a hegemonic power. In other words, it does not make the case that
China and Russia have formally cooperated at the official level to balance the United
States. Theoretically, as has been demonstrated in Chapter Three, the partnership is an
alignment rather than alliance, a key distinction. According to Snyder, “alignments,
whether or not they have been formalized as alliances, are essentially expectations in the
minds of statesmen about future interactions. These expectations will, of course, be held
with varying degrees of confidence. Their principal sources are conflicts and common
interests among states, differences in capability, observation of each other’s past
behavior, and formal alliances.”372 From this standpoint, a pattern of behavior that
demonstrates coordinated expectations could be considered soft balancing, particularly
when such actions are repeated over time by the same actors and in the face of the same
systemic constraints. As He and Feng ask (rhetorically), if not soft balancing, then
what?373

Evolution of the SCO
From Shanghai Spirit to Shanghai Cooperation Organization
During the Cold War, Moscow and Beijing had frequent skirmishes over
borderlines. However, with the waning of the Soviet Union, China and Russia moved
toward rapprochement with Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev and Chinese President
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Jiang Zemin signing a joint communiqué in 1989 to resolve their border disputes. The
entente between Beijing and Moscow led to the formation of the Shanghai Five (also
called the Shanghai Forum) in 1996, which later evolved into the SCO. After the demise
of the Soviet Union, the Shanghai Forum demilitarized the border between China and the
former Soviet republics of Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan.374 “Following
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the relationship evolved even more quickly, and during
the April 1996 summit between Boris Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin, the two sides formally
declared they would ‘develop an equal and trustworthy strategic partnership aimed at the
21st Century.’”375 The “strategic partnership” continued to solidify, with former Russian
president Vladimir Putin and Chinese premier Hu Jintao calling for a return to a
multipolar world order. The two leaders worked together to turn the Shanghai Forum into
a more effective institution.
The partnership was expressed publicly once more in a Joint Declaration of the
Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on 26 March 2007. The
declaration mentioned the intention of both sides to contribute in every way possible to
the expansion of the SCO’s ties with the Eurasian Economic Community and the
Collective Security Treaty Organization, institutions in which Russia plays a major
role.376 Vladimir Portyakov argues that his joint announcement demonstrated Chinese
respect for Russia’s interests and strategic roles in the region. The expansion of the SCO,
374
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Portyakov writes, showed that “the consistent implementation of [a] course aimed at
cooperation, but not rivalry, between Russia and China in the SCO could serve the
progress and greater efficiency of the organization.”377
Indeed, such “strategic partnerships” can be adopted “in lieu of formal alliances.
It is a preferred option because it provides security cooperation without cementing
security commitments,” which appears to be the case of contemporary Chinese-Russian
relations.378 For example, current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev continued to
endorse the partnership during his May 2008 trip to Beijing, saying it was necessary for
maintaining global, not regional, balance. “Some don't like such strategic cooperation
between our countries, but we understand that this cooperation serves the interests of our
people, and we will strengthen it, regardless of whether others like it or not,” he said.
“Russian-Chinese relations are one of the most important factors of maintaining stability
in modern conditions.”379
His counterpart, Chinese President Hu Jintao, also said the SCO was necessary to
combat both regional threats and unilateralism: “Unilateralism and power politics still
exist, traditional and non-traditional threat is still severe, and economic globalization
failed to bring benefits to the majority of developing countries,” Hu said at the 2007 SCO
summit.380 Hu and Medvedev continued this theme at the 2009 SCO summit in
Yekaterinburg. “The China-Russia strategic partnership of cooperation has become a
377
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model for relationships between big countries and neighbors,” Hu said.381
Establishment of the SCO
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization was officially established 15 June 2001
with the addition of Uzbekistan as a sixth member for the purpose of “strengthening
mutual trust and good-neighborly friendship among the member states; encouraging
effective cooperation among the member states in political, economic and trade, scientific
and technological, cultural, educational, energy, communications, environment and other
fields; devoting themselves jointly to preserving and safeguarding regional peace,
security and stability; and establishing a democratic, fair and rational new international
political and economic order.”382 The basic principles of the SCO include adherence to
the purposes and principles of the UN Charter; respect for each other's independence,
sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in each other's internal affairs,
mutual non-use or threat of use of force; equality among all member states; settlement of
all questions through consultations, non-alignment and not targeting at any other country
or organization; openness and willingness to carry out all forms of dialogues.383
The SCO’s founding charter states that it “adheres to the principle of
nonalignment, does not target any other country or region, and is open to the outside,” yet
Section 10 of the declaration makes clear the organization seeks to alter the strategic
balance at the global level: “In the current international situation, it is of particular
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significance to preserve global strategic balance and stability.” Implicit in this statement
is a concern about American unipolarity, although conforming to soft-balancing the target
of the alignment remains unnamed.384 Indeed, “the tone of the founding documents of the
organization repeatedly censured U.S. hegemony and favored instead the establishment
of a multipolar world order.”385
Structure and Organization of the SCO
The SCO institutions consist of two parts: the meeting mechanisms and the
permanent organs. The two permanent organs are the Secretariat and the Regional
Counter-Terrorism Structure (RCTS) in Tashkent, which was formerly called the
Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS). The highest SCO organ is the Council of
Heads of State (HSC), which appoints the Secretary-General and the RCTS Executive
Committee Director for three-year terms. In 2004, the SCO created an observer status for
other regional states. Mongolia joined as an observer in June and Pakistan, Iran and India
were granted that status in July 2005. Sri Lanka and Belarus were granted “dialogue
partner” status at the 2009 SCO summit in Yekaterinburg.
The main duties of the Secretariat include overseeing over the SCO’s
bureaucracy; executing resolutions passed by the HSC; and performing as a liaison
between the SCO and other regional and international institutions and states.
Responsibilities of the RCTS include coordinating counterterrorist maneuvers among the
member states’ law enforcement and security apparati, including coordinating security
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for the 2008 Beijing Olympics; and directing exercises to quell separatist and extremist
movements. describes the functions of its mechanisms (councils) as the following: The
HSC is the highest decision-making body in the SCO and consists of the presidents of the
member states. It meets once every year to take decisions and give instructions on
important decisions regarding the SCO. The Heads of Government Council (HGC) meets
once every year to discuss strategy and priorities, including economic and trade issues,
and to adopt the organization’s annual budget. There are also mechanisms (councils) for
the respective members’ national Speakers of Parliament; Secretaries of Security
Councils; Foreign Ministers; ministers of Defense, Emergency Relief, Economy,
Transportation, Culture, Education, Healthcare; Heads of Law Enforcement Agencies;
Supreme Courts and Courts of Arbitration; and Prosecutors General. The Council of
National Coordinators of SCO Member States (CNC) is in charge of coordinating
interaction within the SCO framework.
From Regional Institution to Global Actor
Gradually, the SCO evolved from a purely regional outlook to an organization
seeking international recognition. In 2004 the SCO received an observer status at the UN
and in the following year, the SCO Secretary-General Bolat Nurgaliev was allowed to
make a speech to the UN General Assembly. Additionally, the SCO has broadened its
involvement in Asia by signing Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and with the Collective Security
Treaty Organization.386 Nurgaliev and his counterpart, CSTO Secretary-General Nikolai
Bordyuzha, signed the memorandum in Dushanbe on 5 October 2007. The document
386
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envisages joint efforts for the establishment and development of equal and constructive
interaction between the SCO and CSTO on issues covering regional and international
security and stability; counterterrorism; drug and weapons interdiction; transnational
organized crime; and other areas of mutual concern.387 During a 19 November 2008
meeting, Nurgaliev and ASEAN Deputy Secretary-General Soeung Rathchavy agreed to
deeper integration in the areas of economic and trade relations; transportation and
communications; energy, environmental protection and sustainable development; and
information technologies.388
The sheer size of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization makes it an important
actor in regional politics. The territory of the SCO member states constitutes 60 percent
of the Eurasian landmass (30 million square kilometers) and has a population of about 1.5
billion. Together, with the four SCO observers – India, Pakistan, Mongolia and Iran – the
organization possesses huge energy resources and a significant number of the world’s
nuclear weapons (See table 6-1).389
Over the past several years, the SCO increasingly has become the focus of
scholarly inquiry and interest of foreign policy and military analysts because of its rapid
growth and potential influence as a regional security regime. The organization has largely
evolved beyond its initial mission of resolving outstanding border disputes. It now
focuses on improving trade, energy and economic development in the region as well as
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combating terrorism and separatism. This growing influence has translated into increased
economic integration.390
Moreover, the organization has matured into what some describe as “an
institutionalized multilateral body” that has adopted a more confrontational tone with the
West.391 In addition to the official declarations concerning Central Asia, the SCO has
joined Russia and China in denouncing the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2001 during the administration of President Bush II; opposed
the U.S. National Missile Defense (NMD) program; and supported China’s position on
the status of Taiwan as lawful territory of the PRC.392 In fact, a detailed analysis of SCO
statements, declarations, pronouncements and proclamations validates the conception of
the organization as a countervailing coalition to Western and American interests in
Central Asia. Although the SCO cannot be considered a formidable military bloc yet, “its
rhetoric and actions have included elements of deliberate ‘counterbalancing’ and
‘blocking’ of Western nations and organizations that also have legitimate interests and
partnership goals in the regions concerned.”393
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China
Russia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
Uzbekistan
Observers
India
Iran
Mongolia
Pakistan

Table 6-1 – Capabilities of SCO Members and Observers
Area in square km Population
GDP in $US trillions
Military spending Nuclear weapons
in US Billions*
9,596,961
1,338,612,968
$4.758
$98.800
Yes
17,098,242
140,041,247
$1.232
$61.000
Yes
2,724,900
15,399,437
$0.175
$1.500
No
199,951
5,431,747
$0.011
$0.185
No
143,100
7,349,145
$0.013
$0.063
No
447,400
27,606,007
$0.075
$0.053
No
3,287,263
1,648,195
1,564,116
796,095

1,156,897,766
66,429,284
3,041,142
174,578,558

$3.561
$0.876
$0.009
$0.449

$36.600
$9.174
$0.071
$4.823

Yes
No
No
Yes

Source: CIA World Factbook https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html
*Military spending from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute for FY 2009; Numbers for Kyrgyzstan are from 2008; Numbers for Tajikistan
from 2004; Numbers from Uzbekistan from 2003; Mongolia for 2007.
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Reducing U.S. normative influence
Because second-tier powers lack the military and economic capabilities to do so
in a unipolar system, they are likely to adopt indirect balancing strategies that are less
provocative to a hegemonic power. One way to do this is to remove the political
influence of a hegemonic power that has penetrated into the region of lesser powers
Russia and China, through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, have attempted to
undermine the American normative (and strategic) interests in this manner. In this area,
there have been three highly visible exploits the SCO has undertaken to counter
American influence in Central Asia: rejecting a request by American observers to attend
the 2005 summit; creating its own cadre of elections observers to respond to criticisms
from their counterparts in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) and American officials and NGOs; and promoting the concept of “sovereign
democracy” as an alternative to Western concepts of democratization and human rights.
SCO Attempts at Strategic Denial
Strategic denial is a prominent goal in any balancing context, let alone soft
balancing. In the case of Central Asia, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization clearly has
attempted to reduce America influence in the region, although with mixed results. There
have been several prominent moves by the SCO in an effort to reduce U.S. influence in
the region. First, the SCO has rejected requests by the United States to observe its official
functions and meetings,394 although U.S. diplomats were invited to the SCO special
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conference on Afghanistan held in Moscow on 27 March 2009.395 Second was the 2005
Astana declaration, which called for a timetable for the removal of the military
contingents of the “antiterrorist coalition” from the territories of the member states, a
clear signal to the United States and its allies.396 Finally, Beijing and Moscow, through
the SCO, supported Uzbekistan’s eviction of the U.S. military from its territory. Outside
of the SCO framework, Moscow also pushed for the removal of American troops at the
Manas base in Kyrgyzstan with tacit support from Beijing, although the outcome still
remains to be seen. Finally, the Peace Missions conducted by member state militaries
have been cited as a signal to the United States that balancing between China and Russia
could harden if American unilateralism continued unabated. (The role of soft balancing
across the military dimension is dealt with in Chapter Seven).
The most demonstrable evidence of strategic denial came at the July 2005 summit
in Astana, where at the behest of Russia and China, the SCO called for a timetable for the
removal of the military contingents of the “antiterrorist coalition” from the territories of
member states. Many Western commentators have viewed the bold declaration as part of
“concerted efforts to attack U.S. regional sway.”397 Just five days before the declaration,
“the Chinese and Russian presidents had issued a bilateral statement castigating unnamed
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states that ‘pursue the right to monopolize or dominate world affairs’ by seeking to
‘divide countries into a leading camp and a subordinate camp’ and ‘impose models of
social development.’ While the Astana summit declaration reaffirms ‘the supremacy of
principles and standards of international law, before all, the UN Charter’, it provides a
characteristic twist by stressing above all the principle of non-interference and arguing
that ‘it is necessary to respect strictly and consecutively historical traditions and national
features of every people’ and the ‘sovereign equality of all states.’”398
The Astana declaration was preceded by the May 2005 Andijan incident, when
Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov’s forces conducted a bloody crackdown that killed
hundreds of “democratic” protestors in the city of Andijan. Karimov officially
characterized the protest as “terrorist acts.”399 The incident was denounced by the United
Nations, United States and European Union, but Karimov’ pointedly received the strong
backing of SCO members China and Russia. Although the Uzbeks used the SCO as a
cover to eject the Americans, there were greater underlying concerns. “To be sure, the
Russians and Chinese also welcomed the exit of the Americans from the region, but the
SCO provides sufficient weight so that all the countries in the region could speak in
concert.”400
The U.S. rebuke of the Karimov regime over the Andijan incident resulted in a rift
that led to the eviction of U.S. forces from the Karshi-Khanabad (K2) base in Uzbekistan.
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Although the removal of U.S. forces from the K2 base was the result of bilateral tensions
between the United States and Karimov over human rights concerns and the lack of
democratization, the incident nonetheless pushed Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan (which also
had come under pressure from Washington to democratize) firmly back into the orbit of
the SCO.401 “For Russia and China, the temptation to use Karimov’s fury to throw the US
out of the region proved irresistible.”402
Another method of strategic denial, Robert Pape argues, is entanglement,
particularly through regional and international institutions such as the United Nations.
The SCO has held true to this logic as well; it routinely calls for international disputes to
be resolved through the United Nations Security Council and repeatedly rejects unilateral
undertakings, which are thinly disguised criticisms against the United States. At the most
recent the 2009 SCO summit in Yekaterinburg, the organization declared:
Serious changes are taking place in the contemporary international environment.
Aspiration to peace and sustainable development, promotion of equal cooperation
became the spirit of the times. The tendency towards true multipolarity is
irreversible. There is a growing significance of the regional aspect in settling
global problems…. Settlement of international and regional conflicts must be
conducted by political diplomatic means on the basis of the principles of equality
and mutual respect, non-interference in internal affairs of sovereign states. The
attempts to achieve unilateral advantages in defense field are counterproductive as
they undermine the strategic balance and stability in the world, do not benefit
confidence building reduction of arms and disarmament. 403
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The month after the Astana declaration, the SCO also held its first-ever joint
military exercise through the Regional Antiterrorist Structure (RATS), which was created
at the July 2002 summit in St. Petersburg. Dubbed “Peace Mission 2005,” the war games
were ostensibly an anti-terrorism exercise. Another “peace mission” was held in August
2007 and included 10,000 troops from land, sea and air units. Some commentators
viewed the exercises as sending a strong message to Washington: “The fact that the
exercise took place so soon after the SCO’s Astana summit, at which the organization
made its clearest ever protest against US involvement in Central Asian affairs, indicates
that the signals it conveyed about Chinese–Russian capacity and resolve were not aimed
exclusively at potential non-state adversaries.”404
Moscow’s strategy to remove the U.S. presence from Central Asia appeared to
pay off when, on 3 February 2009, Bakiyev announced, in Moscow, that Kyrgyzstan
would close the Manas base shortly after the Russian government reportedly agreed to
lend Kyrgyzstan US$2 billion, write off US$180 million in debt and add another US$150
million in aid. “The Manas installation is viewed as ‘the premier air-mobility hub’ for
U.S. and allied operations in Afghanistan, with about 1,000 military personnel from
America, Spain and France stationed there, according to a U.S. Air Force website.”405
Negotiations between the United States and Kyrgyz governments continued, however,
and the U.S. lease for the base was extended to July 2010 after the Pentagon agreed to
triple the rent it had paid to lease the base.406 The status of the base remained unclear
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after April 2010 uprising in Kyrgyzstan, which overthrew the Bakiyev government.
According to news reports:
The opposition has declared that it wants to permanently close the base, although
it is unclear whether this was at the behest of Moscow or the result of domestic unrest.
According to news reports, Russian President Medvedev urged the opposition to close the
base, while the administration of U.S. President Barack Obama pushed for its
continuance.407 Reports stated that Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin recognized the
interim government formed by opposition leader Roza Otunbayeva because Bakiyev had
failed to fulfill a promise to close the U.S. base. However, U.S. officials said it was
unclear who was running Kyrgyzstan, although he added Washington did not see the
upheaval as a Russian-sponsored or anti-American coup.408
Promotion of Sovereign Democracy
The proliferation of Western NGOs promoting democratic reform in the region
clearly has disturbed its autocratic rulers, who despite initially benefiting from American
aid because of the “war on terror,” view democratization as a threat to their rule. Because
of the SCO’s strong support of sovereignty in regards to domestic affairs, it is not
“burdened” with democratization and human rights issues that hamstring Western
interests.409 To counter the normative agenda of the West, the organization has adopted
the alternative Russian doctrine of “sovereign democracy,” which treats foreign support
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for domestic democratic movements and nongovernmental organizations as a form of
external meddling in the internal affairs of its members.410
The doctrine has been heavily promoted by Russia. Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov published a 2007 article about “sovereign democracy” that criticized NATO’s
“bloc” policies.411 In the final year of his presidency, Russian President Putin made a
number of speeches indicating that he also saw the United States and other Western
countries as seeking to infringe on the sovereignty and interests of Russia and other
countries. In a February 2007 speech to the Munich Security Conference, Putin warned
the United States that it should not attempt to create a world “of one boss, one
sovereign,” and that the Americans should stop interfering in Russian domestic
politics.412 “Without mentioning the United States specifically, Putin also complained
about countries that were trying to expand their power in the world much as the Nazis did
before World War II. In a number of other speeches in the run-up to the 2008 Russian
presidential election, Putin continued this theme, suggesting that current policies on the
part of some states present threats similar to the peacetime roots of World War II.”413
The powerful role that norms play in the systemic balance of power is illustrated
in Russian and Chinese responses to Western support for various “Color Revolutions” in
Central Asia and Central Europe. Indeed, these “revolutions” have been as troubling as
U.S. military power projection to Moscow and Beijing, which view the normative agenda
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as U.S. stratagems to destabilize the region. “The U.S. invasion of Iraq and the Color
Revolutions that deposed pro-Moscow governments in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan
have (sic) led influential Russians to view the continued U.S. presence as a major source
of instability. In February 2005, the Russian Foreign Ministry pressured the Kyrgyz
government to reject a U.S. request to station AWACS aircraft at Ganci. Since then,
Russia’s state-dominated media has repeatedly urged Central Asian governments to crack
down on U.S.-supported civil liberties groups.”414
American officials are aware of the threat democratization in Central Asia poses
to Moscow, Beijing and the smaller authoritarian states in the region. Speaking to the
U.S. Congress in 2006, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher criticized the SCO’s
disinterest in human rights and democratization, saying: “I think the first thing to note is
the organization doesn’t take up human rights questions itself, and that is probably our
big criticism of Shanghai Cooperation in the human rights field, that there’s no effort at
all to match economic agreements, border agreements, security cooperation,
counterterrorism efforts with any standards of human rights or even, I suppose, what we
would say is sort of understanding of the political environment in which those things
have to operate. And so it’s kind of, as I said, no-questions-asked cooperation in these
fields. And that in itself is not helpful to bring a balanced development in the region.”415
The U.S. continues to use normative capabilities as a fungible asset to promote its
agenda in Central Asia. In the case of Kyrgyzstan, the U.S. awarded grants to civil414
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society development, grants to independent media outlets (pro-Western), and grants to
finance a Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Service. In addition, the United States
finances Kyrgyzstan’s most active democracy NGO, the Coalition for Democracy and
Civil Society.416

Table 6-2: How China and Russia soft balance through the SCO
Military
Political
Economics
Astana Declaration
Creation of RATS

Opposition to democratization
in Central Asia
Opposition to U.S. plans for
National Missile Defense

Increasing troop strength Push for alternative norm of
in Central Asia
“sovereign democracy”

Control of Central Asian
pipeline routes
Potential for exclusive
economic zone in
Central Asia
Possible “energy cartel”
including Iran

American financial assistance also has funded peace, security and democratization
efforts in the Central Asian states. In 2008, the U.S. provided US$324 million in aid to
the region, although the amount dipped in 2009 to US$134.51 million.417 Cumulative
spending for the region was US$1.5 billion, which includes Defense and Energy
department spending on areas such as nonproliferation and counterterrorism.418
Such aid could be viewed as low-level measures to support potential Central
Asian allies, who in turn would be more loyal, or at least amenable, to Washington than
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to Beijing and Moscow. In other words, by securing the allegiance or acquiescence of the
smaller republics in the region, the United States could hinder Russian and Chinese
interest. “U.S. elevation of democracy promotion into an existential struggle for victory
over terrorism and an essential foundation for peaceful relations among states has put it
squarely at odds with China and Russia, both of whom have approached the task of
combating terrorism as a matter of defeating specific organizations and strengthening
regimes currently in power. They see noninterference in internal political affairs as the
key to regional peace and cooperation.”419
America’s democracy promotion in the autocratic Central Asia states, ironically,
has pushed their regimes closer to China and Russia.420 After the infamous Andijan
incident, the U.S. called for an international investigation of Karimov’s government, an
action that moved Uzbekistan closer to its SCO members (all six members declared that
any investigation should be the internal matter of Tashkent). More troubling for Beijing
and Moscow was the American-supported “Tulip Revolution,” which led to the ouster of
Kyrgyz President Askar Akiyev in March 2005. The United States immediately
recognized the elected government of Kurmanbek Bakiyev, an opponent of Akyev.
However, an increasingly autocratic Bakiyev – eventually recognizing his tenuous hold
on power in the face of “democratic” forces – quickly returned to the orbit of Beijing and
Moscow and initially endorsed Russia’s call for the removal of U.S. forces from the
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Manas air base in Bishkek.421 Despite his vacillation between American and Russian
suitors, Bakiyev had become more pro-Moscow than his predecessor until his ouster.422
It has not solely been the leaders of the major powers to speak out against what
they perceive as a one-size-fits-all approach to democracy by the West. Tajik President
Ismali Rahmonov aired similar concerns during a 6 November 2006 interview with the
BBC. “I have been saying and reiterate now that this should be taken into account. It is
not worth imposing some kinds of new ideologies on Asian countries as a chess-board
model. This is not worth. As for the OSCE standards and meeting conditions or
requirements of international norms, particularly of the OSCE, 100 percent, I think there
is not a single country in the world which can meet demands and standards of the OSCE
100 percent,” Rahmonov said.423 In a unipolar and increasingly globalized world, norms
can be a serious threat to states. If norms can be used to weaken states, then they can
theoretically be used to strengthen them. Like weapons and money, norms thus can be
considered a fungible capability.
Creation of SCO election observers
So far, this section has demonstrated the threat the “Color Revolutions” have
posed to the rule of the Central Asian autocracy and the negative externalities they have
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produced in Beijing and Moscow. If norms can be projected – and have substantial
material outcomes such as regime change – then this power theoretically can be
balanced. To counter this “democratic” onslaught, the SCO “has formed its own cadre of
election observers, who since their debut in Kyrgyzstan in February 2005 have endorsed
every election held in a member state – in contrast to monitors from the OSCE
[Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] and Western Organizations.”424
In response to American and Western pressure on the political systems in Central
Asia, the SCO established its own Observer Mission to oversee the electoral process in
member states. Two recent elections stand out for review in this study: the 2009
presidential election in Kyrgyzstan and the 2007 presidential election in Uzbekistan.
Neither election was deemed free or fair by the U.S. State Department or the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Nevertheless, The SCO
and its members endorsed both elections. Determining whether the elections were “free
and fair” is beyond the scope of this study, however. The examples below are provided to
demonstrate the nature of balancing at the normative level (soft balancing), which can be
just as intense as any military rivalry and whose outcomes can be just as transformative
as warfare.
Kyrgyzstan: The 23 July 2009 Kyrgyz presidential elections pitted incumbent
Kurmanbek Bakiyev of the Ak Jol party against challengers Almazbek Atambaev
(independent candidate representing the United People’s Movement [UPM] and
Chairperson of the SDPK party); Jenishbek Nazaraliev (independent); Temir Sariev (Ak
Shumkar party); Nurlan Motuev (independent, aligned with the Joomart movement); and
424
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Toktaiym Umetalieva (independent). The Kyrgyz government invited the OSCE mission
to observe the election, and the mission deployed 277 observers from 39 OSCE
participating states.425 The Observer Mission from the SCO was composed of three
Secretariat officers and five representatives from SCO member states (three from the
Republic of Kazakhstan and two from the Republic of Uzbekistan).426
Although observing the same election, the two missions came up with radically
different conclusions. OSCE observers found the election marred by many problems and
violations, including inaccuracies in the voter lists, evidence of ballot box stuffing and
some evidence of multiple voting, and evidence of direct manipulation or falsification in
numerous instances. The OSCE report concluded: “The 23 July 2009 presidential election
in the Kyrgyz Republic failed to meet key OSCE commitments for democratic elections,
in particular the commitment to guarantee equal suffrage, to ensure that votes are
reported honestly and that political campaigning is conducted in a fair and free
atmosphere as well as to maintain a clear separation between party and state. The field of
presidential candidates offered a genuine choice to voters and the continuing engagement
of civil society provided an important element of transparency and accountability.
Notwithstanding these positive elements, public confidence in the electoral process
remains a fundamental challenge.”427
In contrast, the SCO report found that voting at the polling stations observed by
its mission was conducted in accordance with Kyrgyz election law in a free, calm,
425
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transparent and well-organized environment with no violations reported. “The Mission
notes that the election took place in a democratic environment, which basically
conformed to the requirements of the national legislation of the Kyrgyz Republic and its
international obligations.”428
Uzbekistan: A similar pattern was found during the 23 December 2007
presidential elections in Uzbekistan. In the election, the incumbent Islam Karimov
(Liberal Democratic Party of Uzbekistan [PDPU]) faced challenges from Asliddin
Rustamov (People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan); Dilorom Tashmukhamedova
(Social Democratic Party, Adolat Party); and Akmal Saidov, head of the National Centre
for Human Rights, who represented NGOs organized in a government-initiated NGO
umbrella. During the Uzbek presidential election, the OSCE sent only a small contingent
of observers and no systematic or comprehensive observation of polling stations were
conducted because of the tightly controlled political environment in the country.429
The mission, nonetheless, found numerous problems. Among them were “legal and
administrative obstacles that prevented political movements representing alternative
views from registering as political parties or initiative groups, thereby precluding them
from fielding presidential candidates.”430
The findings of the OSCE were in marked contrast to those of the SCO Observer
Mission for Uzbekistan. The mission reported the election was conducted in accordance
to Uzbek election law and conformed fully to international standards and provided the
428
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necessary democratic and legal preconditions for free expression of the voters’ will by
secret ballot.431 According to the U.S. State Department, however, “Uzbekistan has no
meaningful political opposition. Four pro-government political parties hold all seats in
the parliament, and independent political parties have been effectively suppressed since
the early 1990s.”
The Strategic Role of Democratization
These two cases demonstrate the significant role normative capabilities can play
in the international system and how states have developed soft balancing strategies to
counter them. Indeed, such strategies cannot be easily dismissed. Given the widely
divergent findings each group had of the elections in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, the
SCO seems to have created its own election observers to provide a counterbalance to the
election observers from Western states. In the current international system, democracy is
a major component of state legitimacy and a site of contestation both within and without
borders. The threat democratization poses to many leaders in the developing world is as
serious – and in some cases more serious – than military threats. For instance, the United
States has pursued “regime change” via military capabilities in Iraq, but also through the
use of normative capabilities in countries such as Ukraine and a combination of economic
and normative capabilities in Iran.432
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Generally, the regime targeted for change is considered an “enemy,” “rogue” or
“pariah” state by the hegemonic power. In the case of a liberal hegemonic power,
democratization, theoretically, would remove the “hostile’ regime in power and bring
about a new ruling class more amenable to the liberal world order. In other cases, the
targeted regime might be the ally or vassal of another great power. In this situation,
regime change in a smaller power – whether via military or normative means – can
reduce the power of its great power ally or patron through realignment, thus altering the
balance of power.
Table 6-3: Status of Democracy in SCO Member and Observers
SCO Member
China
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Russia
Tajikistan

Status of Democracy
Not Free
Not Free
Partially Free
Not Free
Not Free

SCO Observer
India
Iran
Mongolia
Pakistan

Status of Democracy
Free
Not Free
Free
Not Free

Source: Freedom House World 2007 http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=372&year=2007

The “Color Revolutions” are a case in point. The 2005 Orange Revolution
resulted in the electoral victory of pro-Western candidate Viktor Yushchenko over proRussian incumbent Viktor Yanukovych in Ukraine;433 and the 2005 Tulip Revolution in
Kyrgyzstan led to the ouster of Moscow-supported incumbent Askar Akiyev in favor of
then U.S.-favorite Kurmanbek Bakiyev. In both “revolutions,” Western- and American-
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funded NGOs and U.S. democracy assistance played a significant role in the electoral
outcome. In the Ukrainian election, the United States spent more than $18 million in
election-related efforts in the two years leading up to the 2004 presidential vote.434 Of the
$36.4 million in U.S. aid to Kyrgyzstan in 2005, 14.6 percent supported democratization
programs, including legal and judicial programs, support for NGOs and support for
independent media.435
The strategic role of democratization is a major objective of U.S. national security
policy and the United States and European Union spend nearly $1.5 billion on democracy
promotion to this end.436 In fact, U.S. national security strategy is infused with liberal
theories of international security. Those theoretical underpinnings are imbedded in the
March 2006 National Security Strategy of the United States, which states on page 3:
“Because democracies are the most responsible members of the international system,
promoting democracy is the most effective long-term measure for strengthening
international stability; reducing regional conflicts; countering terrorism and terrorsupporting extremism; and extending peace and prosperity.” Like its predecessor, the
2010 NSS states that democratization can be pursued through the formation of
partnerships with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other civil society voices
to support and reinforce their work.437
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As argued throughout this study, the role of normative capabilities has not been
lost on China and Russia, either, although Moscow has taken the lead in this category.
Ivan Krastev, an analyst of Russian foreign policy, argues that Moscow is seeking to
increase its normative capabilities to counter U.S. advocacy of Western democratization:
“The search for soft power is what characterises Russia's return to the world stage. The
dynamism of the energy sector and the attractiveness of sovereign democracy are the two
weapons of choice in Russia's current march on Europe. Contrary to the assertions of
Putin’s critics, the concept of sovereign democracy does not mark Russia’s break with
European tradition. It embodies Russia's ideological ambition to be ‘the other Europe’ –
an alternative to the European Union [emphasis in the original].”438
Russia’s opposition to Western democratization has manifested itself in a number
of ways. Moscow has criticized OSCE election-observer missions, particularly in postSoviet states, as biased. Russian restrictions on OSCE observers led the organization to
decide not to monitor either Russia’s parliamentary elections in 2007 or its presidential
elections in 2008.439 “The leadership group that surrounds Putin and helped put
Medvedev in the president’s office has explicitly rejected a number of Western
democratic norms. They see freedoms of speech, the press, and assembly—to say nothing
of political opposition—as some of the major contributors to the weakness and division
of Russia in the 1990s. This group of leaders views U.S. efforts to promote democratic
norms as cynical, hypocritical, and motivated by the U.S. drive to remain the dominant
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global power. U.S. efforts to spread values of freedom and democracy in Russia and its
neighboring countries are seen as nefarious efforts to reduce Russia’s influence, impinge
on Russian sovereignty, and weaken and destabilize Russia’s own successful political
system.”440
Not only do Russia and China see democratization as a source of instability
internationally, but as a threat to their own internal rule. In an extensive overview of
Chinese elite perceptions of global norms, Daniel C. Lynch finds that the ruling Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) rejects the role of democratization in international relations
because it views the norm as a Western machination.441 One Chinese academic Lynch
cites, Xu Chongwen, argues that the West actively manipulates democratic norms for the
purpose of subverting developing countries. In a 2005 article in Leadership Reference,
Xu said the Color Revolutions in Central Asia and Eastern Europe were products of
American intervention similar to the Bush Administration’s invasion of Iraq. According
to Xu, the Bush administration pursued a “secret and dangerously effective strategy” to
overthrow authoritarian states and replace them with Western democracies. “To provoke
the Color Revolutions, Bush mobilized the Agency for International Development to:
first, prod NGOs into cultivating relations with opposition elements in the countries to be
subverted; second, stir up dissatisfaction with domestic economic arrangements and
ethnic relations; third, subsidize oppositional media outlets, and encourage journalists to
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publish news stories damaging to leaders’ reputations; and fourth, assist in the
organization of opposition parties.”442
In regards to soft balancing, many Chinese elites share the view of this author that
norms are a distinct capability and a fungible asset of power. As People’s Liberation
Army scholar Tang Guanghong writes, ‘‘the current international regimes, including the
UN, World Bank, IMF, and WTO, are products of American hegemony.’’443
Accordingly, Lynch concludes: material power can fuel ideational power. To which I
might add, ideational power can delegitimize and undermine material power.
Criticism of SCO as a Balancing Mechanism
Critics and skeptics of the balancing role of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization have pointed out a number of reasons why the organization should not be
considered a viable balancing mechanism: first and foremost, it is not a formal security
alliance; secondly China and Russia may be pursing their interests in the SCO for other
power-seeking motives such as dominating the region’s energy resources or controlling
pipeline routes, irrespective of the presence of American troops; and finally, critics argue
that China and Russia have a number of conflicting interests that will likely doom any
Sino-Russo “strategic partnership” against the United States.444
Each of these issues can be addressed within a soft balancing framework. As Hans
Morgenthau once pointed out, “Not every community of interests calling for co-operation
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between two or more nations, then, requires that the terms of this co-operation be
specified through legal stipulations of a treaty alliance.”445 Furthermore, soft balancing
theories, including the one explicated in this study, maintain that indirect and nonmilitary measures are likely the best strategies in a unipolar system. As for the second
criticism, actors can pursue more than one interest within the confines of an institution.
The fact that the SCO is utilized for the purposes of regional stability does not rule out its
potential use for off-shore defense; both strategies can be pursued via the SCO and
should be viewed as complementary rather than mutually exclusive.
The final criticism raised by skeptics – that the latent tensions between China and
Russia are likely to undermine any long-term attempts to balance the United States – can
be turned back against them: Given these serious underlying problems, why does the
Chinese-Russian “strategic partnership” continue to persist? Despites Moscow’s
concerns about China’s exploding economy, it continues to supply its energy thirsty
neighbor with Russian oil; although China’s military capabilities are increasing by leaps
and bounds relative to those of Russia, Moscow continues to sell its most advanced
weapons systems to its larger neighbor; and notwithstanding Moscow’s concerns (real or
perceived) about a Chinese “yellow peril” invading and occupying the Russian Far East,
Moscow continues to align with Beijing on almost every important international issue. As
Yong Deng points out, “These accelerated developments are remarkable, especially in
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light of the many domestic obstacles, stemming notably from the border demarcation,
Chinese immigrants in Russia, and mutual security suspicion.”446
Indeed, as pointed out in the preceding chapters, neoclassical realism offers a
strong explanation for the persistence of the Russo-Sino “strategic partnership.”
Domestically, the Russian oil and arms industry benefits greatly from trade with China.
Culturally, Chinese and Russian nationalism provide a strong impulse against Western
globalization, particularly those concerning democratization and human rights. But the
overarching reason is structural. As long as the system remains unipolar, China and
Russia will be forced to partner if they wish to counter American intervention, which
threatens both their interests. “Such an alliance would experience real friction, but to
protect their interests, states will find allies where they can, when they must.”447
Conflict frequently besets allies and partners at the international level. Serious
friction among NATO members over the Second Gulf War has not led to the demise of
that alliance. France and Germany vigorously opposed the United States invasion of Iraq
in March 2003, but the alliance remained intact. Indeed, skeptics of soft balancing via the
SCO appear to have raised the bar too high when it comes to cooperation between Russia
and China.448 The SCO is a relatively young organization and cannot be expected to
become a major power broker within a few years, although it has made some remarkable
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strides over the past decade. It took the European Union, one of the most touted examples
of regional integration, nearly half a century to evolve from the European Coal and Steel
Community in 1951 to the supranational organization it is today. Nevertheless, despite
deep integration within the EU, there remain rifts among members over immigration,
security and defense policy.449 True, the potential conflict between China and Russia is
greater than any policy disputes among the Atlantic alliance. Yet, as many have pointed
out, “despite such concerns, Russia appears to regard the growing American influence in
Eurasia as more threatening to its interest than a rapidly growing China. Thus, both China
and Russia are eager to foster a strategic partnership aimed at heading off American
ability to extend its global dominance in the region.”450
Conclusion
This chapter demonstrates the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in
soft balancing the United States. It argues that China and Russia have attempted to use
the SCO as a buffer to American hegemony in Central Asia. Drawing on neoclassical
realism and regional security complex theory, it demonstrates the interplay between the
domestic and international forces that shape Chinese and Russian foreign policy in the
region and the role the organization plays in Moscow and Beijing’s calculus of strategic
denial. Furthermore, it highlights the roles norms play in great power politics. China and
Russia recognize that they cannot counter U.S. influence simply through denunciations of
American “hegominism” alone.
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By offering alternative means of legitimation and strongly supporting state
sovereignty, the SCO can provide another pole of power around which smaller and
midsize powers might gravitate. Attracting the small, autocratic Central Asian republics
and middle powers such as Iran to the Beijing-Moscow axis will not alter the strategic
balance of power, but it could undermine U.S. hegemony and in some cases restrain
American unilateralism. Nevertheless, it has become “a kind of center of attraction, or an
object of interest for a whole number of Asian countries. Having obtained the observer
status in the SCO, Mongolia, India, Pakistan and Iran have not only contributed to the
broadening of the potential area of the organization, but also demonstrated the real
possibility of the SCO to directly influence the institutionalized structure of the interstate
units, and the international relations of Asia as a whole.”451
As for the success of the soft balancing strategy, the results have been mixed at
best. The removal of U.S. forces from Uzbekistan could be counted as a success, even if
it were the result of bilateral tensions between Washington and Tashkent, because it
furthered the goals of Russia and China, which supported the outcome. However, despite
intense Russian pressure, Moscow has not been able to push the Kyrgyz government to
evict American troops from the base in Manas. The joint Peace Missions held by the SCO
signal that Russia and China are willing to take steps to harmonize their military force
structures, although that is still at a rudimentary stage. However, “the organization’s
influence in the region is considerable, and its biggest members—China and Russia—
have the ability to undercut American initiatives there. But the SCO’s power to produce
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concrete results where they matter the most to its members—security and stability—is
limited at best, and all its members have a strong interest in the success of the principal
U.S. mission in the region, which is to secure Afghanistan.”452
In the arena of regional security, the SCO has made some progress. It has
promoted effective cooperation among member states in the economic and humanitarian
spheres; reduced the armed forces in the border areas; coordinated the fight against
separatist and terrorist elements, fostered economic development and promoted
cooperation across the environmental, scientific and cultural spheres. Proper
implementation of cooperative measures by the member states “is capable of improving
the socioeconomic situation and stabilizing the domestic political situation in the Central
Asian countries … [and] lowering the destabilizing influences of radical Islam and
western ideology fraught with the danger of ‘orange revolutions.’”453
Irrespective of these shortcomings, the establishment and cementing of the
“strategic partnership” through the SCO should be considered a success in and of itself.
The fact that Beijing and Moscow have forged a relationship to counter American
hegemony has not gone unnoticed by U.S. officials. In an interview with the Russian
ITAR-Tass news service on 2 February 2010, Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake
said the United States continues to closely monitor the organization. “I think the SCO can
be a good engine for cooperation and for partnership in the region, but I think our interest
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is ensuring that the SCO is not exploited by any country to try to use it as a vehicle for
domination of that region. It should be, again, a vehicle for equal partnership.”454
Leszek Buszynski points out: “Both Russia and China nonetheless regard the
SCO as a balancing mechanism to the American presence in Central Asia, which
stimulates their cooperation.”455 Because soft balancing is a non-traditional strategy and
one that works best indirectly, the tentative steps taken by Moscow and Beijing to
undermine U.S. policy might easily be overlooked as simple self-aggrandizement or
dismissed as traditional diplomatic friction. Yet, systematic engagement in a policy to
counteract U.S. interests should be viewed as part of a larger strategy, not simply the
vagaries of regional powers. Eugene Rumer, an expert on Central Asia, sums this point
up quite adequately:
A close look at the organization, the behavior of its members, their motivations,
and the practical impact of their declarations suggest that the SCO’s challenge to
U.S. interests and policies in Central Asia is less than meets the eye. But ignoring
the SCO simply because of its limited capabilities for action and concrete results
would be a mistake; it is more than a paper tiger. As a political organization, it is
an important vehicle for Russian and Chinese diplomacy aimed to counter U.S.
influence in the region. The SCO also provides a forum where Central Asian
states, dwarfed by their giant neighbors, can sit at the table with them as equals, at
least nominally. For all these reasons, the SCO is worth the attention of the United
States. The question is what kind of attention we should pay to it.456
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CHAPTER VII
THE MILITARY DIMENSION OF SOFT BALANCING

Soft balancing is a response to the military imbalance in the international system,
and therefore, a soft balancing strategy could affect the global strategic balance. From a
strategic standpoint, soft balancing can set favorable diplomatic conditions that can
increase the chances a state has of fending off superior military power. This chapter
assesses the impact soft balancing has had on Chinese and Russian military doctrine and
strategy. It argues that both states have undertaken military modernization efforts to
address their shortcomings vis-à-vis the United States, though each has done so in a
manner that does not jeopardize its relations with the hegemonic power.457
Counterbalancing U.S. military power requires indirect methods similar to
balancing at the normative level. Detailed analysis of Chinese and Russian military and
foreign policy thinking indicates that both seek to offset U.S. military superiority without
engaging American power directly. Chinese defense doctrine in regards to the United
States is predicated on the concept of “strategic denial” or “anti-access,” which Russia to
a lesser extent shares. In the case of confrontation, the goal is not to engage the superior
forces of the United States head-on, but to utilize measures that attack American
vulnerabilities, such as logistics, forward basing, command and control and satellites
capabilities. Regional denial, which is discussed in Chapters V and VI, plays a significant
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role in the calculations of Moscow and Beijing because it could foreclose the possibility
of American basing rights in a third country.
The first part of this chapter covers Chinese contemporary military strategy,
followed by a similar examination of Russian doctrine. The third section analyzes the
bilateral relations between Russian and Chinese militaries and the role the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization could play in any military confrontation between China and/or
Russia and the United States. It concludes with a discussion of the role normative
capabilities could play in the future use of military force.
Chinese Defense Posture
Contemporary Chinese military doctrine follows Sun Tzu’s ancient and timeless
maxim: “in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is weak.”458
Following this logic, PLA military planners have developed weapons systems designed to
exploit relative Chinese military strengths against relative military weaknesses of the
United States. Parallel to its soft balancing strategy, China has adopted an “active
defense” military doctrine, which is based partially on non-linear, non-contact and
asymmetric operations. Under the “active defense” doctrine, China's strategic goals are
viewed as defensive, including defending China's maritime periphery, although limited
offensive measures “might be employed as necessary to safeguard China's core strategic
interests (for instance, by using an ASBM [anti-ship ballistic missiles] to target a US
carrier strike group dispatched to preclude China from coercing Taiwan). Non-linear
operations involve launching attacks from multiple platforms in unpredictable fashion
458
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that range across an opponent's operational and strategic depth.”459 Present Chinese
defense strategy was heavily shaped by the post-9/11 policies of the United States. The
Bush doctrine’s unilateralism and advocacy of preventive force suggested to PLA
strategists that American restraint and self-restraint were weakening.460
Furthermore, China’s sharply rising dependence on imported oil and concerns
with maritime access rights coupled with pro-independence sentiment on Taiwan in the
early years of the decade led Beijing to be more explicit about solving the dispute with
force if all else fails.461 Although the Bush administration’s unilateralism played a major
factor in Beijing’s military calculus, it is the unipolar nature of the international system
that most concerns the PLA, a scenario that is expected to persist under the Obama
administration and into the near future, despite the administration’s more nuanced and
multilateral approach to international relations. China, for example, continues to assert
contested sovereignty over much of the South China Sea, which is an important maritime
route. To protect those sea routes from American access in times of crisis, China is
developing and testing anti-ship ballistic missiles equipped with maneuverable reentry
vehicles (MaRVs) capable of hitting moving ships at sea.
According to Congressional testimony in the United States, “Observers have
expressed strong concern about this development, because such missiles, in combination
with broad-area maritime surveillance and targeting systems, would permit China to
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attack aircraft carriers, other U.S. Navy ships, or ships of allied or partner navies
operating in the Western Pacific. The U.S. Navy has not previously faced a threat from
highly accurate ballistic missiles capable of hitting moving ships at sea.”462
China’s concern about U.S. maritime supremacy in the Pacific is deep-seated, and
persists despite changes in American leadership. Regardless of administration, Beijing
remains troubled by American support for Taiwan. One PLA theorist, for instance,
“blames America’s hegemonic impulses that have led to a ‘new buildup of American
forces based in Asia’ and ‘blocked the realization of unification [of China and
Taiwan].’”463 Indeed, unipolarity trumps many of the PLA’s concerns with potential
regional rivals. David Gompert makes this point when he argues that China has tabled
conflicts with other regional actors such as India and Russia to deal directly with U.S.
hegemony. Although China’s calculations and motives might be complex, Gompert
argues that there is coherence in Beijing’s strategy and programs. To counterbalance the
U.S., “China has placed its long-standing disputes and rivalries with India, Russia, and
Vietnam on the back burner and its Pacific interests, access, and defenses on the front
burner, which constitutes a shift of focus from the continental west to the oceanic east of
the Middle Kingdom. While being careful not to antagonize the United States—economic
partner, leader in the war on Islamist terrorism, guardian of world oil supplies and routes,
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and in any case the world’s superpower—Chinese military planning now revolves around
Sino-American contingencies.”464
Chinese weapons programs indicate that the PLA’s focus is squarely on the
United States.465 In addition to rapidly modernizing its undersea warfare capabilities, the
PLA Navy (PLAN) is developing conventionally armed missiles that could provide
China with a potent capability against regional bases and U.S. aircraft carriers operating
in the vicinity of Taiwan. Beijing also is determined to modernize its strategic nuclear
forces. China is deploying road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and
developing nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and submarinelaunched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). China currently has about 20 silo-based,
liquidpropellant DF-5 ICBMs capable of striking targets in the continental United States
and some older missiles that are more limited in range and serve primarily as a regional
nuclear deterrent.466 In the area of space defense, China’s successful testing of “groundbased, midcourse missile interception technology” on 11 January 2010 “was another
example that the People's Liberation Army is looking to challenge the United States in
space.”467
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Anti-access themes are pronounced when Chinese strategists discuss options
available to the PLA for wresting the initiative from the United States or for preventing
the timely deployment of additional U.S. forces in Asia.468 “The United States is the key
security focus for China and the Chinese strategy of sea and air denial is designed with an
armed conflict against the United States in mind. No doubt, the United States military
presence in Asia-Pacific is a significant military factor.”469 The bulk of weapons
platforms Beijing has purchased from Russia suggest an “access denial” strategy that is
wholly consistent with Beijing’s focus on the Taiwan issue, particularly its naval
modernization program.470 In submarines, the PLA Navy has found a weapon system that
provides a cost-effective instrument for deterrence, or if necessary, to engage in combat
against a superior foe. According to reports, the PLAN launched 13 submarines between
2002 and 2004 in addition to the eight “very quiet” Kilo class-diesel submarines that
were delivered from Russia by end of 2006. The exchange signified a major effort by the
PLAN in undersea warfare.471 From a strategic standpoint, China’s anti-access denial is a
combination of Mackinder (Central Asian strategic rear) and Mahan (Pacific blue water).
In classical terms, China is challenging U.S. sea control of the Western Pacific.
Sea control implies an unchallengeable ability to use particular waters and routes
while also being able to deny such use to others. It does not mean that others
would routinely be deprived of their freedom to use the seas in question for
commercial or military purposes, but, rather, that use may be denied at the sole
discretion of the controlling power, e.g., in a crisis or conflict. In fact, sea powers
like the United States and Great Britain have been champions of freedom of the
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seas for one and all, except when they choose to curtail that freedom. Sea control,
classically understood, does indeed describe fairly what the United States
currently seeks in the Western Pacific. Thus, the Chinese would be right to
understand this to mean that China could be denied use of these international
waters in the event of trouble—e.g., Chinese military action against Taiwan—but
wrong to interpret it to mean that China could be denied use of the seas and access
to the world under normal peacetime conditions. 472
Soft Power as a Military Asset in PLA Doctrine
In addition to military anti-access strategies, Chinese security analysts also
discuss a number of diplomatic and political means of denying or limiting U.S. military
access to the region in the event of conflict. As outlined in Chapter Six, diplomatic and
political anti-access would be part of a strategy aimed at pressuring countries in the
region to deny use of forward bases and refuse to provide other critical forms of
assistance to U.S. forces.473 To do this, Andrew Erickson and Lyle Goldstein argue that
China will rely heavily on “soft power” in any future confrontation with the United
States. “Beijing intends to increase its soft and hard power in ways that could pose a
challenge to U.S. hegemony, which it fears threatens its core national interests. China not
only wields increasing commercial clout in all regions of the globe, but is also willing to
deliberately ignore human rights issues in order to achieve diplomatic advantage with
respect to the United States.”474
Beijing also uses its cozy relationship with Iran to indirectly balance U.S.
interests. Backing Tehran in its confrontation with the West over Iran’s nuclear energy
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program could be considered a “strategy game” that deflects attention from Chinese
policies (as well as the important strategic objective of allying China with an energy-rich
nation). Iran’s continued intransigence over its nuclear program, with help from China
and Russia, forces the United States to focus firmly on the Middle East while neglecting
the equally strategic-important Pacific theater. “With China also pursuing a foreign
policy that currently overtly avoids direct conflict with other states or entities such as
Taiwan, and hence fails to encourage U.S. interventions, this situation is allowing Beijing
to expand its economic and diplomatic influence in Asia unhindered, creating for itself
the role of a regional hegemon.”475 With the American forces focused on the Middle East,
China can increase its capabilities under the radar in the Pacific, and thus avert a direct
challenge to the United States.476
Russian Defense Posture
Russia has consistently opposed American hegemony since the early 1990s and,
holding consistent with a soft balancing strategy, Moscow has sought to create a world
overseen by the UN Security Council and several power centers supporting an antihegemonic axis.477 Similar to the Chinese position, Russian opposition to U.S.
intervention in Central Asia has been largely reactive and non-confrontational.478 Like
their counterparts in Beijing, military strategists in Moscow were particularly concerned
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about aggressive American unilateralism under the Bush Doctrine and are unlikely to
change their views regardless of the “reset” of Russian-American relation sought by
President Obama. Unipolarity, too, is another key factor in Russia’s calculations,
especially with the United States possibly on the verge of attaining nuclear primacy
against Russia and other great powers irrespective of the recent signing of the new
START treaty.479 “Strategic stability vis-à-vis the U.S. is another element of Russia’s
self-image and the cornerstone of its security policy in the global dimension. Although
Moscow cannot afford to maintain numerical parity with the U.S… it is still obsessed
with qualitative equilibrium.”480
In both the 2000 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation and the 2003
Military White Paper, Moscow detailed its view of reviving multipolarity at the systemic
level. “A trend is growing toward the establishment of a unipolar world structure that
would be dominated by the U.S. economically and through force . . . the strategy of
unilateral action can destabilize the international situation, provoke tensions and an arms
race and exacerbate the contradictions between states and national and religious strife.”481
Regional denial is another element of Russian defense doctrine, although it is an
objective the Russian army has been unable to fully achieve. Nevertheless, Russia’s
military assets in Central Asia give it substantial hard and soft power.482 Over the past
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decade, Russia has been increasing its defense-related activities in Central Asia. For
example, In October 2003, Russia established its first new military base since the USSR’s
implosion at Kant, Kyrgyzstan, which made Kyrgyzstan the only country hosting Russian
and American military bases on its territory. “The approximately 20 military aircraft and
1,000 troops deployed there lie only some 30 kilometers from the U.S. base at Manas,
which was also used by some U.S. allies with military contingents in Afghanistan.”483
Similar to China, this strategy focuses on asymmetric responses in the case of armed
conflict with the United States, what Russian Gen. M.A. Gareyev calls “strategic
deterrence” or “flexible strategic containment.”484
Russia’s initial acquiescence to the American presence in Central Asia to combat
Taliban and al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan after the 9/11 terrorist attacks was partly selfserving. After 9/11, Moscow reluctantly accepted the American presence in Central Asia
because the United States was the one entity that could effectively deal with Islamic
extremists along Russia’s borders. However, Moscow concluded that the U.S. risks
associated with a continued U.S. presence in Central Asia far outweighed the benefits.
The Color Revolutions deposed pro-Moscow governments and many in the Russian
foreign policy elite came to see the U.S. presence as a major source of instability. In
November 2005, for instance, Secretary of the Russian Security Council Igor Ivanov
wrote: “What we see are practical attempts to interfere in the political life of new
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independent states under the guise of advancing democratic values and freedoms, putting
pressure on authorities via processes.’”485
Andrew Monaghan argues that Moscow’s vision of a multipolar foreign and
security policy thinking is marked by the attempt to construct an anti-American
international axis and forge counterbalances to U.S. dominance through the development
of strategic relationships.486 This point is echoed by Gen. Gareyev, who lambastes what
he calls “subversive activity” by the West because of its support for the varied “Color
Revolutions” along Russia’s borders. Given the widespread distrust of American
intentions in Moscow, the “reset” in Russian-American relations started under the Obama
administration is likely no more than a patina, which simply covers the long-term
structural problems lurking underneath the façade of U.S.-Russian cooperation.
One Russian expert considered the relationship to be similar to an iceberg – the
top, smaller part creating the impression of good partnership and cooperation, but
the larger, underwater part giving no grounds for optimism, and acting as …
deadweight to relations. For its part, the Russian political and security elite is
arguing that a world dominated by the US and particularly US military might is
inherently unstable and threatening to Russia’s interests. There is widespread talk
of the erosion of the partnership established in 2001, the disappearance of the
common agenda and a downhill slide in relations.487
Russian force posture also is tailored for intervening in its near-abroad. This is
largely due to its lack of power projection capabilities outside of Russia’s immediate
sphere of influence. The inability of Russia to launch long-range forces means it must
focus its balancing efforts regionally. The 2008 limited war in Georgia exemplifies the
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type of strategies and tactics Moscow will use to insulate itself from outside influence.
Such missions likely will be limited deployments in support of friendly regimes in the
post-Soviet near-abroad. These hostile interventions into post-Soviet space will be “along
the lines of the August 2008 Georgian campaign, to chastise a regime, protect Russian
nationals or interests or otherwise assert strategic interests in what Moscow regards as its
sphere of influence; the defense of Russian interests in contested regions such as the
Arctic; and the assertion of Russia's global role as a major power, such as by participation
in multinational peacekeeping missions or participating in exercises in theatres far
beyond Russian territory.”488
Soft Balancing and Military Rivalry: The Case of Kyrgyzstan
Russian intervention in Central Asia has been much more pronounced than that of
China, which does not come as a surprise given the region’s intimate relationship with
Moscow. Recent activities in the region appear to indicate that Russia is quickly losing
patience with the U.S. presence there. The overthrow of the regime of Kurmanbek
Bakiyev in Kyrgyzstan is a case in point. In April 2010, nationwide protests led to the
resignation of Bakiyev, who was replaced by interim President Roza Otunbayeva.
Bakiyev had come to power during the 2005 Tulip Revolution, but, like his predecessor
Askar Akiyev, was accused of intimidation and corruption by his opponents. Although a
wave of popular discontent drove Bakiyev from power, many analysts argued that
Moscow played a key role in his ouster.
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Stephen Blank pointed to Bakiyev’s failure to close the American base at Manas
as the main reason Moscow withdrew its support for him and instead backed his
opposition. Blank argued that Russia prepared a concerted plan to undermine the Bakiyev
government and replace it with one more openly dependent upon Moscow. “Certainly
Bakiyev’s successor, Roza Otunbayeva, thanked Russia for helping oust Bakiyev, for
offering humanitarian aid, and for recognizing the new government before anyone else
did. And members of the new government hinted at forthcoming changes in foreign
policy while asking for Russian aid and hinting that they could ask as well for Russian
peacekeepers. Moscow also sent 150 (if not more) paratroopers to its base at Kant.”489
Bakiyev himself admitted that Russian support for Otunbayeva was largely based
on his decision to not shut down the American base at Manas. Asked about speculation
that Moscow may have played a role in the uprising, Bakiyev said Russian President
Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin had been unhappy at his decision
in 2009 to extend the lease on the U.S. base. “They told me: ‘Why are you holding on to
this Manas base, this worries us, this does not suit us,’” Bakiyev told reporters in Russian
at a news conference in Minsk, where he fled after the revolt that led to his ouster.
“Russia's leadership was irritated, annoyed by the presence of the base and this factor
also played a certain role.”490 Although the coup was primarily backed by Moscow,
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Beijing quickly indicated its support as well, in hopes that Russia could provide stability
in the country and prevent increased influence by U.S. forces in the country.491
An article in the Nation summed up Russia’s anger with Bakiyev:
Despite its seeming neutrality, it's clear that Moscow largely orchestrated the
palace coup that ousted President Bakiyev last week. Last year, Russia offered
Bakiyev $2 billion in aid on the apparent condition that he close the U.S. base at
Manas, but after Bakiyev collected more than $400 million in Russian aid he
decided to accept a U.S. offer to triple the Manas rent, angering Prime Minister
Putin of Russia. The Russian media carried out a well-orchestrated campaign
attacking Bakiyev, accurately, as a thieving kleptocrat, and they compared him to
Genghis Khan. (In some countries that would be taken as a compliment, but it
wasn't meant that way.) Then Moscow used its economic muscle to build
momentum for popular opposition to Bakiyev.492
It is still too early to determine whether Russia’s support for Otunbayeva will
yield substantial dividends. After initially vowing to evict the American forces,
Otunbayeva later backtracked and promised to extend the lease on the base at least
another year after it expired in July 2010. However, the Kyrgyz government has sent
mixed messages about the future of the base, which also faces substantial public
opposition in Kyrgyzstan. Russia continues to pressure the new administration to shut
down the base, and Kyrgyz officials are wary of American intentions; many felt U.S.
concern about the country’s future centered squarely on the status of Manas rather than
true democratization and economic development that would help improve Kyrgyzstan’s
condition. Moscow could exploit its close relations with the Kyrgyz government to obtain
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concessions from the United States by muting Russian opposition to the base. However,
the situation remains in flux and the outcome is far from clear.
Military Dimensions of the Strategic Partnership and the SCO
Relations between Russia and China, long complicated, have probably never been
better.493 China has become an important trading partner and is a major arms customer of
Russia. Friendship with Beijing helps Moscow further a number of its goals and enhance
its prestige. The two countries support one another in international and bilateral forums
on issues such as missile defense, terrorism, sovereignty, territorial extremism, and North
Korea. They have carried out joint military and police exercises, both bilaterally and in
the SCO. “These exercises mark a radical change for China, which had not engaged in
exercises of this sort with other states in the past.”494
The relationship consistently shows elements of soft balancing: the use of
regional organizations, reliance on international institutions and non-entangling
diplomacy. One of the more concrete expressions of this pattern of behavior came in July
2006 with the issuing of the joint Sino-Russian statement “Regarding the International
Order of the 21st Century.” According to analyst John Hill, the statement demonstrated
China’s continued objective of engaging partners bilaterally without acquiring the
entanglement of formal alliances or giving the appearance of being aimed at third
parties.495 The gist of the statement, Hill suggests, “is concerned with changing how
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international security is currently arranged [and] is found in a series of observations
around a single (unstated) theme of harnessing the U.S.'s freedom of international action.
Three main issues drive this shared perspective: the paramount nature of each country's
unique situation and sovereignty; the centrality of a (reformed) UN to the international
order; and the importance of encouraging regional supra-national organizations.”496
The declaration also promotes the goal of developing regions as poles of power
within the international system. Because of overwhelming U.S. hard power, China and
Russia believe regional complexes can be used to offset Washington's hegemony.
“Therefore, organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the EU are seen as the best
locations for the necessary alternate poles to balance the current international system.
These organizations are therefore to be encouraged to develop broader security
functions.”497
Another area of cooperation is within the United Nations. In the UN, the two
countries consistently vote together. In 2006, they voted together 100 percent of the time
on resolutions concerning nonproliferation, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Sudan. China is
a solid supporter of Russia when Russia questions U.S. actions and policies, and, like
Russia, it views the United States as destabilizing in Central Asia and other post-Soviet
states. Both countries are strongly opposed to U.S. democratization efforts abroad (and to
U.S. criticism of their own domestic policies and institutions). Some Russians argue that
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China should be Russia’s most prominent partner and ties to China, including those
extended through the SCO, should eclipse Russia’s relationship with NATO.498
Military cooperation between the two Eurasian giants has intensified significantly
since the mid-2000s.499 The month after the Astana declaration, the SCO held its firstever joint military exercise through the Regional Antiterrorist Structure (RATS), which
was created at the July 2002 summit in St. Petersburg. Dubbed “Peace Mission 2005,”
the war games were ostensibly an anti-terrorism exercise. Another “peace mission” was
held in August 2007 and included 10,000 troops from land, sea and air units; another
Peace Mission was held in July 2009, which included 2,600 soldiers from. Some
commentators viewed the exercises as sending a strong signal to Washington: “The fact
that it involved amphibious landings, sea blockades, and other operations that were
irrelevant to the geography of landlocked, desert Central Asia suggests that the SCO is
primarily a vehicle for a new Moscow-Beijing condominium in Asia, and is not intended
as a true multilateral security framework for Central Asia.”500 Coming off the heels of the
Astana declaration, the Peace Mission signaled that “Chinese-Russian capacity and
resolve were not aimed exclusively at potential non-state adversaries” but at Washington
as well.501
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Other areas that demonstrate growing coordination, if not outright cooperation,
include the SCO’s focus on security of the seas and space. Russian Lt. General Anatoly
Klimenko writes that “with granting the status of SCO observers to other three sea
powers (India, Pakistan and Iran), who in due course will probably become its full
members, SCO can control an overwhelming part of the Asian coastline.”502 In terms of
securitizing space, Russia is pushing for the SCO to adopt its GLOSSNAS global
navigating system as an alternative to American Global Positioning System (GPS). “Only
by developing this navigating system our two countries [India and Russia] could put an
end Pentagon dependence. It should be said here that other SCO participants are also
interested in using this system both in peaceful purposes and in defense perspective.”503
In bilateral relations, Russian weapons transfers to China are reinforcing their
strategic partnership. Although the main rationale for Russia’s arms sales to China is
economic, it should also be examined within the context of overall Russian arms trade
policy within the global environment. Paradorn Rangsimaporn argues that while Russian
arms trade policy with China is primarily based on economic benefits, it is also a
political-strategic tool useful in affirming the Sino-Russian relations and increasing
Russia’s global influence. Rangsimaporn counters those skeptics who warn that Russians
fear that arms transfers to China will fuel the beast. In fact, such transfers “do not pose a
threat because if China intended to attack Russia, Beijing would be buying land-force
equipment and low-flying assault aircraft, hardware in which it has expressed no interest.
Alexander Lukin at the Moscow State Institute for International Relations also asserted
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that the Chinese military threat is groundless because China’s technological level is
‘insufficiently high to present a threat to Russia in the visible future’” and points out that
‘the [current] thrust of China’s defense policy points southeast, toward Taiwan and the
South China Sea, rather than toward Russia and Central Asia.’”504
The logic of Russian weapons transfers to China as a form of strategic balancing
is supported by an examination of U.S. conventional defense doctrine. For example, the
2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review specifically singles out China for the lack of
transparency that surrounds its nuclear program, which “raises questions about China’s
future strategic intentions.” And although it acknowledges the urgent nature of the
possibility of nuclear terrorism, the NPR still identifies Russian and Chinese arsenals as
the greatest challenge to ensuring strategic stability.505 Politicians and military strategists
on each side of the strategic triangle appear to agree that the greatest likelihood of
conflict among members of the triad is between China and the United States. “The often
contrasting strategic goals of China and the U.S., alongside Beijing's extension of its
power projection, will necessarily undermine to some extent U.S. preponderance in the
East Asian theatre and implies that apprehension rather than acceptance will dominate
Washington's reaction to continued Chinese military expansion.”506
Furthermore, major U.S. defense platforms and strategic weapons appear to be
directed at China, which in turn looks to the West rather than East when devising
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strategies for its long-term military defense.507 Washington has built up its military forces
throughout East Asia and American bases in Guam have been upgraded and are now
home to several new forces. Three new U.S. nuclear attack submarines based there will
be able to triple their time on patrol off the Chinese coastline. A new wing of B-52
bombers permanently based in Guam can reach throughout Asia, including penetrating
the Chinese mainland. The 2006 quadrennial defense review shifts the U.S. Navy’s
surface fleet westward, with one aircraft carrier being redeployed from the Atlantic fleet
to the Pacific (bringing to six the number stationed there, more than half the U.S. fleet).
Furthermore, all of the navy’s SM-3 equipped Aegis ships (the Navy’s most modern
system) are deployed to Asia. That number has recently doubled, from three to six, and is
likely to continue to rise.508 “The Pentagon is planning to enhance its conventional strike
capabilities in ways that seem tailor-made to target China.”509
Conclusion
The examination of Chinese and Russian defense doctrine reveals that their
defense postures, hard and soft power are largely aimed at warding off the United States
and not each other. On the other hand, U.S. conventional defense doctrine and buildup –
outside of its continued focus on the Middle East and counterterrorism efforts – is
directed mainly at a potential Chinese threat in the Pacific. The dynamics of the strategic
triangle can be explained by soft balancing. Unlike past balancing behavior, which
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consisted of formal alliances and/or arms buildups, Moscow and Beijing have focused on
less direct means to challenge U.S. supremacy. These include military modernization that
seeks to exploit American vulnerabilities, the use of regionalization to buffer against
American forward-basing rights, and tactics that avoid direct confrontation by striking the
“soft underbelly” of U.S. military power, including command and control, systems
networks and logistics. The balancing efforts are not only limited to the military domain;
information security and cyberwarfare are two other dimensions in which Russia and
China have tried to balance the United States by using non-confrontational means.510
“The PLA has established information warfare units and is also able to harness extensive
civilian resources to conduct cyberwarfare operations, even during peacetime. Taiwanese
authorities have said that they regard a cyberwarfare attack from China as much more
likely than an actual invasion.”511
Moscow and Beijing also have added “soft” or “normative” dimensions of power
to their military doctrines to counter American normative influence among leaders of
various minor powers in Central Asia. The development of alternative norms would be
crucial in winning over allies in the event of confrontation. Russian Col. A. Yu. Maruyev
highlights the importance of soft power as an asset of military strategy when he writes “it
is extremely important to formulate a national ideology that could be aimed, in the realm
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of international relations, at turning Russia into a world power capable of influencing
world events from the perspective of its own national interests.”512
Leading figures in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) also want to strengthen
China’s soft power. In May 2004, for example, “the CCP Politburo held its 13th
collective seminar on ‘Development and Prosperity of Chinese Philosophy and Social
Science.’ The backdrop to this seminar was the introduction of the Beijing Consensus and
increasing international interest in the Chinese development model.”513 According to
Young Nam Cho and Jong Ho Jeong, “the seminar was significant because it served as an
example of Chinese leaders beginning to pursue the strengthening of China’s soft power
from a strategic point of view.”514
In conclusion, this chapter has offered a systematic analysis of the Chinese and
Russian military doctrine through the framework of soft balancing and its impact on
strategic studies. To this point, strategists and area specialists in Chinese, Russian and
Central Asian politics have been the main source of scholarly and general literature about
the organization. However, their analyses have been confusing; for example, both
skeptics and alarmists of the SCO generally agree that one of its goals is to reduce
American influence in Central Asia, but their views diverge radically from there. A
theory of soft balancing resolves this quandary. Furthermore, there has been a dearth of
literature on the actual strategic deployment of soft power assets in world affairs.
Traditional strategic literature has focused on the military balance, whereas balance of
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power dynamics among great powers in a unipolar system are likely to play across other
dimensions of power, where violent conflict can be avoided. Furthermore, the use of
norms can be an effective way for states to achieve their political and military interests
without resorting to violence. The 2010 National Security Strategy adopted by the Obama
administration is infused with normative language and promotes a liberal agenda that by
and large benefits the United States and its allies. China and Russia seek to match the
West’s superiority in this crucial dimension of power, especially since it is much less
expensive to increase normative capabilities than military ones. The potential payoff of
achieving political interests through a normative strategy also could be greater than using
destructive force, something Gramscian theorists have recognized on their writings about
hegemony and legitimacy.
From a military standpoint, Russian Gen. Gareyev makes a similar observation:
“In order to achieve greater rationality in our actions it is necessary to respond to
emerging threats more flexibly and, whenever possible, not with direct but with
asymmetric measures. Military force must not be resorted to unless every other means
has been exhausted [emphasis added].’’515 Avoiding military conflict and achieving
strategic objectives can be achieved through political, economic, diplomatic,
informational and other non-military means and methods, according to Gareyev.
China, too, is forming its own normative agenda and incorporating it into its
overall grand strategy. Zheng Bijian, former vice president of the CCP Central Party
School and former senior policy advisor for President Hu Jintao, has promoted extending
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Confucianism to diplomatic ideas.516 Confucian norms, according to Bijian, include
principles such as “live peacefully with neighbors, bring prosperity to them, and provide
safety to them” and build a “harmonious world. … This is clearly different not only from
Marxism-Leninism but also from realism and liberalism in international politics. Through
greater systemization, China plans to re-establish Confucianism as an inherently Chinese
value and vision. In fact, some Chinese opinion leaders have openly revealed this
agenda.”517 The joint ‘Russian-Chinese Declaration on the Multipolar World and the
Establishment of a New International Order’ demonstrates the mutual goals of China and
Russia to create additional poles of power in the system, each with its own set of norms.
Political intrigue and machinations are not new to international politics. However,
new tactics and strategies have evolved apace with technological innovations and
systemic changes such as globalization. Chinese and Russian strategists have adapted
their military doctrines to incorporate soft power, given the role norms play in the current
international system. States cannot rely on traditional hard power alone to balance one
another. Norms are increasingly becoming a source of capabilities for great powers that
can be deployed just as effectively as military assets. The Sino-Russo strategic
partnership is an example of how soft power can be integrated into military strategy and
exploited in an overall soft balancing strategy.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION: REASSESING NORMS IN GRAND STRATEGY
In this study I have endeavored to achieve two objectives – one theoretical, the
other empirical and analytical. In regards to the former, the goal was to develop a
rigorous definition of soft balancing than found in the existing literature and integrate it
more fully in the overall balance of power framework. Current formulations of soft
balancing suffer from indeterminacy or drift too far from the essence of balance of power
theory, which largely concerns security matters. Developing a framework that focuses on
logics of balancing based on systemic configuration gives theoretical footing to soft
balancing rather than ad hoc explanations based on the capriciousness of contemporary
politics. Such a conceptual framework identifies the major mechanisms behind balance of
power outcomes (system polarity) and the types of balancing expected under each logic:
alliances, arms buildups and soft balancing (alignments). Furthermore, this study
explicated the conditions under which soft balancing likely would operate and a method
to identify patterns of behavior derived from the theory, for example the use of regional
complexes as buffers or insulators to hegemonic interventions.
As for the latter goal, this study has sought to demonstrate the empirical evidence
for initial soft balancing in Central Asia and the utility of soft balancing as an analytical
framework for geopolitics. Through the SCO, Beijing and Moscow have called for a
timetable for the removal of U.S. military troops from the Central Asia and have
supported the smaller authoritarian members in their quest for international legitimacy.
These moves include support for Uzbekistan’s eviction of U.S. troops from Uzbek
territory and continued pressure on the Kyrgyz government to boot NATO and U.S.

197

troops from the Manas airbase. Diplomatically, China and Russia have continued their
efforts to reduce American political influence in the region by co-opting the leaders of the
smaller republics and building regional institutions such as the SCO, which is one of the
few, if not only, major regional security organizations in the world without direct U.S.
participation.518
Analytically, the study has sought to develop a robust definition and
methodological framework to determine whether soft balancing is occurring in a specific
instance. The definition provided in this study has gone further than those found in the
existing literature by rethinking norms as a capability.519 Re-conceptualizing norms (or
soft power) along these lines distinguishes hard balancing from soft balancing. Instead of
trying to increase relative strength through internal arms buildups or alliances, states
faced with overwhelming hard power can develop and increase their soft power assets to
restrain a superpower. Such a strategy is much more cost effective than costly internal
balancing and less perilous than risky alliances. Furthermore, soft balancing is unlikely to
draw the “focused enmity” of the reigning hegemon, which reduces the potential for
defections. For these reasons, soft balancing (whether acknowledged or not by the
balancers) is the ideal strategy for states that are not currently worried about physical
attack by a hegemonic power, but rather are looking for ways to counter the objectives
and preferences of the hegemon.
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Making hard and soft balancing analytically distinct also will help policymakers
and scholars avoid possible misperception in international politics. Because of its indirect
nature, soft balancing could easily be overlooked. In fact, some scholars argue that there
is little or no evidence for the concept. I argue the opposite and demonstrate the necessity
of analytically distinguishing between hard and soft balancing. If soft and hard forms of
balancing are not kept distinct, there is the possibility of misinterpretation of behavior.
For example, actions by China and Russia to counterbalance norms might be
underestimated and dismissed because they are indirect and therefore difficult to perceive
or quantify. On the other hand, conflating all forms of balancing into the traditional
variety could lead to an overestimation of Chinese and Russian motives and capabilities,
leading to unnecessary confrontation, escalating tensions and spiraling security
dilemmas.
Furthermore, it is important that scholars begin to recognize that the distribution
of norms in the international system can serve as a causal mechanism for alignment
formation. In fact, norms are becoming a crucial capability in geopolitics. The fear stoked
in Russia and China by the spread of the Color Revolutions, for instance, demonstrates
the efficacy of soft or normative power. The fallout from these movements impelled the
leaders in Beijing and Moscow to counter these “revolutions” with their own alternative
norms of “sovereign democracy.” The states involved in these “revolutions,” although
small and minor, are strategically significant. Some, for example Georgia, are vital to
Western-proposed oil and gas pipeline routes that would bypass Russia if ever
constructed. Others, such as Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, provide basing for the United
States in proximity to China and Russia, both of which consider such bases forms of
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encirclement regardless of American denials. The Ukraine, another strategically
important state that faced a Color Revolution, had been considered for possible
membership in NATO.
Intermittent opposition by Russian and Chinese to Color Revolutions could be
dismissed as simple diplomatic friction, but this does not appear to be the case. There is
consistent resistance by Beijing and China to the spread of Western norms, particularly
within their sphere of influence, and their attempts to block such ideologies have been, in
part, through normative means such as strong support for sovereignty and nonintervention. Concrete examples of alternative norms include the creation of observers in
the SCO to officially sanction elections among its members, almost all of which have
been disputed by Western organizations. Many of these leaders are allies of Moscow and
Beijing, and their demise would increase Western leverage with the smaller states at the
expense of Russia and China. The overarching concern for Beijing and Moscow,
however, is that Western norms of democratization and human rights will infiltrate their
own borders, setting off protests and demonstrations that could lead to political
instability, or worse, the overthrow of their own regimes. The spread of norms, in this
case, parallels the projection of other capabilities that can threaten regime survival.
Success or Failure: The Result of Soft Balancing
From “strategic partnership” to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the soft
balancing alignment between Moscow and Beijing has manifested itself in a number of
ways. The fact that the alignment has lasted for nearly a decade despite the myriad of
external and internal factors that could undermine it is testament to its endurance.
However, longevity itself does not a success make. Nevertheless, there are achievements
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that can be pointed to. The transformation of the SCO into a major international actor
stands as one of the major accomplishments of the alignment. Coordination in venues
such as the United Nations Security Council is another area of mutual benefit for Russia
and China in regards to curtailing U.S. preferences. Such coordination includes their joint
opposition to what they refer to as American “hegemonism” – or the intervention of the
United States in the sovereign affairs of other states, for example their strong opposition
to the Iraq War.
On the military front, Russia and China increasingly have focused on soft power
assets in their defense modernization efforts to counterbalance U.S. superiority. Moscow
continues to supply China with some of its most advanced weaponry despite latent
tensions that exist between the two powers and concerns that Russia is feeding the beast
on its doorstep. Both states have sought to build relations with emerging powers in the
Middle East, Africa and Latin America to increase their global influence and power
projection capabilities.520 Institutionally, Russia has partnered with China via the SCO to
undermine and perhaps reverse the U.S. military presence in Central Asia.521 These
strategic objectives are consistent with balance-of-power theory, although the means to
achieve them are non-traditional. Such a strategy doesn’t combine military forces in an
alliance, but rather combines soft power assets such as diplomacy to restrain the United
States from imposing its preferences.522
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Although the formation of a soft balancing alignment could be viewed as a
success in its own right, the strategy has had mixed results in regards to restraining
American power. The United States still retains its military presence in Central Asia,
albeit a reduced one given its eviction from Uzbekistan. China and Russia have not been
able to transform the system from one of unipolarity to multipolarity primarily through
soft power means, although the purpose of soft balancing is not necessarily systemic
transformation but rather preference setting. Nonetheless, the evidence appears clear that
China and Russia are each other’s closest partners and that their partnership is directed at
the United States, something recognized by U.S. defense analysts.523
The partnership itself could lay the groundwork for a future hard-balancing
strategy against the United States if Washington returns to the aggressive unilateralism of
the past Bush administration. It also could transform into an axis that emerging powers
such as Iran and Venezuela could gravitate around.524 The so-called BRIC states are
widely viewed as a potential bloc to counter the United States and its Western allies, and
Russia and China could serve as the nexus that binds them together.525 However, soft
balancing theory, as with balance of power theory overall, cannot be judged solely on
whether the alignment or alliance achieves its goals. Theory predicts that given certain
conditions, alignments or alliances will form. It cannot predict the efficacy of such
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alignments. Notwithstanding their unpredictability, unsuccessful alliances and alignments
can teach scholars much about the world. “Even if soft balancing efforts fail,” writes
Christopher Layne, “they are important for two reasons. First, they indicate that other
major states regard U.S. geopolitical dominance as a problem that needs to be addressed.
Second, soft balancing efforts to rein-in American power may help the other major states
learn to cooperate in ways that will the open the door to future hard balancing against the
U.S.”526
The SCO in Geopolitical Context
Situating the SCO within the context of soft balancing helps clarify its role as an actor
in international and regional affairs and eliminates much of the confusion about its place
within the global balance of power. The SCO is neither an “axis of evil” nor simply a
“paper tiger.” The organization is not a “club of dictators,” as it is sometimes ridiculed,
although it does support authoritarian regimes. Rather, it has adopted the alternative
doctrine of “sovereign democracy,” which treats foreign support for domestic democratic
movements and nongovernmental organizations as a form of external meddling in the
internal affairs of its members.527 Although the SCO was largely a creation by Beijing,
Moscow has been the main driver in trying to turn the organization into a pole or bloc
that can counterbalance U.S. interests in Central Asia.
This arrangement is acceptable to China, which prefers to take a backseat in this
regard. Russia is too weak to serve as a traditional alliance partner for China and Beijing
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commands far greater strategic maneuverability than Moscow.528 Nevertheless, Chinese
leaders continue to see ties with Russia from the perspective of Beijing’s relative position
in the international system. “For China, cooperation with Russia helps to promote greater
multipolarity and multilateralism, lessening U.S. influence. Russian leaders share
Chinese elites’ discomfort with U.S. power and relative predominance, in particular with
the U.S. perceived penchant for military alliances, regime change, democracy promotion,
and unilateral diplomatic and military actions.”529
The Endurance of the Strategic Partnership
As long as the status quo – unipolar and hegemonic – remains in place, the strategic
partnership between Russia and China is likely to endure. Offensive realist theory
predicts that interventions by an external hegemonic power will likely trigger
countervailing coalitions, though not the traditional alliances formed in the past. And
balance of threat theory argues that distribution of capabilities and threats play a role in
alignment and alliance formation. Empirical evidence appears to back both positions. If
norms are viewed as a system-wide capability, a concentrated distribution of normative
power in the hands of the unipole can be as threatening as a concentration of hard power
(in this case, both forms of power are concentrated in the hands of the hegemon). This is
increasingly true in Central Asia, where the United States has aggressively promoted its
liberal agenda, which includes support for democratization and Western norms of human
rights. For states facing a hegemonic power, threats can emanate across any of the three
dimensions of power – military, economic or normative. Traditional realist theory has
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neglected the latter category, which is an important aspect of contemporary international
politics.
To be sure, traditional security concerns still play a role. Beijing and Moscow not only
fear Western norms, but encroachment on their borders by the U.S. military and NATO.
Each state feels hemmed in by Washington and its allies, which have systematically
encircled China and Russia with forward bases, whether consciously or no. The concern
of encirclement remains irrespective of changes in U.S. presidential administrations.
Despite an attempt by President Obama to “reset” relations with Russia, Moscow remains
conjoined with Beijing in its opposition to American hegemony, including Obama’s
revamped theater missile defense program.530 Pointedly, neither China nor Russia trust
American motivations.
Although primarily normative in nature, soft balancing is reflected in Chinese and
Russian defense doctrine, too. The major objective of Chinese defense strategy is to deny
the United States military or naval access to its territories and coastlines.531 Russia’s
strategic objective is to retain nuclear parity with the United States while increasing its
capabilities in the areas of command and control and providing an alternative set of
norms to counter Western ideas. As detailed in Chapter Six, these strategies aim at
American vulnerabilities rather than directly focused on balancing U.S. military
supremacy. Particularly, they focus on creating or maintaining regional security
complexes, where states could attain greater freedom of maneuver, and diplomatic
measures, such as pressuring regional states that host U.S. forward bases.
530

Gilbert Rozman, Chinese Strategic Thought Toward Asia, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010).

531

China is purportedly developing the Dong Feng “carrier-killing” missile in an attempt to deny the U.S.
Navy access to the South China Sea, which Beijing claims exclusive sovereignty over.

205

Overall, the strategic partnership, whether through the SCO or the United Nations,
provides states with a different security arrangement than in the past. In fact, narrowly
conceived in their geopolitical context, strategic partnerships could be viewed as a new
model of alliance and alignment formations. These alignments rely mainly on diplomatic
measures to stymie the goals of the hegemonic power, but they could be strengthened in
the event of changing international circumstances. Realist international relations theory
has failed to keep pace with these changing developments in global politics; however,
viewing the strategic partnership along the lines of alliance and alignment politics
integrates new forms of balancing strategy into the realist tradition without undermining
realist theory.
Implications for U.S. foreign policy
For U.S. policymakers, soft balancing might be difficult to discern. However, its
implications are far-reaching. Although American military power makes the United
States secure from any existential threat, regional alignments could undermine U.S.
interests around the globe. In this sense, hegemony suffers from its own internal
contradictions. America’s role as the only global superpower inevitably involves it in
almost every region of the world; yet U.S. intervention is likely to result in a backlash
from disaffected regional powers. To redress this, U.S. policymakers should make
prudent use of America’s role as an off-shore balancer. The United States should only
intervene in regions of strategic interest, and only then when potential hegemons threaten
to overrun the regional balance of power. Additionally, retrenchment of U.S. forces from
areas of little strategic value could likely preclude any attempts at soft balancing, at least
for the foreseeable future.
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Furthermore, American policymakers must recognize that a normative-driven
foreign policy can lead to reactionary blowback.532 The Bush administration made
democratization a pillar of its foreign policy, which alienated potential partners in the
“war on terror.” The administration of President Barack Obama continues this liberal
tradition, albeit in a more multilateral fashion. Nevertheless, U.S. policymakers must
rethink the aggressive promotion of democracy without abandoning core American
values in the process. Such a “realist” policy would admittedly be difficult to implement
because the very nature of hegemony involves at least some management of the
international system. Neoclassical realism, liberalism and Gramscians all argue that
domestic political considerations in the United States factor into its normative-driven
foreign policy. Overcoming such considerations might be difficult, but Obama has made
it a point to project a benign face of American power abroad, which might alleviate,
though not fully eliminate, soft balancing by other great powers.
Whether China and Russia can sustain their “strategic partnership” or “marriage
of convenience” depends largely on U.S. foreign policy. A return to American
unilateralism practiced from 2001-2008 could harden the Sino-Russian alignment into a
formal alliance, no matter who is president in the United States. However, a more
multilateral approach that respected Russia and China’s sphere of influence in Central
Asia and along their borders would make the partnership largely unnecessary.533
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For doubters of soft balancing, the Sino-Russo “strategic partnership” offers
compelling evidence to the contrary. Despite a number of potential pitfalls that could
afflict Chinese-Russian relations, from Han immigration into Russian Siberia to the rapid
pace of Chinese military modernization, external factors have forged an axis of
convenience between the two great powers. These exogenous variables don’t just include
U.S. military and economic superiority, but American norms and values, too. From this
author’s standpoint, it would take a significant change at the systemic level for the
strategic partnership to break up. For example, if China were to emerge as a second
superpower, Russia might tilt to the West rather than become Beijing’s junior partner.
The status of India, Japan and Europe Union could affect the regional balance of power in
Eurasia as well, pushing Russia and China closer together or pulling them apart based on
differing dynamics. Despite these different scenarios, the United States remains the major
factor in affecting the Sino-Russo partnership because the alignment is intrinsically tied
to the structure of the international system.
Implications for theory
The concept of soft balancing should go a long way in improving International
Relations theory. Since the time of E.H. Carr, there has been tension between those who
advocate a materialist interpretation of international politics and those who support an
idealist version. This tension need not exist, at least if scholars of international politics
rethink norms as capabilities. From this standpoint, norms can be used as an asset in a
state’s strategic arsenal. As neoclassical realism argues, such norms are based on the
unique domestic characteristics of each state. Theorists of hegemony – realists, liberals
and Gramscians – argue that powerful states will attempt elevate their domestic norms to
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the systemic level. Once elevated, norms can create systemic structures if they are
codified and create “rules of the game” that constrain actor behavior, a position taken by
many constructivist scholars. Institutions embody and legitimate the rules of the
hegemonic power and can even absorb counterhegemonic ideas.534
Similar to other capabilities, norms can provoke balancing alliances or alignments
based on levels of concentration and/or threat. Powerful states can commit great amounts
of resources on normative expenditures, such as foreign aid, support for NGOs and
media. Additionally, norms can provide an ideological substance for a state’s foreign
policy. When the Cold War ended, for example, the United States adopted “human
rights” to replace “anticommunism” in its ideological arsenal. Although the concept of
human rights “refers to transcendental abstractions … the fact that it is universal rather
than particular is essential for it to serve as a platform for the transnational projection of
foreign policy.”535 In this case, the projection of ideals could be a potential threat,
particularly when such ideals can challenge the legitimacy and authority of rival states.
Indeed, Kenneth Waltz admonition against maximizing hard power continues to hold true
for soft power: states should make prudent use of their normative capabilities to avoid
provoking balancing coalitions, whether hard or soft.
What the Future Holds for Soft Balancing
For the foreseeable future, traditional balance of power theory is unlikely to
explain great power behavior because contemporary systemic dynamics differ from those
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of past. Therefore, if scholars and analysts wish to explain how states respond to
concentrations of power under unipolarity, they must find alternative frameworks that
correspond to differing systemic logics. The status of the United States is unique; there
have been few states or empires to accumulate the power that is concentrated in its hands.
International Relations theory must catch up to these changing realities by developing
cutting edge theories that don’t focus solely on material capabilities and that can deftly
respond to the nuances of globalization.
Furthermore, scholars are beginning to recognize the importance of norms as an
important variable in international politics. Realists have been behind the curve in this
regard, disregarding the strategic value of normative power. My study has attempted to
break ground by systematically demonstrating the importance of norms or soft power as a
valuable asset. I do not argue that the use of norms is a better (or worse) strategy than
using hard power. Both have their benefits and limitations and concentrations of either
can provoke balancing by other states. However, recent events in international politics
continually point to norms as a great source of consternation for states. The balance of
military capabilities will continue to hover in the background, setting the base of the
strategic balance. Norms, however, are the superstructure. In the Marxist sense, this
relationship between the base and structure is reciprocal. Hard power provides the basis
for a normative superstructure, which reinforces the material base. It is the superstructure,
however, that major powers currently are concerned with.
In practical terms, theory will have to account for the way states respond to the
superstructure of international politics when the base is essentially unassailable, as it is
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under unipolarity.536 In other words, when the military balance overwhelmingly favors
one power, how can states not allied with the unipole create conditions favorable to their
interests? How can they “change the rules” of the game without changing the power base
from which the rules emanate? The case of China and Russia finds that great powers that
can’t forcibly rewrite rules will try to develop alternatives. To do this, they will seek to
carve out their own space within the system – their own regional spheres where they can
set preferences to their liking.
The trend towards increased regionalization and norm proliferation in the
international system supports this contention. In the future, states will rely on such
subsystems to buffer the reach hegemonic power. These subsystems can create rules that
benefit states seeking greater autonomy. In fact, as Western-led globalization continues to
spread, emerging powers dissatisfied with the status quo are likely to adopt soft balancing
strategies to unshackle themselves from an economic and political system they do not
believe benefit their interests and consider detrimental to their culture and social systems.
These strategies will require the accumulation of normative capabilities to attract minor
and midlevel powers interested in forming such subsystems. Scholars no longer need to
wait for evidence of balancing against the United States. Soft balancing is here, and it is
likely to be the wave of the future.

536

Changing the superstructure of the international system has been a concern of critical theorists and neoMarxists, who generally view the capitalist world economy as oppressive. Unlike these theorists, realists
refrain from making value judgments about which political-economic systems are ideal for humanity as a
whole. To put in other words, realists are more concerned about what strategies states might use to overturn
or transform international systems rather than which system is preferable.
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